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FOREWORD
The Hon. Mr Justice Mahoney
I am grateful to Mr Anderson, S.M., for asking me to write an in-
troduction to the published papers of the Seminar “Problems of Delay in
Criminal Proceedings", because I think this Seminar marks clearly prob-
lems with which, most urgently, those involved in the administration of
criminal justice must deal.
As a perusal of the papers will show, the structure of the Seminar was
well planned. There were two main papers and three Discussion Papers. The
two main papers (“Problems of Delay in Criminal Proceedings in the
Supreme and District Courts” by Mr John Hogan; and “Problems of Delay
in Criminal Proceedings in the Magistrates’ Courts” by Mr B. R. Brown,
S.M.) dealt respectively with the delaysdn jury and non-jury courts. Each of
these papers was supported by commentators from different ends of the Bar
Table (Mr W. D. Hosking, Deputy Senior Public Defender, and Detective
Inspector R. J. King upon the first paper; Mr C. J. Bone, Deputy Public
Solicitor, Sgt. 0. Taylor, Police Prosecutors’ Branch, and Mr M. B. Grove,
Q.C., upon the second). The Discussion Papers raised possible remedies for
delay in the proceedings. The first Discussion Paper (Dr G. L. Certoma of
the Sydney University Law School) discussed criminal procedure in Italy.
The second (by Mr E. Sikk, S.M.) discussed, inter alia, the imposition of a
time limit for the conclusion of criminalproceedings. The third (by Mr J.
Parnell, S.M.) proposed that all offences be tried by one level of first in-
stance courts, with provision for review and limited appeal and, perhaps,
the restriction of jury trials for certain crimes involving specific intent.
The matters raised in the papers and the commentaries, and by those
who spoke at the Seminar, were many and varied and there was, I think, no
single theme. In retrospect, I would see the Seminar as important for two
main reasons: for what was said (and not said) about delay in criminal pro-
ceedings in this State; and for the insights it gave into the general problems
of judicial administration.
Delay in criminal proceedings is socially corrosive and it is important
that it be publicly discussed. That which the criminal law does is, on the one
hand, to protect person and property and, on the Other, to protect the
liberty of those who, to this end, are arrested and to ensure that they are not
overlong in jeopardy. The effectiveness of the law depends upon public
confidence that it is doing what it should do. If people, sufficiently and in
sufficient numbers, cease to have that confidence, the force of the law will
be destroyed. And there are few things more calculated to destroy that
confidence than long delay in criminal justice.
In an ideal Seminar (which had no restrictions as to time or finance)
one would expect the papers and the discusson to do, inter alia, four things:
[0 detail the facts; to identify the delays; to propose the remedies; and, upon
an assessment of the extent of the delay, indicate the urgency of the
problem.
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The paper presented by Mr B. R. Brown, S.M.,
was most interesting.
Mr Brown was able to present raw data as to t
he delay in Magistrates‘
Courts and as to when and where it occurred
. He proceeded from this to a
categorisation of the delays which have occurred
and he then suggested
remedies for some of them. Those who have bee
n involved in the ad-
ministration of the Magistrates‘ Courts are to be c
ongratulated on having
had the facilities, the finance, and the enthusiasm nec
essary for the prepara-
tion of these details.
Similar data was nOl able to be presented as to
the delays in the
Supreme Court and the District Court. As Mr H
ogan pointed out, in his
new office, he is only now able to start the develop
ment of a “statistical
capability”. The presentation of precise and partic
ular data as to delay in
these courts would have enabled a better judgment
to be formed by those
present (and by those who, later, will look to the Se
minar for information)
as to the dimensions of the problem in New South Wa
les.
The two main papers identified in some detail caus
es of delay in the
disposal of cases and suggested remedies. The Discuss
ion Papers also pro—
posed remedies. ldeally, the area of delays which we
re identified might have
been supported by statistical evidence, to identify
the significance and
dimensions of each of them. But those who presented
the papers and who
commented upon them represented together a great d
epth of experience in
matters of criminal procedure. It is therefore of p
articular interest to have,
in the record of the Seminar, what they say as to the thin
gs which contribute
to the delay and what should be done about them. A
nd it is particularly
valuable to have the views of those “in the trenches“: the p
rosecutors, the
defenders, and the police officers who are concerned w
ith the preparation
of the cases. The considered views of such people mus
t be the starting point
for anyone seeking to deal with the present problem.
The Seminar allowed less than three hours for the
presentation and
discussion of the papers. Had the time been available
, I would have hoped
to have heard the views of the participants on other as
pects of the problem.
I shall mention two.
First," no assessment was made of how bad (
or how good) the position
as to delay was. My own impression has been that t
he position in this State
is, on world standards, not bad. A comparison
with the position in, e.g.,
England, New York, Illinois. and California, would
have been of assistance
in deciding this. Mr Hogan. itt his paper, expressed
dissatisfaction with the
present position in the District Court and, the qual
ity ofjustiee being, in the
end, determined by what happens in individual cas
es. unnecessary delay in
even a few cases should not be accepted. But a com
parative assessment of
the position here and elsewhere would be of signifi
cance in determining the
extent of the evil and the urgency of the remedy
that is required. It is
fashionable at present to criticise the law and many
of the criticisms are
more colourful than accurate. In relation to a prob
lem which affects public
confidence in the law, it is, I think, important that th
e position be assessed
and stated as accurately as possible. Second, the Se
minar did not enable me
to form a judgment as to how far delays in criminal p
roceedings result from
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inadequacies in the procedural rules a
nd how far from a less than fully
effective use of them. It is right to give at
tention to the terms of the rules by
which people must work, but I have the
conviction that. that which. finally,
determines the quality of the work done
is the person and not the rule: it is
the horse and not the harness that do
es the work. To deal with delay in
criminal proceedings. those concerned i
n the administrative process must
have both the knowledge and the will nec
essary to make the process work.
There was. in the Seminar. no examinati
on of h0w far delay in criminal pro-
ceedings in this State results from inade
quacies in the administrative train-
ing or (let it be emphasised also) t
he administrative facilities necessa
ry for
the work. It may be that we are fortunat
e to have no felt need for extra skills
in this area. If this be so. our po
sition is unique: this has not bee
n the
experience in England or in the United
States, where substantial attention
and. at least in the United States, substa
ntial funds. have been devoted to
improving the skills of those involved i
n the administration of the judicial
process and the facilities available to t
hem. Mr Hogan mentioned, in pass-
ing, pending administration changes and
suggested others. An examination
of these matters in the Seminar might ha
ve had the result of focusing public
attention upon the desirability of those
concerned in the administration of
criminal procedures having ongoing tr
aining and updated equipment for
their task.
1 have said that this Seminar was imp
ortant because of what it
illustrated in relation to our approach to
the administration of our judicial
system. The administration ol'justice is a
growing industry. The reasons for
this are many. nm the least of which is an
increased recognition that each
case. and not merely the system as a who
le. should be expected to yield a
just result. Whatever be these rea
sons. a systematic approach to t
he
administration of it is essential if we a
re to cope with the increasing
demands upon the judicial system. It sho
uld not be the function of such a
Seminar as this to examine whether ther
e is an acceptable delay in criminal
proceedings; nor should it be the functio
n of those administering the system
merely to react to such a finding. Ideally.
the system should be such that the
relevant information is already available.
the relevant problems identified.
and the options for their solution availab
le to be discussed.
The necessity for the systematic and ongoin
g examination of the prob-
lems of the judicial system has been a
ccepted in Other countries. In the
United States. the centres for this purpose
are well-known: The liederal
.ludicial Centre in \\’ashingtou. the Nation
al Centre for State Courts in
Williamsburg. Virginia. the Institute of Judicial A
dministration in Denver.
Colorado. and the Centre for Judicial Ad
ministration and Research itt
Berkeley. California. are some of them.
The arrangements recently made in
England. consequent upon the report of Si
r Nigel Bridge. to provide infor-
mation and assistance to judges in the crimin
al field. is a further develop-
ment. It is. I think, unfortunate that. at
least in New South Wales. there is
no similar centre and that. insofar as they a
re performed. the functions that
such a centre would perform are still to be
undertaken, voluntarily and
without adequate funding, by the Inst
itute of Criminology.
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This Seminar has served a most useful purpose. The Institute, and
those who have participated in the preparation of the papers and the corn-
mentaries upon them are to be congratulated. [trust that it will not be long
before the experience derived from the Seminar is used as the foundation
for a more detailed examination of the present subject.
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PROBLEMS OF DELAY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE SUPREME AND DISTRICT COURTS
John Hogan
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
and Clerk of the Peace for New South Wales
On 16 December, 1934, near Juichin in Kiangsi Province in south-
eastern China, 120,000 assembled souls set out on The Long March — 7,500
miles. Strung in four separate columns, carrying an enormous amount of
goods, the ponderous, amorphous mass moved out of Juichin. lt took aweek to walk from the head ofthe cohort to the rear. On 20 October, 1935,
the remnants of the cohort (only 7,000 survived) arrived at Wuchichen in
north Shensi/ Mao tse-Tung was still in the same uniform.
The trudge to judgment in this State is starting to show some
similarities to Mao’s march; from the time it takes to get to trial even after
committal, very often a year in the District Court, to the clothes the
dramatis personae are still wearing at the end of that time. The accused is in
different clothes when the curtain is finally raised — he has had time to
change. By and large, he does not wish an early performance anyway, and
he usually knows, better than anyone else, especially if he has been a regular
patron of the rhealrum criminis, that an early performance is to be avoided
and the producers and directors will usually accommodate him.
Before proceeding to deal with some ofthe problems of delay, it will be
useful to sketch the functions of my ofﬁce which, since I January, 1980, has
been retitled “Office of the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions and Clerk of
the Peace". Firstly, I am the instructing attorney for the Crown in the
majority of indictable matters prosecuted in this State, and in appeals from
Petty Sessions to the District Court, appeals to the Court of Criminal
Appeal and the High Court of Australia. Secondly, I am, by legislation,
Registrar of the District Court in crime and, although lam not a registrar of
the Supreme Court, my office performs many of the functions of registrar
in respect of criminal matters cdming before that court.
l must say, for my own part, that this dual role is not one which l
espouse and. indeed. since taking office in October, 1978, l have sought to
achieve a division ofthe roles which my office performs. It seems to me that
it is quite improper for the one person to be registrar andprosecuting
attorney.
The change in title is a step in the right direction and is reflected
organisationally in my office by what is presently a kind of biological
cleavage, leading, 1 hope, eventually to a complete separation between pro-
secuting and registry functions.
I mention this matter, not only so that the role my office performs,
which hitherto could not possibly have been gleaned from its former title,
might be appreciated at least in outline, but also because I am of the view
that the combination of the two roles in the one person has been a feature of
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delay in itself. Many of my professional officers who are responsible for
instructing c0unsel and who, in some instances, appear themselves, get bog-
ged down in the performance of registry—type functions. This causes some
delay in preparation of cases and consequent delay at times in bringing the
matter to hearing.
I turn now to a delay problem arising from the non-involvement of the
Crown at Petty Sessions level. There are an increasing number of committal
cases in Petty Sessions of a very lengthy and complex nature. When such
cases have been disposed of in the Magistrates Courts by way of committal
of the accused, the papers then come to my office and the preparation of‘the
matter begins ab initio — my office not having been involved in the case
before. This not only involves considerable duplication ofeffort, very often
a long time after the events which gave rise to the committal proceedings.
but also places my office in the position ol‘ltaving to prepare a matter for
trial before a Judge and jury which, up to that point of time, has not been
looked at in that light.
I can best state my views by setting out part of my submission of 17
August, I979, to the Lusher Inquiry:
I propose that the services of my officers be utilised in the conduct of
the prosecution of selected committal proceedings, as it is my firm
opinion that such a course will react, not only to the benefit of the
Crown, but also be of advantage to the police.
The proposal l am submitting is not entirely a novel one. Quite some
years ago — in the early nineteen-sixties to be precise — the Crown, at
the behest of the Police Department, took over the prosecution of
committal proceedings in difficult and complicated cases. This
operated very satisfactorily for a number of years, until the then Clerk
of the Peace decided that his staff was insufficient to meet all re-
quirements, and regrettably the practice ceased. l have no doubt that I
will be able to make available sufficient staff so that the proposal
becomes a viable one.
Recently, at the request of police, I have made available an Instructing
Officer to assist in committal proceedings of a complicated and
lengthy matter of conspiracy. A number of accused are charged. and
they are all in custody. In the eycnt that they are committed for trial.
they will have been in custody for many months. but. fortuitously, the
attendance of my officer at the committal proceedings will reduce the
period between committal and trial that otherwise would occur.
Adoption of the proposal will result in much closer liaison between the
police and the lnstructing staff, thus enabling difficulties to be resolv-
ed more readily, and time taken itt obtaining statements and checking
out queries reduced to a minimum.
Being in the matter from “grass-roots" the lnsuuaing Officer will be
conversant with every facet of the case. and importantly, there is
.
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greater scope for the Crown to acqui
re information that can become
relevant in reply in the light of what t
he accused raises in his statement
from the dock. ‘
Adoption of the proposal will fac
ilitate the course the trial will
ultimately take. Because of the close
relationship that already exists,
the Instructing Officer will always
have ready access to the Crown
Prosecutor, who will be prosecut
ing at the trial, and evidence cal
led at
committal can be confined to the iss
ues that will ultimately be submit-
ted for determination by the jury
.
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Under the present system, there is unn
ecessary time—wasting by reason
of the duplication of work involved.
The police prosecutor gives con-
siderable time and effort in grasping
the issues involved in the more
, complex cases, carries the matte
r to committal stage, and then b
ows
out. The Instructing Officer takes
over, and he prepares the case
afresh for submission to the Crown P
rosecutor. I think the police pro-
secutor will agree that his time can b
e better devoted to some matter
that he can bring to finality.
-
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l have in mind, in particular, that ther
e are many important summary
prosecutions which the police are a
ble to bring to finality before a
magistrate. They cannot bring comm
ittal proceedings to finality. I
believe the community and the polic
e themselves would be better serv-
ed by the police being able to devote
more time to the preparation and
presentation of cases they can concl
ude in the lower courts. Accept-
ance of my proposal would contribut
e significantly towards that end.
But by far the greatest beneﬁt l see a
ccruing from adoption of the pro-
posal is the elimination of delay tha
t occurs between committal and
trial. The administration of the cri
minal law has come under severe
criticism by reason of the time that el
apses between commission of the
offence and date of trial. Criticism
has been validly made on many
grounds —— difficulty experienced by
witnesses in recalling events of so
long ago -— strain on the accused ha
ving the charge hanging over his
head for such a length of time —
and disinterest by all parties,
including the jury, in events that hav
e become so old. Whilst there are
; .n-tany factors attributable to th
e delay that does occur, it must be said
1 that the delay betwee
n committal and trial is one of
the principal
5 factors. I would envisage
that under the proposed system the
Crown
2 would be ready to proceed to
trial within a short time after committal
.
 
There remains for considering the m
ethod of selection of the cases in
which the Crown would prosecut
e at the committal proceedings. It
should be worked out between the
Chief of Staff at the Criminal In-
ycStigation Branch and the Senior Pol
ice Prosecutor with nominated
members of my staff.
‘
I made mention on page 14 of one o
f my officers being involved in
committal proceedings last year. That
case has been referred to iii the press
as the “Croatian Conspiracy Case“. I
t ran for some 58 sitting days at Petty 
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Sessions and took some 4,000 pages of transcript t
o record the 106 witnesses
who gave evidence. The committal to the District Cou
rt for trial ultimately
took place on 24th October and, although my off
ice had only a portion of
the transcript taken at Petty Sessions, 1 was able to b
rief senior and junior
counsel in the matter within 48 hours of the commi
ttal concluding. The
reason for that was purely and simply that I had one o
f my ofﬁcers in Petty
Sessions assisting the police throughout the proceeding
s. On committal for
trial, the venue was changed to the Supreme Court an
d the case fixed for
trial in April.
The benefits accruing to a more expeditious disposal of ca
ses from this
example are obvious. I hope that the opportunity for
my ofﬁce to par-
ticipate in committal proceedings will continue on a larger
scale.
This paper, according to the title selected by the Institute,
is to concern
itself with delays in both superior jurisdictions. Let me
say at once that
there is little delay in bringing on matters after committal
for trial in the
Supreme Court. It must be remembered, of course
, that nearly all cases
coming before that court are cases in which the accused is in
custody and,
consequently, there is considerable pressure on everyone in
volved to get the
matter disposed of.
There have, of course, been delays in specific cases for specific
reasons.
However, the general position is very satisfactory. The va
st majority of
matters are able to be brought on within three to six months
of committal.
Mind you, we are looking at only about 200 matters
a year arising
throughout the State, whereas the Sydney District Court alo
ne has a queue
of matters awaiting disposal over the last year of about seve
n times that
number of which a smaller percentage are in custody than in Su
preme Court
cases.
Apart from the relatively small number of cases requiring the atte
ntion
of trial by the Supreme Court, there are other reasons, perhap
s more impor-
tant reasons, for the small delay factor in that area. Firstly, c
ases coming to
my office as a result of committal to the Supreme Court, are ha
ndled prin-
cipally by police officers from the one specialised squad, and th
ese officers
have become particularly well versed in the requirements of the
Crown.
Secondly. because of the relatively small number of cases and t
he matter to
which I have just referred, it is possible for my ofﬁce to list these cas
es
within a reasonable time after committal. Thirdly. once cases are list
ed.
adjournments are very rare. No doubt an element here is that, a
s already
mentioned, there is pressure on everyone to get the matter
disposed of
because of its seriousness and the fact that the accused is. almos
t always, in
custody.
There are, on the other hand, significant and disturbing
delays in the
District Court, particularly the Sydney District Court. There has,
of course,
been an increase in work in that court in the last couple of years. T
he A.B.S.
statistics for the middle seventies give the impression of a fairly s
table situa-
tion or even a downturn, no doubt consequent upon the 1974 am
endments
to 5.476 of the Crimes Act.
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My office is only starting to develop its own statistical capability, but a
look at the number of remanets on 30th November, 1979, revealed a worry-
ing situation in the Sydney District Court. We now have approximately
100
more trials in the remanet figure than we did in I977, and that is despite
more Judges, more Crown Prosecutors and some increase in in
frastructure
support. Furthermore, the number of cases coming into my offic
e is in-
creasing at a steady rate, and a goodly proportion of these are lo
ng and
complex. The increasing length and complexity of trials adds to the prob
lem
of reducing the remanet figure. Normally, there are seven divisions of
the
District Court sitting in crime in the City of Sydney. The matters to whi
ch I
have adverted seem to suggest that there should be an examination,
either of
the need for more divisions of that Court being engaged in criminal work,
or whether the present number of divisions is being efficiently utilised.
Since assuming my present Office fhave noted that these seven divi
-
sions are less than fully occupied in certain periods of the year, for exam
ple,
school holidays. This is brought about by the unavailability of many peopl
e
necessary to the proceedings. For instance, police officers are entitled to si
x
weeks holidays a year and, like many other groups in the community
, in-
cluding the profession, should be able to enjoy their leave at times c
onve—
nient to them. However, I do think it may be possible to so arrange the
order of listings to enable cases to be listed during those periods to keep th
e
courts fully occupied without inconvenience to those involved. I might also
suggest here that the present system of court vacations could be looked a
t
with a view to ascertaining whether their elimination would alleviate delay
in disposing of cases.
I have placed emphasis on the Sydney District Court and on trials in
that court. It should not be assumed that delays have not been occurring in
other areas of that court‘s operation, for instance, in Appeals and in the
country. However, efforts have been made over the last year, of an ad-
ministrative nature, to tackle those areas and, I am happy to say, ben
eficial
effects are starting to show. For instance, the number of appeals awaiting
disposal twelve months ago was alarming, and the small number actually
being dealt with each month more alarming. As a result of administrative
changes implemented by my office, with the concurrence of the Chief Judge
of the District Court, the number of appeals dealt with rose from under 60
in March, to 200 in November.
In relation to the country, I have introduced a concept of regionalisa-
tion in my own administration. I believe that decentralisation of an
organisationsuch as mine is desirable in administrative terms. Moreover
, it
enables cases to be prepared locally, eliminating much time consuming con-
tact with Sydney. This reduces delay. In the past fifteen months I h
ave
opened offices in Newcastle, Wollongong, Lismore and Dubbo. An office is
expected to open in July in Wagga. Furthermore, the operations of my of-
fice in the western fringe area of Sydney have been re-organised. Offices
exist at Parramatta, Penrith and Liverpool. Hopefully, an office will o
pen
in Campbelltown within a year. My administration is now divided into t
hree
divisions covering the State. A northern division, based on Parramatta and
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Dubbo, and a southern division based on Wollongong with, as l have said
,
an office to open in July in Wagga.
I might take this opportunity to suggest that the superior courts also
look at a regionalised concept of operation. I mention here that the concept
was strongly supported recently by a team of Canadian Management Con—
sultants, Bob Leighton & Associates Ltd., in their Master Plan for Cou
rts
Administration in New South Wales.
I have mentioned some problems the Crown has encountered in bring-
ing accused persons more speedily to trial. and have outlined some of the in-
itiatives l have taken to solve such problems. I should indicate that a
number of organisational and administrative improvements have been
made throughout my ofﬁce in addition to those already mentioned. These
have all been directed towards efficiency in (administration which has,
as a
central feature, the elimination of unnecessary delay in bringing cases to
finality.
Much of the real effectiveness of the steps l have taken can be reduced
unless complemented by other involved parties. One of these is the profes-
sion.
1 want to devote a little time now to delays occasioned by what i will
call inefficiencies in the legal profession. These take many forms, from the
submission of no bill applications to the Attorney-General at the last
minute, that is. when a trial has been listed and is about to come on for
hearing, to the lack of expedition of the profession in getting on with the
job. There are many instances where it is all too clear that the profession
itself is to blame for delay, not only prior to the trial but also at the trial. In
the case of Brian James Turner and Ors., 61 CAR 67 at p.76, Lawton L..l.
had this to say:
. what we do want to do is to invite the attention of both
judges and counsel to the need to keep trials as short as is consis-
tent with the proper administration ofjustice . . .
His Lordship then went on further to say this:
. . . Trials as long and as complicated as this one was are a
burden upon judges, jurors and accused, which they should nOt
be asked to bear. The public has an interest too. When legal aid
for two counsel and solicitors is granted to all accused persons.
as it rightly was in this case. the bill which the public has to pay
in the end is very large indeed . . .
Long trials place a burden upon everyone involved in them. 1 ant con-
vinced that a lot of the delay in this area can be avoided, if not by a realistic
approach by legal representatives on both sides, then by procedures
specifically designed to shorten trials.
Naturally. everything must be done to ensure that the interests of the
i!
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accused are well served by those appearing for him. Moreove
r, the Crown
has a duty to see that justice is done, and that involves, among
st Other
things, fairness in its conduct of the prosecution. However, I am qu
ite eon-
t‘ident that the ingenuity of man is not beyond ensuring that th
ose factors
are taken into account and, at the same time, the length of the p
roceedings
themselves reduced.
There have been occasions, too, where judges themselve
s have con-
tributed to the delay in proceedings, either by failure to take co
ntrol of the
proceedings in a proper referee sense, or being so concerned wi
th appellate
courts that they allow the proceedings to drift, or, sometime
s, even to
abort. I might observe here that the Chief Justice of the
High Court in
Mclnnes v The Queen (l9th December, I979) has stated
that a trial judge
must also have in mind the interests of the Crown, and o
f witnesses. and of
jurors. As a stronger expression ofthe obligations of a trial judg
e. I turn to
the remarks of Mofﬁtt P. in Steel v. Mirror Newspapers Lt
d. [1975] 2
N.S.W.L.R. 48 at p.52, where the learned President was
moved to say:
. . . The Court remains the master of its processes, and,
of its
Own accord, can and should insist upon proceedings be
ing con-
ducted in accordance with procedures and standards whic
h it
regards as proper and within the proper ambit of the issues
. A
judicial attitude of being a benevolent referee, commenda
ble
though it may at times be, must always give way to the Cour
t’s
insistence of the standards referred to . . .
l conclude what I have just been dealing with by saying this; t
he cost of
the administration of criminal justice in this State is sta
ggering, and it
behoves those who administer it to remember that it is th
e community‘s
money which is being spent, and there should be a proper ac
counting for
that by those involved in its administration, including by the
courts. The
View I have sometimes heard expressed, that there is no such
thing as waste
of judicial titne, is, I would have thought, quite unacce
ptable to the corn-
munity. It should be unacceptable to judges and the professi
on
I now wish to say something about legal aid. There has been a
pro-
liferation of legal aid, and whilst this has undoubtedly shortened
some cases
“hich otherwise might have gone to trial, it has undoubtedly
resulted in
some delay in proceedings coming to trial and in prolonging the tr
ial itself.
I strongly support legal aid. Nevertheless, the rapid proliferat
ion of it,
\xithout appropriate managerial and organisational steps bein
g taken into
account for its effects on the system, has been a cause o
f delay.
Ten/fifteen years ago, the average trial took appreciably less
time than
now. lam of the view that a principal reason for that is legal aid
. Of course,
some may think it is a good thing that trials are becoming longer.
Be that as
it may, they are. and there must be a policy and administrativ
e response to
that fact if the courts are not going to be eventua
lly completely bogged
down with a backlog of work.
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As I indicated at the outset, I do not expect that the vast majority of ac-
cused persons want an early trial and, indeed, one could be forgiven for
observing that there has been a development along the lines of postponing
the evil day as long as possible, with the inevitable well known consequences
that it is much more difficult for the Crown then to prove its case. I believe,
here again, that legal aid has been a factor in accused persons, particularly
seasoned accused, becoming all too well aware of the advantages to them,
and the disadvantages to the Crown, of delay, not only before the ap-
pointed time of trial but at the trial, where there is quite often hot pursuit of
every herring irrespective of its colour and every rabbit to more than one
burrow, habitable or not.
One of the techniques used from time to time, which has had some ef-
fect on alleviating congestion in the higher courts, has been to extend the
jurisdiction of magistrates. The extensive amendments to the Crimes Act in
1974 giving magistrates a wider jurisdiction did have some quite beneﬁcial
effects in relieving pressure on higher courts. Perhaps the time is opportune
to conduct a further review in this area.
One particular crime that might be looked at in this regard is culpable
driving which occupies some 15-20% of the cases coming before the District
Court. The plain fact of the matter is that in the vast majority of these
cases, particularly since Grifﬁth '5 case in the High Court, judges are either
giving bonds, or are not sentencing persons convicted of culpable driving to
custodial sentences for periods which would actually be served over and
above what magistrates presently have the power to sentence in relation to a
number ofoffences, including driving under the inﬂuence. Why then, might
one ask, should the community pay for what, to many, might be seen to be
the luxury of expensive trial by judge and jury which does not result in a
more severe penalty than could be awarded summarily by a magistrate for
what is, very often, the only issue in the charge of culpable driving, namely,
was the accused under the inﬂuence of alcohol?
I am conscious of the social and policy issues involved in this question,
particularly the fact that the object of the legislation was to impress upon
the community the seriousness of the offence. I think we may merely now
be spending too much money and time for too little result in a very signifi-
cant percentage of the work of a superior court.
in any event, I think there is room for streamlining 5.52A in aid of less
delay at trial. For instance, very rarely now is a culpable drive (DUI) case
put before a jury without expert evidence as to blood alcohol. Without go-
ing into a great detail, where there is a death, or grievous bodily harm has
been occasioned, and the police are on the scene shortly after a collision and
they ascertain that the accused has been drinking or they are suspicious,
then the accused is placed on the breathalyser. If the reading is in excess of
.08, then the Crown will try to adduce evidence that, at the time of the colli-
sion, this reading had some signiﬁcance, in trying to establish that the ac-
cused was under the inﬂuence of intoxicating liquor.
In many instances there is not a true and completely accurate drinking
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history prior to the breathalyser as an additional factor for considerati
on by
the jury. Experience has shown that because of the often inaccurat
e drink-
ing history, the expert opinion is such that it gives a range which go
es below
0.1, and goes anything up to, say, 0.16. In these circumstances t
he expert
will not express a firm opinion, and this is no doubt one of the reason
s why
juries are reluctant to convict in this category of case.
It seems to me, now that the breathalyser legislation has been
in opera-
tion in New South Wales for over ten years and quite accepted as p
art of the
machinery of law enforcement, that the legislature might consid
er making it
a specific offence to drive with the prescribed concentration a
nd occasion
death or grievous bodily harm. Perhaps to that end, s.52A might b
e amend-
ed by providing that it would be an offence to drive with the presc
ribed con-
centration of alcohol.
. .
It may be useful now to direct the attention of the seminar to
pre-trial
procedures. I am of the view that some form of pre-trial confer
ence should
be introduced in New South Wales as a means of reducing th
e length of
trials, eliminating unnecessary proof by oral evidence of forma
l or uncon-
troversial issues at the trial, and as a possible safeguard again
st “trial by
ambush" tactics by Crown and defence counsel.
Without treating the matter exhaustively, and as a basis for discus
sion,
I suggest the hearing take the form of a conference between co
unsel in the
presence of a judge (preferably the judge who is to preside ov
er the trial)
either in chambers or in the open court. Matters raised at the co
nference
should generally be settled by agreement between counsel, wit
h the judge
acting as referee and a spur to agreement where the parties are
in dispute.
Some matters to be decided at the conference will be determi
ned by the
judge and be the subject of formal orders.
Obviously, the success of pre-trial hearings depends largely on th
e co-
operation ol' counsel and solicitors on both sides. lt is probable
that the
defence will tend to be wary of pre-trial hearings, at least, initial
ly. To allay
some fears, I would agree with the suggestion by the Criminal Bar
Associa-
tion of England, that an indication by an accused at a pre-trial hea
ring that
he intends to plead guilty on arraignment, should not be used by the
court
to alter his status, e.g. as to bail. More importantly, it is clearly
essential
that counsel be fully instructed (i.e. prepared) before the pre-trial h
earing. I
find considerable support for my view in Studies in Comparative
Civil &
Criminal Procedure undertaken by The Law Reform Commissi
on of New
South Wales which may be found in Volume 2, Innovatio
ns in Civil &
Criminal Procedure prepared in 1978 by Mr J. Bishop, B.A., L
L.M.
(Sydney). In that paper, he refers to some overseas practice and, a
t p.48 of
his paper, makes specific recommendations as to the procedure whi
ch might
usefully be adopted in this State.
Whilst the matter to which I shall now refer primarily affects the
Magistrates Courts Administration, and it may be that M
r Bruce Brown will
be referring to it in his paper relating to the problems of delay
in that ad-
ministration, nevertheless, as the position there ultimately inﬂuenc
es the
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delay in disposing of charges coming before the higher courts, I feel that
some reference by me would be pertinent to procedures adopted in relation
to committal proceedings.
In England and Wales, the Criminal Justice Act l967 (U.K.) intro-
duced substantial changes in respect of those proceedings. Brieﬂy, the pro-
visions of that Act provided for dispensing with the calling of oral evidence
at committal proceedings. subject to certain safeguards being adopted to
protect the accused. These provisions are dealt with in detail by Mr Bishop,
in the paper to which I have referred, at p.49 eI seq. It may be that adoption
of this procedure in whole or in part in this State would provide some reduc-
tion in the time it takes to dispose of committal cases.
I mention a couple of interesting observations which are pertinent to
what I have just referred to. Of the 489 cases listed for trial before the
Sydney DiStrict Court last year, in 124 cases a plea of guilty was entered on
arraignment. In all cases there had been full committal proceedings. In ad-
dition, before being listed for trial, there were pleas of guilty in a further
l0() cases. Again. full committal proceedings had been held in those cases.
I might throw in at this juncture that the procedure under 5.51A of the
Juslit'es Act. allowing an accused to withdraw a plea ofguilty and have the
matter remitted to a magistrate for fttll committal procedures. could be
looked at.
This paper has dealt with what I believe to be some causes of delay in
cases coming before the higher courts, and raised a couple of matters which
law reform authorities might consider as techniques for reducing delays. 1
want to conclude by turning to what I believe should be our aim. namely,
reducing to a minimum the total time involved between when an accused is
charged and the final disposal of the case. By final disposal, I include result
of any appeal. It is one thing to identify delays in Petty Sessions and in the
Supreme attd District Courts and remedies specifically directed to those
delays. It is quite another thing to look at the entire system, and I believe it
should be. as one integrated system of criminal justice through which the
accused can fairly and efficiently travel. at reasonable cost to the com-
ll'lUllllY.
(ioyernments can go on appointing more magistrates and judges and
building new courts until the cows come home. but unless that is accom-
panied by efficient organisational and management procedures. coupled
with a comprehensive (not a piecemeal) law reform programme. the udders
will be finally prodttcing in real terms less and less, but more expensive.
milk.
l mention the simplest but most illustrative example of the sort ofthing
I am referring to. An accused, charged with indictable crime in this State.
can travel through several administrative and legal bottlenecks. First of all.
Petty Sessions opens a file on him. lf he is committed. 1 open a file on him
either in my Supreme Court or District Court administration. If he appeals
to the Court of Criminal Appeal. another file is opened on him and. finally,
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assuming he is a person of stout persistence, the High Co
urt will open yet
another file. Moreover. each jurisdiction has diffe
rent procedures for deal—
ing with him, many of which are prescribed by legis
lation.
It would seem to me that the time has come where the ad
ministration of
justice is such an important social issue, attracting the at
tention of the press
and legislatures almost every day of the week, for thos
e responsible to sit
down and look at the entire system. Whilst that proces
s might take a few
years, I think it well worthwhile. It should not be ove
rlooked by lawyers
that much emphasis needs to be placed upon manageme
nt and administra-
tion. There is not a bit of use reforming the law
without having the
machinery to deal with it efficiently and effectively.
I likened, at the outset of this paper: the process of cri
minal justice in
this State to the monumental disaster of The Long March. Th
e march was
' based upon belief in an ideology. lt was an exercise f
ounded on a principle.
As a practical exercise it was a tragedy because it was de
void of efficient
organisation and management, and totally lacked proper logi
stic support. It
is difficult to see today that there is much left of The L
ong March other
than Mao‘s body reposing in a crystal sarcophagus in the
mausoleum in
Tien An Mien. Any law reform exercise embarked upon
in the ﬁeld of
criminal justice must not suffer a similar fate. Law refor
m must march
hand in glove with good organisation, administration and
management.
The system of criminal justice in this State has tended to c
oncentrate too
much on supporting what seems. at particular points of time,
to be good
principle, and not enough on putting such principle into e
ffect.
Change, of course. for the sake of change is wrong. Equa
lly wrong is
the belief that, because certain ideas and ways of doing thin
gs have proceed-
ed for a long time, they are right. This is especially so in
the theatre of pres-
ent dramatic social change, on the stage of which the
administration of
justice, particularly criminal justice, should be a principal
actor. One ofthe
most important things in this democracy. after the procre
ation of children,
should be the administration of criminal justice. An im
portant requirement
in that area is sound organisation and administration. Th
ere must be good
management of a sensible legal machinery. That machiner
y must surely'lie'
somewhere between the revolutionary courts in Iran. an
d the nineteenth
century Chancery suit described by Dickens in "Bleak Hou
se".
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
John Hogan
Delay in criminal proceedings is a subject which can
expose some very
controversial issues. l see no reason to avoid such is
sues and I hope nobody
else here does. There is little point in holding meet
ings of learned institu-
tions unless there can be frank discussion even th
ough some participants
may be quite disturbed by certain aspects of such
a discussion. The real
beneficiaries of such discussions ought to be the publ
ic. not any particular
vested interests. The public should be those who mos
t benefit from our col-
lective experience and professional training. We live
in a very fast moving
era. Life is becoming increasingly complex and the la
w has to move with the
times and to take account of the growing comple
xity of social issues,
because the law is a living expression of social re
gulation. Society is faSt
making the material world much easier to live in b
ut it is greatly com—
plicating itself in the process. We seem to have forgo
tten that simplicity is
the beginning of all wisdom.
Delays in criminal proceedings are many and manifo
ld. and arise from
a great number of different causes, and, of course. t
he solutions to delays
are as many as there are delays themselves. I have tri
ed in my poor attempt
at racy journalism to indicate some of these matters
that do cause delay.
There are. of course, many others and l have ind
icated that I see the
problem being tackled in two ways.
Firstly, I believe there has to be a very wide ranging
programme of law
reform coupled with Strong managerial and organisati
onal input. It is one
thing to have a law, it is another thing altogether to ma
ke the law work. I
feel that we tend to concentrate too much on the produc
tion of law to con-
form to a particular policy or philosophy, and in that p
rocess we have not
taken into account the fact that we need to make the law w
ork. Nowhere is
that more evident than in the field of the criminal law. It
is not a bit of use
in my view to tackle this problem piecemeal. It has to be att
acked on a wide
front such as a combination of law reform and organi
sation and manage-
ment. Of course. the obvious way to solve delays in crimina
l proceedings is
to build many more courts and appoint many more ju
dges and all the
necessary infrastructure. That in many ways would heal th
e symptoms of
delay, not the cause. But that poses problems, not in the
least of which is to
the government to find the money. Even if we commence
d tomorrow to
build a massive court complex in Sydney it would be man
y years before we
would feel the benefit of having such an advantage. I do not
really think we
can wait that long. If an attack is not made upon some of the
problems that
we do have very soon, we will by the year 2000 be presiding o
ver what I can
only envisage as being a complete shambles.
Some of the matters that l have raised in my paper will no
doubt create
a lot of discussion and some of the matters have bee
n commented upon by
the commentators. There are two other matters in wh
ich I would like to
have the benefit of advice and experience, not only fro
m the commentators,
but from members of the audience.
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Firstly. we do subscribe to a lot of noti
ons in the law that appear to be
regarded like mysteries of religion an
d I sometimes wonder if we know wh
y,
in fact, we do subscribe to them wit
hout question. Some of these notions
are related very much to, the questio
n of delay. For example, consider m
a-
jority verdict by juries. Unanimity of
twelve on a jury is the only thing that
I
can think of in a democracy that is req
uired to be unanimous. I do not know
why it has to be unanimity of twelve.
lt perhaps has some magical biblical
significance. There were twelve tribes
of lsrael and there were twelve beasts
of the apocalypse. I used to think it
had something to do with the twelve
apostles but I abandoned that notion
because even Christ had to put up wit
h
a majority verdict.
The second matter I want to throw in
is our current method of handling
committal proceedings. The delay fa
ctor, of course, starts operating from
the time a person is charged until he
has been right through the process.
I
have in mind a system which is not n
ovel by any means but in which com-
mittal can be done by the presenta
tion of documentary evidence by t
he
Crown to the defence, and superimpo
sing upon that a system of ex officio
indictment. Committal is becoming a v
ery significant part of the delay fac—
tor in the criminal process.
I think that we really have to look at
such matters and try to put aside
any preconceived notions that we migh
t have about how the system should
operate according to time honoured
tradition. We are living in a time whe
n
we have to make very rapid respon
se to the social change. Things are
start—
ing to overtake us in the administratio
n of criminal justice and it is going to
be a long while before we can catch
up. but we must start to do somethin
g
about it now. We have to, in my vie
w, abandon the way in which we hav
e
been treating the whole process of t
he administration of criminal justice
,
which seems to me to be very tnuch like
the old English foxhunt — Tallyho!
there he goes. let's see if we cart cat
ch him! We must attack with a com
-
posite far reaching programme
coupled with a very deep look
at our
organisation and our management.
'
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COMMENTARY
W. D. Hosking, QC.
Deputy Senior Public Defender
The suggestion by John Hogan that “some form of pre-(ria/ con-
ference should be introduced in N.S.W. as a means of reducing the length
of trials" is, to my mind, the most controversial and drastic proposal con-
tained in his paper. it imports a new dimension to the practice of the
criminal law and deserves a better fate than summary rejection. In my view
such a conference should be conducted formally, be recorded and held in
the presence of the accused and in fact be part of the trial itself, although of
course preceding it by some weeks.
Q
Whether such a procedure would save time in an overall sense is
problematical. Much would depend on the personalities involved in each
case. The delivery of, briefs to Crown Prosecutors by the Solicitor for Public
Prosecutions weeks ahead would be necessary. These days informal pre-
trial talks are often not possible because of the late briefing of Crown
Prosecutors.
Further incursions into the right of the defence to say nothing lack ap-
peal. No additional safeguards are necessary to prevent “trial by ambush“
tactics by the Crown. Such tactics would be improper and in my experience
exceptionally rare. The right of an accused to present his defence for the
first time at trial is fundamental. That right has recently been cut d0wn by
statute in the case of an “alibi” defence but for reasons of policy and
commonsense.
Whilst the Crown is a party to Criminal litigation its stake in the out-
come of a particular case can be viewed in indirect and philosophical terms.
To the accused the outcome is seen in starker terms, loss of reputation and
the clanging shut of prison doors. Some accused are in fact innocent.
Plea Bargaining?
The investigation of this vague and proscribed process is inherent in Mr
Hogan‘s interesting revelation that of the 489 cases listed for trial last year
224, or almost half, produced pleas ofguilty. The decision to “fight all the
way" or “brazen it out to the last" depends on many factors, some of
which do nOt emerge until the day of trial. or may arise suddenly when the
matter is listed to fix a date for trial.
Often the Crown or the listing authority are astutc enough to anticipate
the possibility of a plea of guilty and thus another trial can be listed for thc
same day in the same court with no waste of judicial time, More0ver it
would be intereSIing to knew what percentage ofthe guilty pleas were to dif-
ferent or lesser charges. A goodly number I would suggest.
The suggestion by Mr Hogan that the procedures under Section 51A of
m
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the Justices Ac! be reviewed is sound. The suggestion is often
made that the
“reversal of plea" technique is sometimes employed in cases
where it will
never be seriously maintained that the accused is not guilty. If
the section is
being abused a simple expedient, often suggested, would be for t
he judge to
be able to fix a date for trial and not remit the matter for co
mmittal pro-
ceedings. Such an innovation would require a statutory amen
dment.
Delays where the offender is prejudiced
Where an accused is in custody and desirous of pleading guilty to a
n
offence which does not call for a custodial sentence or if it doe
s an effective
one of around six months he has, in general, to wait from
four to six
months and even longer before being sentenced from the time of hi
s arrest.
This is a delay for which in practical terms it is difficult for cred
it to be
given despite backdating, etc. Another matter would be to seek to
achieve
some mitigation of the ultimate penalty. The introduction of
degrees of
murder would enable this to be carried out across the board. The tra
ditional
right of the Crown to grant itself an adjournment by declining to
present an
indictment is another area ofconcern but is not a major problem bec
ause of
the sense of responsibility of Crown Prosecutors.
Suggested Pre-Trial Disclosures to Accused
Upon request all unprivileged information within the prosecut
ion’s
possession (unless public policy requires suppression) includin
g
(i) Names and addresses of all witnesses and copies of
all
statements by them either oral or written.
(ii) Expert Reports (e.g. pathologists, handwriting, ballistics.
etc.).
(iii) Criminal histories — if any — of all witnesses and of the accu
s-
ed.
(iv) Any material which would tend to negate guilt or mitigate the
punishment.
A prevision for experts and witnesses to be available to the defenc
e for
conferences would in the majority of cases save court time and
advance the
interests of justice. Already there is ”pre-trial disclosure“ by the a
ccused in
his interrogation by police, photographing of him in some cases,
the arrang-
ing of line-ups, and statutory requirement to disclose an alibi def
ence and
psychiatric examination by Government Consultant Psych
iatrists often
before he is legally represented.
This suggestion is not as radical as it sounds because much of
this
material would be obtainable on subpoena. Any subpoenas could be
retur-
nable at the pre-trial conference suggested earlier.
Legal Aid
Mr Hogan’s observation that the “proliferation of le
gal aid" is the
principal reason that trials take longer these days may or m
ay not be valid.
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However, it is proper to observe that police investigation is more skilful
and becoming increasingly more sophisticated with the provision of scien-
tific and electronic aids. This makes trials more complex. In the ultimate
this may achieve a saving of court time. Hours and days are expended in the
forensic investigation of the circumstances of alleged confessions. The tape
recording of police interrogations may be the answer provided proper
safeguards for both interests exist. The saving of court time would be enor-
mous and, more importantly, the interests of justice would be advanced.
Culpable Driving
Mr Hogan’s proposals to “streamline” culpable driving trials lacks
appeal. The section is already in strong terms. The so called “proviso“
defence reverses the onus of proof. One might well observe that if the
Breathalyser Experts referred to by Mr ﬂogan are reluctant to express a
firm opinion the Legislature might well be reluctant to intervene.
Might I conclude by saying that the views expressed are my own and
that time did not even permit me to have the benefit of the views of my '
colleagues.
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PRESENTATION or PAPER
W. D. Hosking, Q. C.
I find myself in a novel and happy situation in havin
g the right of last
word so far as the Crown is concerned. N
ormally, as you would all know,
during the course of a criminal trial the evidence
on both sides is called and
then defence counsel address the jury. The C
rown has the last word.
Tonight the situation is reversed.
Mr Hogan is to be congratulated on the construct
ive way in which he
has approached this all important subject. As
a civilization we cannot en—
dure unless we have law and justice in the way we
have come to expect over
the years. But having said that 1 would seek(o so
und a note of very real cau-
tion about suggestions which involve tamperin
g with the jury trial as we
know it. The jury trial is expensive and it is t
ime consuming. It involves
great inconvenience to members of the communi
ty who are called upon to
render service as jurymen, but, nonetheless, it
does represent a very real
bulwark against injustice. Our faith in the
commonsense of juries is
reﬂected by the fact that the verdict which they r
eturn is for practical pur-
poses final in relation to the determination of fa
ctual issues. The sanctity of
the jury system is fundamental and is preserved
for a very good reason — to
guard against, as besr we can, the absolutely appal
ling women of a miscar-
riage ofjustice, i.e., a person who is, in fact. truly
innocent of a crime being
sentenced to a long term of imprisonment or b
eing punished at all. Lest I
am accused of being emotional about it let us a
ssume a person truly inno-
cent of murder is convicted. In those circumstan
ces justice in which we all
seek to play our part is shown not to be perfect
and would have miscarried
to an appalling degree. The only perfect justice.
of course, is divine justice
and being entrusted to human beings circumstan
ces can interact, and do in-
teract. to cause miscarriages of justice. We hav
e the appellate courts and we
have all sorts of other safeguards. but the jury s
ystem is right at the root of
it. In a practical sense the community is playing
its part in the administra-
tion of justice. Any system or any proposal to whi
ttle away to any degree at
all the great rights and authority of a jury wo
uld be one that I personally
would not favour. This overlaps with the proposal
, constructive though it
is. of Mr Hogan‘s that we look at the question
of majority verdicts. True it
is. they operate in England and there is perhap
s much to be said for them.
In my experience with the criminal law on a daily
basis of indictment 1 con-
sider that the need for unanimity by a jury is a
very important part of our
law. Disagreements by juries are comparativel
y rare. In the absence of
evidence that disagreements by juries are a prob
lem which operate to the
detriment of justice I for one would be very mu
ch against any proposal to
disturb the Status quo.
Mr Hogan refers to the presentation of ex
officio indictments and
“abbreviated“ committal proceedings. This
is also a matter which would
require careful consideration because c
ommittal proceedings are, to my
mind, basic to the proper preparation of a de
fence of an accused person
prior to trial.
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Mr Greg Woods, who is a Public Defender and is Director o
f the
Criminal Law Review Division of the Department of Attorney
General and
of Justice, is examining this whole question with a view to ma
king some
submissions to the Attorney General. He circulated widely asking
for views
on the question of some form of abbreviated committal proce
edings with
adequate safeguards. That type of approach, if I might say so, with
respect,
would seem to be on the right track: that a person who wants a full hearing
obtains one or can obtain one. On many occasions committal pro
ceedings
are conducted where there is no real contest. The witnesses are al
most per-
mitted to read their statements or they are led by the police prosecut
or, so
that tendering of statements under those circumstances wo
uld cause no
injustice to anybody. That is the area to which we can look for reduct
ion in
delay.
But having opted for the status qué with one small reserva
tion,
nonetheless, I agree with Mr Hogan that we must in an ongoing se
nse keep
looking at the administration of justice. We are not talking of a
company
with shareholders which must show a proﬁt and be efﬁcient in that
sense; in
the ultimate its efﬁciency is measured by the fact that true justice
is done. 
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COMMENTARY
Detective Inspector R. J. King
C.l.B., Police Department, N.S.W.
Firstly, permit me to introduce myself. l have been a member of the
New South Wales Police Force for a period of 34 years and have spent
the
major portion of that time as a plain clothes officer investigating criminal
matters. I am currently a Supervisory Detective Inspector attached to the
Criminal Investigation Branch, Sydney, and am responsible for supervising
the activities of several specialised squads attached thereto.
My role at this seminar is to act as a commentator on matter submitted
by Mr John Hogan who is Solicitor for Public Prosecutions and Clerk of
the Peace for New South Wales. It is indéed a difﬁcult task to comment on
material submitted by such an eminent perSon as Mr Hogan and I intend to
confine my remarks from a law enforcement officer’s point of view. I do
not propose to make lengthy mention of any legal references because I
believe that there will be others present much more capable in this area than
I. I am pleased to comment on this subject on behalf of police who are after
all responsible for bringing offenders to justice. Without the police there
would be little need for criminal courts and no need for this seminar. At the
beginning 1 would like to stress that my remarks contained in this paper are
my own based on my experience over the past and do not necessarily coin-
cide with police departmental policy unless where official instructions are
quoted.
Before commenting on reasons for delays in criminal proceedings the
exact extent of those delays should first be determined and whether they are
avoidable. I believe that we all agree that there are delays and in the opening
paragraph of his paper Mr Hogan likens the extent of those delays to “The
Long March" in China which lasted more than 10 months. Many members
of the judiciary have remarked on the subject and I refer to remarks
reportedly made by Mr Justice Yeldham in the Supreme Court in November
last year when dealing with “assault occasioning actual bodily harm" and
Other minor charges on 7th November, 1979, and was remanded for com—
mittal proceedings which were not expected to take place until July, 1980.
The accused person was unable to raise the allowed bail of $3,000 and Mr
Justice Yeldham remarked that it would be outrageous for him to remain in
custody until then and reduced bail to $1,000. The justice instanced two
Other cases where he had granted bail against his wishes, because of delays
in hearings at Magistrates' Courts. The justice also commented that he was
aware that magistrates were Overworked with long lists which were becom-
ing longer because of lengthy and complicated committal procedures. In ex—
planation but without criticism he stated that the introduction of legal aid
and the activities of bodies such as the Aboriginal Legal Service contributed
greatly to the delays.
l think we can confidently assume that there are at times lengthy
delays, and proceed to determine the cause of those delays. There will
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always be delays, some of them unavoidable and we can only hop
e to iden-
tify their cause and reduce them to the least possible minimum
. Mr Hogan
sets out in his paper that there is little delay so far as matters li
sted at the
Supreme Court are concerned. I agree with him and intend to c
onfine my
remarks to matters listed for the District Court.
1 would like to say here that it is difficult to confine my remarks t
o the
subjeCL matter of this paper. I am convinced that the delay in c
riminal pro-
ceedings commences from the time an accused person is charged
and con-
tinues through the Petty Sessions Court proceedings through to t
he higher
court until finality. lam aware that others are preparing papers on
delays in
the lower courts but I think it wrong to deal separately with each
jurisdic-
tion whether for the purpose of this exercise or otherwise. The quest
ion of
the delay must be considered as a whole and remedies suggested as a
result
therefrom. lf therefore I transgress on others' area of discussion it c
annot
be avoided.
Let us now consider who is mainly affected by these delays. i believ
e
that the administration of justice itself is the main sufferer because a
s the
delay in the finalisation of proceedings lengthens so does the desire
for
punishment of the wrong-doer diminish. It follows that lengthy dela
ys in
the administration of justice creates disrespect against law and orde
r in the
minds of the community including the wrongdoer himself.
I agree with Mr Hogan’s suggestion that some accused persons, par-
ticularly persistent offenders. are in favour of lengthy delays for reasons he
has set out. As a police officer I am always particularly concerned also
about persistent offenders obtaining lengthy remands and committ
ing
further criminal offences whilst on bail.
I now intend to comment separately on each of the causes of delay set
out by Mr Hogan in his paper and will suggest alternative remedies where
possible. Broadly. I consider that Mr Hogan has most efficiently uncovered
the main causes of delay and appropriate action to lessen delays in the areas
mentioned would accelerate the hearing of criminal proceedings.
First of all, Mr Hogan lists as a cause of delay the dual role performed
by his own department. In view of Mr Hogan's remarks in this regard it
seems obvious that steps should be taken to transfer the duties of Registrar
of the District Court to anorhcr department. or alternatively. to appoint ad-
ditional units to his department to perform this particular duty. I am not
fully au fail with the volume of work shouldered by the Registrar of
the
District Court but it is apparent that the officers attached to Mr Hogan‘s
department should be permitted to carry out their instructing duties without
other distractions.
Mr Hogan suggests that consideration be given to the elimination o
f
court vacations to relieve delays and it is obvious that such action is
necessary ifdelays are to be shortened. I see no reason why all c0urts should
n0t operate throughout the whole year and all officers of the court be per-
mitted to select their holiday periods at suitable times throughout the year
17.
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without affecting staffing problems. This system effective
ly operates in all
other essential services and I see no reason for its failur
e in the court system.
Mr Hogan next makes reference to inefficiencies within t
he legal pro-
fession as a cause of delays. 1 am of the opinion that this
cause does not
only apply to the legal profession. I believe that if a greate
r sense of respon—
sibility in this regard could be impressed upon all parties
including not only
the legal profession, but the prosecution and judiciary al
ike then much will
be achieved to reduce delays. I am greatly impressed wi
th Mr Hogan’s sug-
gestion of pre-trial conferences between defence counsel
, the prosecution
and trial judge to reduce the length of trials by dispensing
with unnecessary
lengthy oral evidence dealing with uncontroversial issues
at forthcoming
trials. 1 consider that providing acceptable and impartia
l guidelines are
devised, such conferences would prove successful in r
educing delays
without interfering with the course of justice.
I also agree with Mr Hogan’s suggestion that even trial judges
at times
contribute to delays by not effectively controlling proceedin
gs and over con-
cern for appellate courts. 1 also consider that Mr Hogan’s
suggestion con-
cerning pre-trial conferences would do much to improve th
is situation.
Mr Hogan also lists the proliferation of legal aid as a major
cause in in-
creased delays and his opinion in this regard is shared by
many others in-
cluding eminent members of the judiciary. Like most othe
rs I support the
legal aid system but agree that there exists a need for respon
sibility in mak-
ing quick decisions respecting its approval. Legally aided
accused persons
should certainly be afforded the best possible representation
but because the
community is providing that service there should be
no waste or un-
necessary consumption of time. The Chief Justice of Austral
ia, Sir Garfield
Barwick. made reference to this expectation in his address t
o the Australian
Legal Convention in Adelaide in July. 1979.
In addition to listing the main causes of delays in criminal
proceedings.
Mr Hogan offers suggesuons to accelerate proceedings. He
requests that his
officers attend complicated and lengthy committal pro
ceedings at lower
courts to familiarise themselves with the brief before it
s arrival at the
District Court. He sets out his proposal at length in his
paper and makes
reference to a matter referred to as the “Croatian Conspira
cy" case where
this course was taken recently at Central Court of Petty S
essions. This par-
ticular matter was handled by detectives attached to a sp
ecialised squad
which I supervise and I am fully aware of great advanta
ge this course will
have upon the impending District Court hearing. There is no d
oubt that the
suggesuon would greatly assist in shortening District Cou
rt trials and in
essence I agree with it and suggest that suitable cases co
uld be selected by
the Senior Police Prosecutor and the Detective Inspecto
r in charge of the
detectives preparing the case in liaison with a nomina
ted member of Mr
Hogan’s staff.
I have tentatively agreed with Mr Hogan‘s suggestio
n contained in the
preceding paragraph although I submit an alternativ
e suggestion for con-
sideration. I do not entertain a great degree of hope
that the suggestion will
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be acceptable particularly to members of the legal profession, but I believe
that it would greatly reduce the time taken to conclude criminal pro-
ceedings. I propose that indictable matters that can only be determined by
judge and jury should be handled at the lower court committal proceedings
in the same manner as “hand-up-briefs” under section 51A of the Justices
Act. This would eliminate the need for the same oral evidence being
duplicated and would only require the magistrate to read the brief com-
pleted by the police officer in charge of the case to decide if the matter
should be committed for trial. Records show that very few of such commit-
tal matters are not committed for trial and in any case the magistrate and
the Attorney-General have the necessary power to refrain from sending the
matter for trial if they consider there is insufﬁcient evidence.
In support of my suggestion I would like to highlight the high standard
demanded in the preparation of “hand-up-briefs” by police and I firmly
believe that such briefs are much more intelligible than the majority of
depositions forwarded from committal proceedings. For the purpose of im-
pressing upon those attending this seminar the criteria to be followed by
police in the preparation of “hand-up-briefs", 1 now quote the following
extracts from Police Instructions:—
Section 51A of the Justices Act is designed to expedite and facilitate
court proceedings insofar as pleas ofguilty to indictable offences com-
ing within its ambit are concerned. The effect of the section is to
remove the necessity for the calling of all the evidence before a
magistrate for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case in such
matters. It has the further effect of obviating the attendance at court
of the witnesses who would be required under normal circumstances
to give the evidence necessary to establish the case. The officer in
charge of the case, or some other member of the Force connected with
the particular matter, must attend the court in question when a matter
under section 51A is being dealt with, in order to assist the Prosecutor,
if required, and to attend to the admission to bail, or return of the
defendant to custody, as the case may be.
Subsection (1) of section 51A provides that a plea of guilty before a
justice or justices under that section cannot be entered where the of-
fence charged is punishable by penal servitude for life. In regard to
such offences, it is still necessary to call all witnesses to give their
evidence orally before thejustice. Whilst subsection (1) of section 51A
provides that a plea of guilty may be entered “at any stage of the pro-
ceedings", it is the practice to take the plea immediately after the
defendant is charged. The defendant, of course, would previously
have indicated to the police his intention of pleading guilty. Clause (a)
of the abovementioned subsection provides that the justice “may ac-
cept or reject the plea”. To enable the justice to decide whether he will
accept or reject the plea, the Police Prosecutor should tender for his
perusal the original copy of the brief which contains statements of all
witnesses and any other necessary documentary evidence. After hav-
ing read the evidence contained in the brief handed to him, the justice
will accept the plea of guilty if he is satisﬁed that the evidence in the
_:
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,matter handed to him supports the charge or charges laid. If
he is not
so satisfied, he will reject the plea. In the latter instance,
there are two
courses open to the police ——
(i) seek a remand in order to gather further evidence b
y way of
statements from witnesses which, with the former ev
idence
available, may on a future occasion justify the acceptance
of a
plea of guilty; or
(ii) seek a remand and call all witnesses to give oral evi
dence which
may or may_ not result in a committal for trial.
If the justice accepts the plea of guilty, then he will commit the de
fen-
dant for sentence to the District Court (Criminal and Special J
urisdic-
tion). ‘ ‘
Police in charge of a matter which is to be dealt with under sec
tion
51A are required to take certain steps to ensure that the case is pro
per—
ly presented. Dealing with the ordinary circumstances associated
with
such a case, it generally follows that after arrest the defe
ndant makes a
statement admitting the offence and indicates to the police tha
t he
proposes to plead guilty. It then becomes necessary for the polic
e in
charge of the matter to secure a remand for a reasonable peri
od and,
during the remand, to collect the evidence necessary to prove the of
-
fence. ln this connection, when taking statements from witnesses
, or
when preparing their own statements, police will ensure that suffic
ient
copies are made to allow the brief to be presented to the Prosecu
ting
Branch in the city or to the District Prosecutor, as the case may b
e, in
duplicate. Each of such copies is to have the usual covering shee
t
(Form P.139A) attached.
lf the defendant‘s statement is in his own handwriting, it m
ust be
copied accurately and verbatim by typing. The exact language and
spelling must be copied. The handwritten statement and one typed
copy is to be included in the brief containing the original statements,
which is referred to as the “original brief". and one typed copy in-
cluded in the briefcontaining duplicates, referred to as the “duplicate
brief". The latter will, after the committal for sentence, be fo
rwarded
to the Modus Operandi Section for filing.
The statements of all witnesses for the prosecution must be sig
ned,
and in the case of witnesses other than police, their signatures mus
t be
witnessed by the police. officers taking them. In taking statements
from witnesses, Form P.19O should be used and for continuation
of a
statement beyond one page. Form P.19OA. The witness‘s full na
me,
including Christian names, occupation and address should be set ou
t
and. in the case of a married woman, the husband’s name a
nd whether
living with him or not. All alterations must be initialled by th
e
witnesses and care should be taken to ensure that each signature
does
not include initials inconsistent with the full name given at the to
p of
the statement.
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The order in which the brief for presentation should be assembled is as
follows:
(i) covering sheet (Form P.139A);
(ii) further statements of charges (if necessary) in chronological
order;
(iii) statement of interrogating officer;
(iv) statements of other police, if any;
(v) statement by defendant, if any. relating to first-mentioned
charge in the brief;
(vi) typewritten copy of the defendant’s statement, if handwritten;
(vii) statement of Owner (where property concerned) or complain-
ant, as the case may be, in relation to first—mentioned charge in
the brief; and
(viii) statements of other witnesses relating to that charge.
All briefs prepared for the purpose of section 51A of the Justices Act
should be forwarded so as to reach the Prosecutor who will be present—
ing the matter to a court of petty sessions at least three days before the
date set down for the hearing of such matter. In complicated cases, a
greater time is required.
All documentary exhibits necessary for an understanding of the case
should be submitted to the Prosecutor with the brief for checking.
This is specially important in connection with certified copies of en-
tries in registers of births, deaths and marriages. ln addition, in com-
plicated cases involving fraud, etc., where a large number of
documents are to be tendered with the brief of evidence, it is of
assistance to the Prosecutor and the court if a comprehensive list of
such exhibits is attached [0 the brief.
Police preparing briefs for tender under the provisions of section SlA
should note that the only indictments to be shown on the covering
sheets to the briefs should be those upon which it is intended to pro-
ceed by virtue of the section. If other charges have been preferred
against the offender, which it is intended should be dealt with at the
District Court by way of placing them on a certificate under Schedule
9 of the Crimes Act and having them taken into account at the District
Court on the question of penalty by virtue ofsection 4478 of that Act,
or, if they be offences to be dealt with summarily, then, although
charge sheets would have to be made out in connection with such mat~
ters. no reference should be tnade to them on the papers relating to the
matters to be dealt with as a hand-up—brief under section SlA of the
Justices Act.
Where a person is charged with a large number of indictable charges,
there is no set ratio as to the number of such charges which should be
proceeded with by way of section SlA or placed upon the Schedule
mentioned, but police in preparing the brief should develop and
prepare cases in respect of a reasonable number covering a cross-
section of the various offences committed.
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As previously stated the foregoing is only an extract
from Police ln-
structions dealing with “hand—up-briefs”, the whole
of which is very com-
prehensive. For instance. I have not set out the instruct
ions regarding multi-
ple offences, co-defendants, method of setting out c
harges. and other legal
requirements.
~
I have quoted the extract set out for the sole purpos
e of stressing the
care which must be exercised by police in the preparatio
n of such briefs and
the confidence magistrates may have in accepting simi
larly prepared briefs
for determining all committal proceedings. I am con
vinced that my pro-
posal along the lines suggested would successfully d
ecrease the delay in
criminal proceedings and if not acceptable at the present
time will be accept-
able in the near future.
Whilst on the subject of “hand-up-briefs” Mr Hogan suggest
s that the
procedure be examined where accused persons be pe
rmitted to alter their
pleas of “guilty” to one of “not guilty". when appear
ing for sentence at
District Courts after being dealt with at lower courts u
nder the provisions of
s.SlA of the Justices Act. This results in the matter
being returned to the
magistrate for full committal procedures and creates a
ridiculous waste of
the court’s time simply because the accused person is only
intent upon being
sentenced by a judge of his own choice. lf the procedure
set out in my pro-
posal was adopted, of course, such a situation
would not occur bttt never-
theless, l alternatively suggest that under those circumst
ances the judge ac-
cept the altered plea and the “hand-up-brief" papers as
a type of ex-officio
indictment and proceed with the trial in the usual manne
r.
Another remedy suggested by Mr Hogan to reduce d
elays is to increase
the jurisdiction of magistrates to deal with indictable mat
ters under the pro—
visions l assume of 5.476 of the Crimes Actor similar
sections. There is no
doubt that similar amendments to the legislature over t
he past has relieved
the congestion in the higher courts but has of course
increased the pressure
on lower courts. As I have previously mentioned howe
ver, the whole system
must be examined if delays are to be shortened a
nd on this account Mr
Hogan's suggestion merits consideration. If the m
agistrates’ jurisdiction
was widened duplicate court hearings would be eliminate
d resulting in an
overall decrease in time taken to finalise hearings.
Mr Hogan points out in his paper that a big percent
age of cases dealt
With at DistriCt Courts are “Culpable Driving" charg
es where the question
of the accused person's sobriety becomes the main i
ssue for deliberation.
Because of this factor expert evidence is frequentl
y called resulting in
lengthy trials. 1 agree with Mr Hogan's suggestion that co
nsideration should
be given for 5. 52A of Crimes Ac! to be amended to in
clude an additional
offence of causing death or grievous bodily harm b
y driving with the
prescribed concentration of alcohol in the bloo
d as defined in the Malor
Traffic Act.
In conclusion I would like to say that the time has c
ome for construct-
ive thought and positive action if delays in criminal
proceedings are to be
reduced to the least possible minimum. To this e
nd, I suggest that a well
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balanced committee be formed as a matter of urgency to inquire into all
facets of the subject matter and make very firm recommendations to the
Attorney-General to implement amending legislature where necessary. A
well balanced committee should include a representative from say the
Magistrates Court Administration, Clerk of the Peace, Law Reform
Commission, Law Society of New South Wales and the N.S.W. Police
Department. l believe that such a committee properly motivated towards
their single goal would achieve success and promote greater respect for the
process of criminal justice.
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THE PROBLEMS OF DELAY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
[N THE MAGISTRATES COURTS
B. R. Brown, S.M.
Deputy Chairman (Administration) of the
BenCh of Stipendiary Magistrates, N.S.W.
During the 19605 the Joint Committee for Effective Administration of
Justice appointed by the American Bar Association adopted the following
statement of its objective:—
Justice Is Effective When —
Fairly Administered Without Delay
With all litigants, indigent and otherwise, and especially those
charged with crime. represented by competent counsel.
By Competent Judges
Selected through non-political methods based on merit.
In sufﬁcient numbers to carry the load,
adequately compensated, with fair retirement benefits,
With security of tenure, subject to an expeditious method of
removal for cause.
Operating in a Modern Court System
Simple in structure. without overlapping jurisdictions or
multiple appeals,
Businesslike in management with non-judicial duties performed
by a competent administrative staff. ,
With practical methods for equalizing the judicial work load,
With an annual conference ofjudges for the purpose of apprais-
ing and improving judicial techniques and administration.
Under Simple and Efficient Rules of Procedure
Designed to encourage advance trial preparation,
Eliminate the element of surprise,
Facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
Reduce the expense of litigation, and
Expedite‘the administration of Justice.
Expedition in the administration of justice occupies a position of very
real importance in all modern concepts of justice. There is also a general
recognition of the need for effective judicial administration to achieve ex-
pedition in practice.
Delay in criminal proceedings in magistrates courts has to be con-
sidered as part of the overall problem of delays within all jurisdictions
presided over by Stipendiary Magistrates. The approach taken in criminal
and quasi-criminal matters is dictated by a desire to preserve recognition of
the liberty of the subject as a cherished principle. Concern for those persons
who have been deprived of their liberty and are in custody by virtue of hav-
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ing been refused bail, or being unable
to obtain the bail which has been fix-
ed, manifests itself by ensuring tha
t criminal charges against them ar
e
speedily heard and determined.
Competing for priority in the magistrat
es‘ work calendar, particularly
in those courts exercising multiple juris
dictions. are matters of urgency oc-
curring in other jurisdictions, e.g., appl
ications for injunctions and infants
custody cases arising under the family
Law Act. These matters of their very
nature frequently also demand priority
over other matters already listed for
hearing. They occur without notice, or
at short notice, and thereby upset
and interfere with administrative plan
ning for the court involved.
But the problem of delay is not a pr
oblem relating only to criminal
Custody cases and urgent applications
under the Family Law Aer. Delay in
the hearing of any cases in magistrates
court‘s is a matter for real question—
ing. For magistrates courts are summa
ry courts originally set up'to provide
speedy and effective justice in all mat
ters.
Some of the questions for considerati
on at this seminar therefore are
these:—
Are there delays in magiStrates courts,
and what are they?
Are these delays acceptable?
What is the cause of them?
What effect do they have?
Can they be remedied fully or partially?m
c
o
c
>
In an endeavour to answer these questi
ons. I examine matters of prac—
tical significance as they confront me in
my administrative role, it being my
function now to monitor the perfor
mance of N.S.W. magistrates courts
(Sydney. Metropolitan and Country
). and to devise and implement sc
hemes
for the better planning and functioning
of these courts.
Nowhere in the paper have I made any
attempt to deal with the matters
raised under any heading in order of im
portance, choosing rather to deal
with them in order of convenience. Obvi
ously certain matters raised will be
seen to be of greater importance than ot
hers. but irrespective of the degree
of importance. all are in my opinion,
worthy of consideration. At times
there may be some overlapping of sub
ject matters but this too has been
done for the sake of convenience.
A. Are there delays in Magistrat
es Courts and what are they?
In the metropolitan areas, including
Newcastle and Wollongong,
delays in the hearing on non-custodi
al cases over the last three years are
set
out in Schedules l and 2 (pages 6| and 62
).
In the c0untry circuits it can be said that
delays have rarely, if ever, ex-
ceeded three months. Generally speaki
ng where they have occurred they
have been confined to Coffs Harbour.
Lismore. Grafton. Katoomba and
Moree. and assistance has been provide
d to overtake arrears and reduce
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delays. To prevent unacceptable arrears accruing in the country, assistance
has been regularly provided. Schedule 3 at page 64 shows the spread of
assistance since 1974, and readily shows that some country circuits were in
greater need than others.
It is important that the data in Schedules land 2 be assessed in the light
of the total work load, including defended cases and the numbers
of stipen-
diary magistrates on establishment strength. This data is available from the
statistics assembled by the Operations and Planning Division of the
Magistrates Courts Administration, and I acknowledge the assistance pro-
vided by Mr R. M. Mathison of that Division. The 1979 court statistics are
not available at the date of writing of this paper. The relevant statistics form
Schedules 6 (I) and 6 (2) and are on pages 67 and 68.
l have attached also for consideration other useful statistics in respect
of the operation of.magistrates courts between 1974 and 1978, althoug
h I
make no further reference to them herein.
Schedule 2 (page. 62) shows that as at January, 1979, suburban co
urts
carried arrears causing delay in non-custodial defended cases to range be—
tween, e.g. eight weeks at Campsie and Newtown courts upwards to 22
weeks at Sutherland court.
Various ﬂuctuations occurred throughout the year attributable to a
number of factors. including additional or reduced assistance, change by
normal roration of magistrates at various centres, and different patterns
emerged later, e.g. Blacktown, which in January, 1979, had a delay of 15
weeks as at November. 1979, had that delay reduced to six weeks, and
Liverpool, which was 16—18 weeks in arrears in January, 1979, was only
eight weeks in arrears as at November, 1979. The court then at 119 Phillip
Street, Sydney (now at St James Centre) had increased delay by November,
I979. to 20 weeks from the six weeks period which existed in January, 1979.
It has been the practice for some years. for matters of some days dura-
tion arising in the suburbs to be heard at Central Court of Petty Sessions.
This has contributed to a situation having arisen at Central Court of no date
being available for the hearing of a non—custodial defended matter of one or
more days duration earlier than approximately five months ahead.
In Other jurisdictions where Stipendiary Magistrates preside the delay
situation is also variable:
~e.e. i. special juvenile court magistrates have no significant delays (five
magistrates preside daily);
ii. Metropolitan Children‘s Court —-— custody and maintenance pro—
ceedings under Family Law Act and other legislation delay
ranged between five and seven weeks throughout 1979 (one
magistrate presides four days per week);
iii. civil claims courts at Wynyard House — the position has
gradually worsened to a current 22 weeks delay (two magistrates
preside daily);
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iv. traffic courts — varying in some suburbs from 9-10 weeks delay
up to 20 weeks at the City traffic courts at 302 Castlereagh Street
(Schedule 4, page 65, shows the delay situation for traffic
courts).
It is expected that further patterns will emerge in the future in respect
of certain courts where different listing procedures and hearing ar-
rangements have been made, e.g. all charge (arrest) cases from the Mer-
rylands police station have been redirected from Fairfield court to Par-
ramatta court. This will cause a corresponding ﬂuctuation in figures at
these courts of some 2000 cases per annum.
Additionally, the rostering of additional courts at Parramatta has
enabled defended cases from other courts, e.g. Burwood, Ryde, Lidcombe
and Fairfield to be heard at Parramatta. Whilst this does not provide a
signiﬁcant reduction in numbers of cases disposed of at the original courts,
nonetheless it makes a substantial inroad into the period of delay which
would otherwise exist if the cases were retained to be heard at the original
courts. The effect of this arrangement was that during November, 1979,
assistance was allocated at Parramatta for the hearing during the period
let January, I980, to 29th February, I980, of defended cases from other
courts as follows:
Lidcombe cases — 5 days
Burwood cases — 4 days
Ryde cases —— 4 days
Fairﬁeld cases — 4 days
Schedule 2 shows that these cases would not have been able to have
been set down for hearing under normal circumstances at their original
court earlier than:
Lidcombe — 24 weeks from the date of adjournment
Burwood —— 12 ,, ,. ,. ..
Ryde — 9 ,, ,. .. ..
Fairﬁeld — lO ., ,, ,. ..
The rather alarming increase in delay at the court at St James Centre
referred to above is to be considered on the basis that the Commonwealth
authorities are seeking to have their cases disposed of at that court (a special
state court exercising Federal jurisdiction) rather than have them heard at
another court or courts, e.g. at Central Court as has been the past practice.
It must be accepted, of course, that there cannot be a uniformity ofap-
proach to cases by all stipendiary magistrates and some magistrates are able
to deal with their case loads in shorter time than other magistrates. Some
think it appropriate to address remarks to a defendant at greater length than
do others, and some magistrates have a longer approach to other facets of
the case than do others. Style and approach therefore, are matters for each
individual magistrate to consider and it is his duty to assess those and other
relevant factors in the light of his ability to carry the allocated caseload.
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B. Acceptability of arrears
In theory, any delay is unacceptable. In pra
ctice, custodial cases are re-
quired as a matter of justice to proceed as
soon as the parties are ready to
proceed. ln non-custodial cases, a delay of u
p to eight weeks is not regarded
as serious, although undesirable, but any
delay in excess of 12 weeks is
regarded as quite serious.
An understanding of the causes of the del
ay is necessary to understand
the significance of setting standards of
acceptability or unacceptability.
Those courts then, which operate at an
unacceptable level can be clearly
seen from a consideration of schedules 1
and 2. The steps taken to improve
the situation are referred to elsewhere i
n this paper.
‘
C. Causes of delay
1. Insufficiency of magislerial numbers
An examination of statistical figures
provides some insight into the
problems of administration of the ma
gistrates courts. The growth in mat-
ters coming before the courts needs to
be looked at in association with the
number of magisterial appointments m
ade to hear the cases.
A table showing the number of magistra
tes available to sit since 1963 is
attached as Schedule 5 (page 66).
The number of appointments of magist
rates as at 3lst December, 1979,
98. shows those magistrates who are
engaged full time as stipendiary
magistrates and does not include the fo
ur S.M.s at the metropolitan Licens-
ing Court or three other persons hold
ing commissions as S.M.s who are
engaged in other non-Bench duties.
Of the additional six appointments ma
de in I979. four appointments
became effective at the start of 1980',
and these have not yet been of any
practical significance or advantage.
The disposition of the magistrates is a
s follows:
50 metropolitan magistrates (Grade 1
)
22 country circuit magistrates (Grade
s | and 2)
5 Wollongong and Newcastle magistr
ates
5 special juvenile court magistrates
5 relieving magistrates
10 traffic magistrates
1 Fair Rents and Strata Titles Board
(providing part time assistance
to the Metropolitan Bench)
It will be understood of course that reli
ef for all magistrates proceeding
on recreation, sick, special or exte
nded leave is provided from within
the ex-
isting number of magistrates. The
schedule shows that there were 92
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magistrates in 1974 through to I979, when the increase referred to was
made.
There was a substantial increase in jurisdiction of stipendiary
magistrates in 1974 by reason of the amendments to the Crimes Act, giving
a right of summary disposition of indictable offences previously the subject
of a district court hearing. These amendments apparently provided some
relief to the delay situation in the District Court, and will no doubt be
discussed during this seminar.
There was also an increase in jurisdiction of magistrates courts in
respect of proceedings under the Courts of Petty Sessions (Civil Claims)
Act.
Q
Notwithstanding the additional work generated in the magistrates
courts by increased jurisdiction, some balance occurred by the substantial
saving of magistrate’s time by the introduction of 5.758 of the Justices Act,
which allowed a shortened form ofexparte hearing in a wide range of mat-
ters (e.g., traffic cases, Local Government prosecutions. Main Roads
Department prosecutions for overloading, Corporate Affairs Commission
prosecutions for failure to lodge annual company returns, etc.).
ln traffic cases, a similar provision had existed since 1965 under s.l8C
of the Motor Traffic Act, which section was replaced by 5.758 of the
Justices Act.
A consideration of the monthly returns of the state of business at
various courts suggests that there was a progressive build up of cases over
the years since 1974, and that the impact of increased jurisdiction, the
numbers and length of defended cases was not felt immediately. This factor
was quite evident at the Central Court where many of the lengthy corporate
matters did not proceed to a hearing due to the unreadiness of the parties or
the unavailability of court time until as long as two years after the com-
mencement of the proceedings.
Schedule (i( l) (page 67) shows a reduction in the number of hearings in
defended cases between 1974 and l978. with the pendulum swinging up-
wards again in 1978, but of course these figures are silent as to the time oe-
cupied in the hearing of defended cases. The figures pr0vided in relation to
numbers and duration of sitting relate to all sittings including list work as
well as defended cases. Nonetheless. there was no increase in establishment
strength from 1974 until I979, when the additional appointments were
made as indicated.
With increases in jurisdiction in civil claims eases expected in the near
future. and with the increase in lengthy prosecutions, no great confidence
can be expressed however, in the ability of the present numerical establish—
ment of magistrates to meet the expected demand of matters to be heard
and determined.
5 f
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2. Gro WI/1 of Dcfended Cases:
Despite the figures in Schedule 6(1) (page 67), to which I referred
ab0vc, which suggests a reduction of hearings of all defended matters, there
has been a substantial increase in work loads generated by defended cases.
This is clearly demonstrated by the figures in Schedule 6(2) (page 68) which
. sl10w a fluctuation in the number of defended cases, between 1974 and
I978.
It can be seen that the figures in that schedule do not include juvenile
and maintenance cases (which I have indicated present no problems of
delay) and that they show that the number of defended traffic cases has
substantially dropped from 7,516 in I974 to 4,957 in 1978. This means that
the increase has been related to cases to be heard by stipendiary magistrates
sitting on the general bench and not in ofher specialised jurisdictions.
The figures detailed therein of defended cases, excluding juvenile,
maintenance and traffic cases, are:—
I974 .................... 8,338
I975 .................... 8,829
I976 .................... 7,991
I977 .................... 10,358
I978 .................... 11,566
The number of cases, dealt with by stipendiary magistrates, has
significantly increased from:—
in I974 ................. 583,090 to
in I976 ................. 632,306 and
in I978 ................. 645,538
In 1978. 19,294 or 2.99% of those cases were defended. There were
19,602 sittings of magistrates courts in I978 throughout N.S.W.
Nonetheless, the defended cases ﬁgure, alone, provides no real insight into
the problems facing magistrates. A wealth of other information lies in the
statistics attached to this paper, but I have not needed to refer to them.
During 1979, defended cases have been of varying duration: e.g., a
Social Security fraud case, which I am hearing began in March, I979, has
occupied I30 sitting days to 3 Ist January, 1980, and is likely to continue on
a four days per week basis until well into I980. (Some estimates suggest to
June, others to September or later.) Other allegations of conspiracy have
ranged in duration from'one to four months hearings.
In the period 30th July, 1979. to 30th December, I979, at Central
Court of Petty Sessions there were specially fixed for hearing 62 cases of
three or more days duration. These are of course in addition to the lengthy
cases referred to above, and an analysis of these reveals the following:—
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l x 23 days
I x 20
l x 19 These cases total 351
days
2 x 15 of hearing or on a five
hour sitting
l x 14 day equal 70 weeks, or
just less
5 x 10 than one magistrate sitting
five days
3 x 7 per week for IV: years.
12 x 5
5 x 4
31 x 3
Estimates of hearing time, made by lawyers for the p
arties, more often
than not are conservative, and whilst a number of th
ese 62 cases have con-
cluded in less than the allocated time, a substantial n
umber have required
additional time, even up to double the time‘originall
y estimated. An atten-
dant difficulty consequent upon such re-arran
gements is referred to
elsewhere in this paper.
A5 at mid-December, 1979, there were already speci
ally fixed 44 cases
ranging up to 40 or more days estimated hearing, f
or hearing in 1980 up to
the end of April, l980. This figure will naturally b
e increased by custodial
cases and other urgent cases coming into the list.
3. Growth of Corporate Crime
Prosecutions based on allegations of corporate crim
e have substantial—
ly increased in the past few years. Whilst I have not bee
n able to gather any
ﬁgures as to numbers of cases, it is clear that these cas
es have occasioned
many lengthy and complex hearings. The increasing inc
idence of these cases
has been the subject of considerable comment in parli
ament and in legal and
commercial circles, as well as gaining considerable medi
a coverage.
Problems associated with the length and complexity
of these corporate
cases, both at Petty Sessions and District Supre
me Court levels, resulted in
part in the enactment of legislation giving powers of
summary jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court.
Elsewhere I make reference to their effect on committ
al proceedings.
Doubtless, Mr John Hogan, the Solicitor for Pub
lic Prosecutions and Clerk
of the Peace for N.S.W., will make reference to th
ese matters during this
seminar.
4. Increases in the Length of Pleas of Guilty
There has been a substantial increase in the time occ
upied for the pro-
per disposal of matters, the subject of a guilty plea, ov
er recent years. Some
of these are related to:—
i. Legal aid -— An unrepresented defendant put lit
tle, if anything
in mitigation of penalty. Since the introduction of l
egal aid,
pleas of varying lengths in mitigation are made. In so
me cases,
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e.g., driving offences (P.C.A., etc.) where loss of license
arises,
a substantial increase in the time occupied by the case h
as occur-
red.
ii. Recent legislation — e.g., environmental and consumer prote
c—
tion legislation, which provides substantial penalties and attrac
ts
a high degree of public interest. These frequently involve lengt
hy
pleas. where expert, technical and other evidence is add
uced.
iii. Increased Jurisdiction — e.g., the recasting in I974 of 5.476
of
the Crimes Act providing for certain indictable offences
to be
dealt with summarily with the consent of the defendant i
n ap-
propriate cases. Many more lengthy pleas in mitigation ha
ve
resulted.
5. Changed sentencing procedures t
These have led to increased time being required and to the inabil
ity of
the court to complete the case on the date of the plea of guilty
or hearing.
i. Pre-sentence reports from the Probation and Parol
e Service:—
The case has to be adjourned to enable preparation of
the
report, which then has to be considered in the light of the ma
t-
ters admitted or, established at the earlier hearing.
If the magistrate constituting the court is not the magistra
te
before whom the plea was earlier entered, further time is re-
quired for a reconsideration by him of the facts and c
ir-
cumstances of the case.
ii. Drug or Alcohol Diversion Schemes
The placement of a defendant as a participant in such a sche
me
causes similar delays as in (i) above.
iii. Use of ”Griffith's Case” Remand Bonds
This requires re-familiarisation with all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances at a much later date. than in (i) and (ii) above.
6. Procedural and Technological Inadequacies:
Matters which I would raise under this heading are included under t
he
same heading in my reference later in the paper to suggested remedial
action
for the delay problem. That reference will suffice.
7. Increased work generated by i. Prison disputes and riots;
ii. Prison escapees on the run.
A considerable amount of work has been generated into Courts of
Petty Sessions over recent years by the apparent failure or inability of the
prison system to:—
a. Maintain good order and discipline within its establishments, and
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b. Keep confined within the prison system, those whose sentences
have not expired.
This apparent failure or inability to maintain good order and discipline
has resulted in a considerable allocation of available court sittings to deal
with criminal charges arising from physical damage to property during riots
and other serious disturbances in prisons.
Hand in hand with this situation, the increasing number of prisoners,
who are able to escape from lawful custody within the prison system, results
frequently in the generating of further proceedings in Courts of Petty Ses-
sions, as a result of the activities alleged against those prisoners, in respect
of their escape and self-maintenance, whilst at large on the run.
‘
8. Loss of Sitting Time due to:—
a. Unpunctuality of magistrate, legal practitioners. police officers
and witnesses.
b. Unnecessary “short” adjournments, due to personal reasons, or
to a failure to recognise in advance foreseeable circumstances or
events arising in the case. Not all unscheduled short adjournments
are unproductive but the time lost thereby can frequently be
avoided.
c. Readiness of some stipendiary magistrates to grant adjournments
for unsound reasons. These frequently take matters out of the list
leaving no work on hand. The matter adjourned goes over to
another date, when an appropriate degree of firmness by the
bench, could properly have resulted in the matter being concluded
that day.
d. Unreadiness of witnesses for the prosecution or defence or of
solicitor or barrister. These matters are outside the control of the
court to a degree, and those charged with the responsibility of
prosecution and defence need to critically examine their role in the
causation of this type of delay.
e. Failure of the defendant charged with an indictable offence to ap-
pear at the appointed time ——
This results in the fact that the matter cannot proceed and there is
a total loss of court time and inconvenience to witnesses.
The late attendance of the defendant with an apparently accept-
able excuse for his late attendance, will probably result in the
restoration of the matter to the list. and necessitate a further ad-
journment to enable the dismissed witnesses to be again produced
at the next hearing, whenever in the future that might be.
 
 
  
49
i. Failure to notify court in advance of intention to change
plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.
ii. Failure to notify the court and other party of intended ap-
plication for adjournment.
iii. Out of court agreement by parties to an adjournment
without notification to the court of such agreement.
How many times could some other practitioner and the court have
properly utilized the time wasted unnecessarily and selfishly?
g. Deliberate delaying tactics by both prosecution and defence. This
is usually seen when one party has been forced to proceed when
his application for adjournment has been refused — he simply
“Bats out time". .
It also occurs where an adjournment is obtained for some dubious
reason, and time allocated cannot be used.
Prolix counsel — who add substantially to court delay by undue
repetition, overstating the obvious, being unnecessarily over
cautious, or perhaps even demonstrating to the client that the
client is getting good value for money.
One can readily appreciate difficulties encountered by counsel in
the conduct of a case, and it is easy with hindsight to be critical,
but many cases ought to be completed in substantially less time
than they actually occupy.
Poor listing procedures and general court administration.
These are to be found existing in inadequate planning and pro-
gramming of work, not only on a day to day basis, but in the
overall management of the court..lt is necessary for the magistrate
to assess in advance the likely work load to be carried at his court
and to plan the spread of work so far as is required to discern and
take into account changing trends in the work coming into his
court.
9. Variations in Approach by individual magistrates
l have already made reference to this topic in considering the “Delay"
schedules attached (Schedules l and 2).
IO. Arrears Generate More Arrears
Parties and/or counsel can take advantage of an arrears situation, by
pleading not guilty to a case. knowing that a lengthy adjournment will
'result. In so doing, they frequently obtain an adjournment which Otherwis
e
may not be granted. The time allocated to the case on the future date is not
usually required, preventing a proper usage of that time.
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l l . Delay caused by Language difficulties
There has been a marked increase in the number of lengthy cases com-
ing before the magistrates courts, in which parties or witnesses are unable to
speak or properly understand the English language.
Despite the existence of a large and co—operative panel of government
interpreters it is not always possible for an interpreter to be present when re-
quired.
12. Court Accommodation
The lack of available accommodation is causing some delay in certain
centres.
A recent reappraisal of available cdurt room accommodation has
revealed almost maximum use of a number of suburbs. So much so, that in
respect of two courts, Manly and Kogarah, the unavailability of court room
accommodation has resulted in arrangements being made for cases from the
Manly lists to be heard on specified dates at North Sydney court house and
for Kogarah cases to be heard on set dates at Sutherland court house.
Whilst this helps to contain arrears at those centres without adequate
available accommodation, it correspondingly reduces the availability of ac—
commodation at the alternate centres for work generated from those alter-
nate centres.
13. Delays occasioned through the introduction of Legal Aid
Let it be said, clearly and unequivocally, that stipendiary magistrates
welcome and support the principle of legal aid being granted to those per-
sons who cannot afford or do not have private legal representation.
The benefits to the person charged, to the court, and to society general-
ly, by reason of legal representation, are well recognized and need no
elaboration.
One may ask, however, would many of the cases now occupying such
lengthy periods before the court, be so lengthy if the defendant had to pro-
vide his own legal representation or appear unrepresented. Clearly the
answer is that proceedings would be much shorter. Obviously the legal
representative fortified by the knowledge that his remuneration is secure,
can expend greater time in probing more obscure matters than he might
have, had he looked to his client for. payment of his fees. Just on that
aspect. it is interesting to note a changing approach now in committal pro-
cecdings. Whereas in pre-legal aid days, committal cases usually were sim-
ply a parade of prosecution witnesses with little challenge or intervention
from defence counsel, now a greater deal of activity from the defence
occurs.
This naturally lengthens the proceedings before the magistrate. and has
played a big part in causing and increasing delays in magistrates courts.
. .
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Criticisms are sometimes levelled, perhaps unfairly. that l
awyers, i.e.,
barristers and solicitors, prolong cases unnecessarily
for their own
pecuniary advantage. However, it is thought that the l
egal aid system is
open to abuse by lawyers from time to time, not necessa
rily directly for that
purpose, but as a consequence of‘ taking longer to conc
lude than before
legal aid was available. Doubtless, there is a school of th
ought, which sug-
gests that it is proper to probe all matters now that direct
cost to the client is
not involved.
Another by-product of the legal aid scheme is the ent
ry into the ad-
vocacy role of many practitioners, who hitherto have not pers
onally practis-
ed and appeared in magistrates courts. Surprise and co
ncern has been ex-
pressed by magistrates from time to time at the poor qua
lity of representa-
tion, and the detrimental effect on the defendant of
certain ill-considered
lines of cross examination. In this rega’rd it is worth
while to note the
remarks of the Chief Justice of New Zealand on 29th M
ay, 1974, at New
Plymouth, when in passing sentence On four men convic
ted of rape, he said
inter alia, in relation to legal aid:—
On the other hand it is undoubtedly right that a conf
ession of
guilt made before or even during a trial can be counted in
the of-
fender‘s favour as a mitigating element in ﬁxing sente
nce. This
needs to be remembered in these days of ample leg
al aid in
criminal cases. Legal aid is intended to help those who
need it
and cannot afford it. it is not designed to provide a
training
ground for counsel or for an opportunity for offenders
to reject
wise advice . . . .
(New Zealand Law Journal 30.7.74 p. 318).
Despite what may be seen to be criticisms of the schem
e, 1 reaffirm sup-
port for the principle of legal aid. The delay to wh
ich I refer arises in the
operation of the scheme.
Quite clearly the presence of the Public Solicito
r’s staff in magistrates
courts has had a significant impact. Many cases, w
here doubt or uncertainty
has existed in the mind of a person charged as t
o his position in law, have
been resolved by the presence of a legal aid solicito
r and many cases, which
may otherwise have been protracted due to th
e lack of skill or uncertainty in
'the mind of an unrepresented defendant have be
en shortened by the in-
tervention of a legal aid solicitor.
D. Effects of Delay
1. Problems confronting the Magistrate ,
a. Quite unlike the Supreme Court and Distr
ict Court, in which,
generally speaking, all criminal trials are conducted by
a judge and jury, the
trial of criminal and quasi-criminal cases in Courts o
f Petty Sessions is
conducted by a stipendiary magistrate sitting alone
. (A Supreme Court
judge exercising ’the summary jurisdiction of that
court, and a District
Court judge sitting on appeal against a stipendiary mag
istrate‘s decision are
excepted.)
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it follows of necessity, consequent upon empanelling a criminal jury
that from the commencement of the trial until the jury verdict, the trial
must proceed on a day to day basis. No risk can arise that a juror through
delay or postponement of the trial will lose the basic value of remembering
and understanding current and recently given evidence, and no obstruction
is permitted to be put in the path of the jurors, who must be free to concen-
trate, without outside diversion or confusion, on the subject matter of their
deliberations. So much so, that there cannot fall upon their decision any
taint of outside inﬂuence arising from e.g., confusion, or loss of memory
occasioned by the passage of time.
Not so the trial of a criminal matter (or indeed any matter) before
stipendiary magistrates, which carries over beyond the (previously)
allocated time span. Under the current scheme prevailing in Courts of Petty
Sessions, unless advance arrangements are nfade, an incomplete trial may
well be adjourned for a number of weeks, or months, before it is resumed.
The effect of this is that notwithstanding the most meticulous and detailed
notetaking, and careful transcript reading, unless the case has some
outstanding feature which provides some indelible or lasting impression on
the magistrate, it is becoming increasingly difficult to recall all important
issues to be considered in coming to a proper decision (e.g., demeanour of a
witness, hesistancy in answering, tone of voice, etc., may well have passed
from the memory of the tribunal).
The actual result may well be that the tribunal which deals with the
balance of’the case upon the resumed hearing, whilst physically the same
person, is quite different in effect to that tribunal which began the hearing.
One may ask, “How can justice be seen to be done in these circumstances?”
and the answer must fall well short of acceptability. The situation is of
course compounded by the distinct likelihood that the magistrate will, in the
meantime, be involved in concurrent proceedings of great similarity to that
case which remains unconcluded, and indeed that situation may well extend
to three or four concurrent proceedings of similar nature.
A few years ago, one tnagistratc was involved in a series of committal
proceedings in relation to .allegations of criminal abortion, in which
evidence of great similarity but with significant differences was being given
on dates ranging over some months during which the hearings were inter- _
mingled. The possibility of confusion of evidence in one case with that in
anOther was real and caused the magistrate considerable concern.
b. In cases. where congestion in the Court lists has caused a real delay,
the problem can become aggravated in a twofold way:—
i. A delay of weeks (or months) in obtaining a commencing date
for a hearing.
ii. Further delay of weeks (or months) if the case does not conclude
in the allocated time span.
Frequently the best made plans are frustrated, by reason of the need to
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set aside a non—custodial ease already listed for hearing, because of the
necessity to try or hear speedily, a case of perhaps greater or lesser impor-
tance, where the defendant is in custody in respect of that charge by reason
of being refused bail or being unable to raise bail.
2. Problems for the Defendant
In some instances, defendants may well be advantaged rather than
disadvantaged by delays. Earlier reference was made to the knowledge of
the existence of arrears being used to obtain an adjournment where it may
well not have been granted but for the court’s inability to hear the matter.
A further advantage is that witnesses for the prosecution may die, or
become unavailable or suffer genuine memory loss as to important details.
‘
‘Nonetheless, disadvantages very frequently flow to a defendant
because of delay. These include:— :
i. Loss of time and/or salary, or other inconvenience (e.g., suspen-
sion from duty during the pendency of proceedings).
ii. Loss of defence witnesses, or reduction in the value of their
testimony.
iii. Additionalexpense in the continued retention of their legal ,
representative.
iv. Suspense and other emotional or physical trauma arising from
the matter remaining unresolved.
I think it worthy of comment however, that in these days of increased
legal representation, whether or not under legal aid, the chance of lost
testimony through impaired memory is diminished by reason of solicitors
promptly obtaining statements or proofs of evidence from defendants and
witnesses, thereby enabling them to refresh their recollection from those
documents, as prosecution witnesses freely do.
3. Problems of witnesses
These include:—
i. Loss of time and/or salary or other personal inconvenience.
ii. Dimin‘ution of recollecuon of persons, objects or events.
iii. Suspense or other emotional or physical trauma occasioned by
non-resolution of the matter.
4. Problems for [he Prosecution
These are bound up with the problems facing the court and witnesses.
because it is the prosecution which bears the onus of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, there can be frustra-
tion of the principle that punishment should follow the crime as soon as
possible.
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An example of such frustration, which creates problems
for the pro-
secution is to be found in cases where a defendant charged with
an indict-
able offence is able to obtain a number of adjournments at Petty Se
ssions
before being forced to have the case proceed. He then agrees to the ca
se be-
ing listed for the taking of evidence, and just prior to that date he notif
ies
the prosecution that he desires to enter a plea of guilty and be deal
t with
under s.SlA of the Justices Act, and in fact he does enter that
plea. He then
obtains as lengthy a period of delay as he can before coming befo
re the
District Court, and then at that court does not adhere to his plea and as
ks
that the judge make an order remitting the case to the Court of Pett
y Ses-
sions for committal for trial proceedings to again be arranged.
Sometimes as long as two or more years may elapse between the date o
f
arrest and the final committal for trial. Frequently prosecution witne
sses,
including victims, are itinerant persons, who have moved on and cannot b
e
located. Sometimes they have died. Their evidence has never been taken o
n
oath and is consequently lost.
5. Arrears Generate Further Arrears
This aspect has been referred to under “Causes of Delay" (page 49).
6. Manipulation of System and Circumvention of Proper Justice by
Unscrupulous Defendant and Counsel
These have been referred to elsewhere and need no repetition here.
7. Adverse Publicity of Delays
It is timely to publicly and emphatically dissent from certain
allegations recently made and published in the daily press of long unwar-
ranted delays of persons in custody awaiting a hearing in magistrates courts.
Allegations, regrettably sometimes made on affidavit in support of bail
applications in the Supreme Court, that a person refused bail, or unable to
raise bail, will be caught up in the general arrears in Courts of Petty Ses-
sions and languish in custody for months before his case is heard, are quite
baseless and are untrue.
Arrangements are made. and will continue to be made, for a hearing
within two or three weeks in such cases. except where such arrangements are
beyond the control of the administration, e.g., absence through illness of a
magistrate before whom the case is part heard.
E. Can the Delays be Remedied?
1. Improved procedures and Elimination of Procedural Inadequacies
Revised procedures could ensure better usage of court time and cut
down on delays. There are a number of areas, some examples of which in-
clude:—
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in summary matters, a pre-trial definition of the issues in dispute
in respect of which non-contentious areas witnesses need not be
called, and a statement be permitted to be tendered in lieu.
A widening of the use of provisions such as 5.404 of the Crimes
Act, in relation to admissions made by an accused person. on the
advice of his counsel. -
In a modern society, does it remain necessary or appropriate to
leave the defendant in the privileged position of being entitled to
say nothing, whilst the prosecution assembles its witnesses to
prove each and every ingredient of the charge? Ought there be
cast upon the defendant some responsibility to indicate the areas
of contest and of non-contest? Can a modern society afford the
luxury of retaining old principles, such as the right to silence and
the presumption of innocence in favour ofthe defendant, without
the defendant giving some indication of his attitude in the pro-
ceedings?
Perhaps greater use ought to be made of averments, allowing the
prosecution to aver as a fact a matter of allegation, without fur-
ther proof unless the defendant puts the averred fact under
challenge.
A “reversed onus” provision may also help curtail proceedings,
by placing greater emphasis on the defendant to participate in the
formulation of the proceedings. The defendant would then be re-
quired to disclose the area of challenge he was making to the
allegation. I do not suggest, however, that there be a change in the
general law of requiring that the onus of proof overall be other
than on the prosecution.
ln lndictable matters dealt with initially Under s.5lA of the
Justices Act, 1902
At the time of initial entry of the plea of guilty, the defendant is
served with or given the opportunity‘to read the entire prosecution
brief. The plea of guilty is then entered with the knowledge of all
matters which the prosecution relies on.
There is an entitlement in the defendant to change that plea, when
he is put before the District Court for sentence, and consequent
upon that, the matter is remitted to the magistrates‘ court for or-
dinary proceedings. In many instances, the change of plea occurs
because the accused person was not prepared to maintain his plea
ofguilty before a particular judge. and the committal proceedings
which result, are simply uncontested. Upon committal, a date is
fixed for the matter to be listed for plea, and frequently the plea
of guilty is then entered. and the matter disposed of.
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The time taken in the formal committal proceedings seems to be
unnecessarily expended. It would appear appropriate that in cases
ofa remitted matter for committal proceedings there be a require-
ment that no witness, whose statement has been examined at the
time of the s.SlA proceedings, need be called unless notification is
given to the prosecution within a time to be prescribed, that there
is a desire to cross-examine that witness.
Alternatively, consideration ought to be given to allowing a se-
cond committal for sentence under s.SlA, but that would not be
proper, if the effect was to enable a defendant to choose a judge
of his liking. Safeguards would have to be in-built to prevent an
abuse of process.
A further alternative approach could be for amendment to allow
the presiding judge rather than remit the matter back to the
magistrates court for committal for trial proceedings, to commit
or remand the defendant for trial at the District Court.
A review of the existing law in relation to all committal pro-
ceedings is presently being undertaken.
c. In Ordinary Committal For Trial Cases
“Paper committals" in the form of statement and documents in-
tended to be relied on, would be served on the defendant prior to
the hearing, and no witness would need to be called, unless the
defence indicated a desire to cross—examine. Variations of this
procedure are in use in the United Kingdom. and in certain States
of Australia.
d. Generally, it may be appropriate for a revision of procedures and
proofs under the Evidence Act, to enable formal identification
and production of documents to be by affidavit, and for such
documents to be “marked“ prior to the hearing. Coupled with
such a provision, would be a need to provide a readily available
photocopying service for the speedy production to the parties of
copies of all such documents.
c. Statutory Limitation of Time, Within Which Trial must Occur
ls there a need for introduction of legislation in N.S.W. such as
The Speedy Trial Act, 1974, introduced into the American Legal
system, which, with certain exceptions requires that a “criminal
defendant" be tried within 100 days of his arrest, or service of a
summons?
I should add that the object of the legislation in America seems
rather to have been to stop the defendant from obtaining
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postponement of his trial indefinitely, than to ensure that there be
no administrative delay in arranging and holding the trial.
2. Technological Inadequucies
a. Sound Recording
The recording ol~ evidence and addresses, etc., on the typewriter
by a deposition clerk in defended cases really belongs to the horse
and buggy days yet, is still the accepted and only available method
ol‘ recording in some courts. Happily, this method is falling into
disuse, accelerated by the non-supply of replacement typewriters.
Nonetheless, whilst recording has been done by shorthand in
selected courts for many years, further progress is being made in
the phased introduction to all metropolitan courts and country
circuit headquarters of tnodern sound-recording equipment. The
completion of this introduction‘is expected during 1980 and
should result in a much speedier disposition of both list work and
defended cases.
b. Computers ,
These, together with stenotype machines, can be used for the pur-
pose ot' transcribing evidence. Their superiority and sophistica—
tion will doubtless ultimately result in the replacement of sound
recording procedures.
The introduction of computers into the legal system may well
reduce the overall cost ol‘ maintaining and servicing the judicial
system, and such reduction may well make available additional
funds for the payment of increased number of magistrates and
support stall.
3: Should there be a System of Introduction of Court Complexes?
In modern times, with efficient transport, there appears to be a lessen-
ing need for courts to contintte in places where they now sit. In many of the
country circuits certain places where the courts used to sit have been
abolished as court centres. and in other places. the court sits there only as
required. It seems appropriate that there should be some rationalisation ol‘
the system, to enable a court to remain stationary and have the litigants
come to it. Certain suburban courts seem to have outlived their usefulness.
and in cases, e.g., Lidcombe and Glebe, it would seem more appropriate
that the business normally conducted there be heard at Parratnatta and
Central Court respectively.
It would certainly allow for better management and adminiStration ol'
the courts, il’ complexes were built, in which a number of magistrates work-
ing in concert, would be more able to reduce time wastage. than in cases
where they sit at separate centres alone. The ability to “overlist” cases at
complexes at lesser risk of inconvenience to parties than at single court cen-
tres is obvious.
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A further example of the utility of such an arrangement is seen when a
magistrate disqualifies himself from hearing a further matter between cer-
tain parties. The ready availability of another magistrate, lessens inconve-
nience, expense and delay.
4. Proper Listing Procedures, Bot/1 at Court Complexes and Single Court
Locations
1 have made reference earlier to the need for the implementation of
proper listing procedures and proper court administration. (See paragraph
8h i under causes of delay, page 49).
In considering this aspect however, 1 should make reference to a prac-
tice of trying to ensure a day’s work is on hand by overlisting. I mentioned
this aspect in passing in the preceding paragraph. It has become well
recognized that in practice listed cases have ahabit of not proceeding when
scheduled. The practice of deliberate overlisting is not without pitfalls.
To try and create a sufﬁcient work load, a court may well list work
with a face value of perhaps eight hours for a five hour court day. Where
this happens, the day becomes a day of chance so far as the parties are
concerned.
i. If three hours work “drop out" of the list, then there is left a
convenient and comfortable residue so that there is no wastage
of time.
ii. If no work drops out, then cases listed for hearing cannot pro-
ceed and parties and witnesses are sent away distressed and
disappointed, and frequently out of pocket, to be required to
come again at some later time.
Apart from the inconvenience and expense under ii the court is also
forced to compromise itself in certain circumstances by permitting adjourn-
ments in cases of no, or limited, merit under circumstances where otherwise
than because of the court's inability to hear the matter, no adjournment
would or should be granted. In other circumstances, the court may well be
. exposed to a criticism that it appeared to be unduly hurrying through earlier
i cases to reach other cases further down the list.
It will be noticed that most courts now follow a system of planning
. which involves the allocation of specific days and times for list work and for
' defended cases. This has proven highly beneﬁcial wherever implemented.
5. Consent Adjournments to be Granted by the Clerk ofPetty Sessions or
Chamber Magistrate
There would be a considerable saving of time if matters to be adjourn-
_ ed by consent, or without objection, were removed from the magistrates
. list. In some of the bigger court centres the period from 10.00 am. to 11.00
am. or 11.30 am. is frequently occupied in granting adjournments and
sorting out work which is not proceeding on that day.
 S9
6. Self Enforcing Penalty Notices .
Where provision is made for the issue to
a person of an infringement
notice, e.g., traffic infringement notice or
“on the spot litter" fine, and the
notice is not met by payment. there seems
to be little value in continuing to
proceed in respect of the breach by way o
f information and summons, with
court proceedings to establish the commis
sion of the offence charged.
It seems that the interests of justice could b
e met in these minor mat-
ters, by making provision in the infringeme
nt notice for the recipient to
challenge the matter if he so desires by giving
notice within a time limited in
the notice, in which case the matter wou
ld be referred to the court for a con-
ventional hearing of the issue involved. In th
e event of no dispute arising,
then the matter would not be litigated and pro
vision would be made for the
enforcement of the penalty stipulated in the
notice without recourse to the
court.
‘
When one considers the vast number of. e.g.
parking cases which are
dealt with by stipendiary magistrates witho
ut the defendant appearing in
answer to the summons. it seems impractica
l that a person who has not
complied with an infringement notice reques
t for payment should be af-
forded all the conventional safeguards of the
law in respect of a matter in
which he has apparently little interest, and whi
ch in many cases is just
another business expense.
7. Night Courts
These were used with limited success in re
spect of traffic cases only,
and their provision has now been disconti
nued.
Their use for criminal cases was never cont
emplated. and whilst their
use might have assisted in respect of reduc
ing the strain on available court
accommodation, they had little other
utility.
8. Alternatives to the Present Conventio
nal Justice System
I have already made reference to the
use of self enforcing penalty
notices.
The introduction in this state of Commun
ity Justice Centres to divert
from the courts. minor community dis
putes, will be watched with con-
siderable interest.
In the field of Family Law, compulsory o
ut of court counselling has been
for some time a statutory requirement.
9. The Needfor Greater Responsibilit
y and Interest in the Administration
of Justice by:—
a. Stipendiary magistrates
b. Police officers
c. Members of the legal profession
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Under paragraph 8 (page 48) relating to causes of delay I set out a-
number of matters occasioning the loss of sitting time, attributable to the
conduct of those involved in the conduct of court proceedings. One ques-
tion often raised however, is this “Does the duty ofa lawyer to his client ex': '
cced his duty to the court?”
It is openly said by-many practitioners that it is the duty of a solicitor or
barrister to shield his client from a forum not of his liking, and that a failure
to have a matter adjourned away from a magistrate, who in the opinion of
the solicitor or barrister, would deal severely or unfavourably with the
client, borders on a breach of the duty owed to the client.
On the other hand, it is said by others that the duty to the court owed
by the practitioners is for the practitioners to be ready to proceed before the
court, irrespective of whom is presiding, and.to proceed according to the in-
structions he has been given. lt is clear that a sudden or apparently sudden"
unreadiness to proceed, plays havoc with court planning and administration
and contributes substantially to delays in the magistrates courts in the
criminal justice system.
It would be unfortunate if attempts to avoid magistrates became so rife
or fashionable that to reduce their incidence a magistrate, in adjourning a
case set down for hearing, would be required to adjourn it to a future date
but for hearing by himself, at the time appointed. Surely the court should
never need to take such drastic and calculated action, but one wonders if
that time is not approaching.
Conclusion
lt is clear that to overcome present and prevent future delays in
magistrates courts there must be implementation of the principles so con-
cisely set out by the American Bar Association in the quotation with which
this paper opened.
In the meantime a policy has been implemented of providing assistance
both permanent and casual in those areas where assistance is more urgently
needed. The problem of delay will continue to inspire the quest for better
planning and better procedures which will be adaptable for current and
future needs. No doubt the cost factor relating to the provision of
magistrates, support staff, equipment and accommodation will continue to
act as a buffer between what can be provided and what is necessary and
desirable.
Nonetheless each one of us involved in the criminal justice system
might very well ask himself critically, “Am I in any way to blame?"
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QUARTERLY REPORTS SCHEDULE l
GRADE l METROPOLI IAN COURTS DELAYS (continued)
 
 
 
 
Quurlcrly :II11111/1Iy141/I Qua/1917
Crmrl 3/77 6/77 9/77 12/77 3/73 6/78 9/78 10/73 11/73 12/73
Rcdl'crn 2m 2m 5w 9w 9- l 0w 12w I 2w n/u |3w I 5w
Rcdl‘crn Transport Nol Availablc .
Rydc 8w 7w 7w 8w 8-9w I0w 8w 8w 8w 8w
Sulhcrland 10w 10w I0w IO-lZw 14w l6w 16w |6w 18w 20w
Wuvcrlcy IJ-Hw 13-I4w 14-l6w l6-l7w l6w l2w l4w ldw 14w l5w
Newcastle 6-7w 8-9w 3-7w
Gusl'ord 2m 25’:m' n/a
Wyong 2m 2m n/a
Woy Woy 6w 6w n/a
Wollongong ’ |0w llw I2w
Now: w= wccks, m = months, n/u = non available. l=1runsporl.
)
DELAYS IN THE LISTING OF DEFENDED CASES FOR HEARING SCHEDULE 2
Mon/h ant/ed I979
Cmm Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sepl. Ocl. Nov. Dec.
Bulmain |6w l8w l6w n/a l6w n/a 12w l5w |5w ISW l5w I7w
Bankslown l5w l7-20w l6-20w l6-20w l8w l5w l8w l8w l8w l8w |8w I6-l7w
Blacklown ISw n/a n/a 18w I8w l9w |6w 12w 10w 7w 6w 6w
. .
Z
9
 IIurwuud
(2111111511-
Cunlrul
I‘llIrl'IL‘Id
LIIL'IK‘
I Inrnxhy
Koguruh
Lidcmnhc
Lin-wool
.\Iu11ly
.\I .C.C.
Ncmuwn
North SydnL-y
I’uddinglon
Purrunmuu
l’cnrilh
Phillip ”011w
Rch‘crn
Rydc
Sutherland
   
Bclmonl
(Iml'ord
Ncncusllc
\anIwmI
\\'11|I1111gu11g
“’01- \\’11}'
\\'1'11111_.'
 
 
l. I
m
I 3w I 3w I (m- I 6w 14w 16w I 411' 16w
I 4w 14w I 3w 12w
811‘ 911' 911 I [11' I0\\' I Iw I Iw I2w I2w
I2\\‘ 13w I3\\'
11/11 11/11 11/11 11/11 11/11 n/a 11/a 20-22w 20w
2lw 22w 11/3
1611' NW I 511' I4\\' [611' I7\\' I61\' I3\\' I 3w
16w I 2w I0w
l-Iw n/u I-Iw 11/11 1311‘ 11/11 I2\\' I4w I2\\' 12w
I4w NW
NW I2-l5w lbw I6-I8w IXW l6-IXw 15w I4-I5\\' I-I-ISw
IS-IXW I5-I6w I3\\‘
5‘.~: 111 4111 4111 31": 111 'x': 111 4111 4 '/:111 5111
3-4111 3-4111 4111 I 511'
11/3 11/:1 1211‘ 11/3 11/11 I 311' I6w 20w 11/11 24\\'
11/21 11/3
I6- I81\‘ III-20w III-15w 11/11 IZ-I-Iw 8-I0w 9w 8w 711-
711‘ 811' 11/11
1411' l Iw l I\\' 7-I-I11' l3w 13w 17w 20w 2111'
25w 2011' 17-21“-
4w 6w 6w 8w 7w 4w 6w 6w 6\\‘ 5w
5 w 7w
8\\' l I\\' IUw l0\\' 811' 911‘ I 111' l [W I2\\'
I 5\\‘ I5\\' |4w
12w I 5w I611 11/3 11/11 [611' I6\\' 1211' 8-I0w 1211'
1011' IO\\'
91"
I2w I411 11/11 I2w 11/3 11/21 [5- [611' MW l2-I6w
1611' MW 14w
4-611 3-611' 6-8w 5-7w 4w 4w 41v 4-5w 4w
6w 8w
6w 11 / u 611' 6W 6W 6w 6w 8 \v 8w
I 6w 2011' I 8w
1411' I-Iw [411' MW MW 1511‘ 11/11 .1411 Idw
9w 9- I0\\' 9-1011 8-9\\' I Iw I Iw — I4— I 511' ISW l4- I 5\\'
1011‘ 911'
2211‘ 22w 2211' 2211' 2011' 20w 22w 22w 2311' 2311‘
2311' I9w
1411' I Iw I I11" I I\\‘ I611 I8-I9w I6\\' 1511' I5\\' I6\\'
I61\' I6w
I0- I 5w I Z-ZUW I8w |7w — I711 18\\' 1811‘ I9\\' 21W
22W 22\\‘
61v 5 w 5W 6w 1 0w
I()\\' 5w I 0w 2m 2m 6w 6-7w 6-8\\' 2111 2 5’: m 2m
2m
8-911 611' 8-9\\‘ 11/11 11/11 8-9\\' 8w 8w 8\\'
8\\' I0\\‘ 11/33
6w 6w _ 9w 1211' l 311'
Ill-1w l2- Idw 3111 3111 3-4111 3-4111 4111 I3-l6w 3-4111 4111
4111 4111
ll)\\' 4w I011 3111 2111 2111 5w 4\\' 10w 6w
2111 2111
I0“ 5\\‘ I011 3111 2111 2111 2111 6-811 2m
(1-711' 2111 2111
O\
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SCHEDULE 3
ASSISTANCE — COUNTRY DISTRICTS (WEEK)
Arranged
as at Total
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978 [7.8.79 I979
 
AIbur)’ l I 2 3 3 2 3
Balhursl U I 5'. 0 0 0 0
Broken Hill 0 | 3 | 3 2% 4-7,
Campbclhown () I-i‘. 2 2 9 4% 5V,
Coomu U 0 0 U 0 0 0
Coolamundru l l (I 2 0 3 3
Dubbo 3 5 5 l 0 6 6
Easl Muilland (J 0 ~11 U I-'/. I l
Glen Innes 2 S 5 ‘4 2 0 0
Goulhurn ‘x. _ ‘x'. I I V. 2 2
Grafton 3 4 3 I0 6 IO‘/_. lO-‘l,
Lismorc 2 3 3 6 0 6 7
Maillund (I 0 3 0 0 | I
Nurruhri 4 3 l 3 2 2
Narrandcru 3 3 2 3 0 2 2
Nowra I 6 0 3 O U 0
Orange (I l 0 () 2 2 2
Tamworth 0 0 0 0 I I l
Turcc () l 2 0 2 2 2
TOTAL (wccks) 20': 377. 34% 37 34 47-7, 52%
NB: Counlry circuit ('nurls Wilh Iwudquarlcrs al Kaloomhu. Wugga and Gosl‘ord have
Mclropolilun Slums and arc not included hcrcin.
(‘ITY ASSISTANCE: I979: — About 400 days.
 
 ('UHI'I
IIunkam
IIcInmm
(".unpsic
.102 CuslIcrcugh SI
Fairl'iuld
(Iosl‘ord
I-Inrnshy
Kugumh
Manly
Ncwcusllc
I’nrrunmllu
I’cnrilh
Rull'crn
Wullscnd
\\"oll0ng0ng
Wo)‘ W0y
Wynng
Sutherland
 
 
 
SCHEDU LE 4
DELAYS IN TIIIi LISTING ()F DEFENDEI) CASES FOR
HEARING
TRAFFIC COURTS
Ila/Ill: I'lN/(‘d I979
______
jan. I’vh. Mar. Ipr. May June
July A Hg. 5(7)]. Ocl, No v. Dec.
15w I3w I3\\' I Iw IUw I0w
IUW I0w 10w
6w 7w 5w 1 Iw 6\\'
8w 9w 9\\' I Iw I2w I Iw
I0w ISw n/u I6\v 16W
10- 12w 16w 13w 20w
I [W I Iw I4w I6w
I Iw I 5\\' MW I8w
19w 4-6\\' I 7w 2 I w I 7w
I9w
3m 3m 10-12»
I 2\\' I2\\' I 2w I2\\‘ n/a 6w
8\\'
6w 6w 6w I I\\‘ 6w
I I\\' I Iw I7-I8\\‘ I7\\' I2“-
4w 4w [1/ :1 9w I 0w
I5w n/a n/a I8w 26w
7w 7w 6\\' I 2w 5 \v
' 6w 6w 4-5w 17w 2I\\'
I Iw l3w 7w I3w
7w 5w 9w 6w
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I963
I964
I965
I966
I967
I968
I969
I970
I97I
I972
I973
I974
I975
I976
I977
I978
I979
SCH EDULE 5
LIST OF NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATES
74
75
76
77
80
83
84
85
85
88
9|
92
92
92
92
92
98
  
 
 
ALL CATEGORIES — PETTY SESSIONS & CHILDREN'S COURTS
(JUVENILES AND MAINTENANCE)
67
SCHEDULE 6(1)
 
I974 I975 I976 [.977 I978
Total cases 583.090 634.457 632.306 592.657
645.538
Charge cases. traffic 44.637 49.253 46.312 36.28
0 36.822
Percentage trafﬁc charge 7.65 7.76 7.32 6.
13 5.7
cases of total cases
Summons cases. traffic 247.028 296.020 308.898 29
8.710 316.492
Percentage trafﬁc summons 42.36 46.66 48.85
50.50 49.02
cases of total cases ‘
Total trafﬁc cases 291.665 345.273 355.210 334.99
0 353.314
charge and summons
Percentage total traffic 50.02 54.42 56.18
56.64 54.73
cases charge and summons .
of total cases
Total cases excluding 523.273 579.516 4- 575.338 543.49
9 593.927
charges of drunkenness .
Percentage of all traffic 55.73 59.58 61.74
61.63 59.49
cases of total number of
cases excluding drunkenness ,
Percentage cases of 10.25 8.65 9.00
8.10 7.99
drunkenness of tetal cases
Total number of defended - 18.497 15.693 1
7.956 19.294
cases
Number of hearings in all — 14.419 12.363 12.476
13.216
defended cases“
Percentage defended cases — 2.91 2.48 3.0
3 2.99
of total cases
Percentage hearings of — 2.27 1.95 2.1
0 2.05
total cases
Total number of court 18.445 19.279 19.364 18.53
7 19.602
sittings
Total duration of such 75.499 81.705 78.511 76.94
4 78.581
sittings. hours
Average daily sitting time 4 hrs 4 hrs 4 hrs 4 hr
s 4 hrs
5 mins 14 mins 3 mins 4 mins 1 min
 
"When a number of defended cases are heard together this is regarded as on
e hearing.
J
u
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SCHEDULE 6 (2)
COURTS OF PETTY SESSIONS (EXCLUDING CHILDREN'S COURTS -—
JUVENILES AND MAINTENANCE)
CHARGE AND SUMMONS CASES
 
I974 I975 I976 /977 i978
Charge cases and summons 447,567 498.749 510.519 486.212 540,183
cases heard & determined
Charge cases and summons 72,321 72.714 67.615 54.298 52.122
eases dismissed through
want of prosecution
Total charge and summons 519.888 571.463 578.134 540.510 592.305
cases
Percentage of charge 8: 13.91 12.72 11.69 10.04 8.8
summons cases dismissed
through want of prosecution ‘
Total charge and summons 279.620 332.865 341.927 322.193 353,314
cases. traffic
Percentage charge & summons 53.78 58.24 59.14 59.60 59.60
eases. traffic. of total
cases
Defended charge & summons 7,516 6.613 5.463 5.197 4.957
cases. trafﬁc
Percentage defended charge 2.68 1.99 1.60 1.61 1.4
& summons cases traffic of
total traffic eases
Total charge and summons 240.268 238.598 236.207 218.317 238.991
eases excluding traffic
Defended charge 8; summons 8.338 8.829 7.991 10.358 11.566
eases excluding trafﬁc
Percentage defended charge 3.47 3.48 3.38 4.74 4.8
& summons cases excluding
traffic of the total cases.
excluding traffic
Total of all defended 15.854 15.442 13.454 15.555 16.523
charge 8; summons cases
I'crccntage defended cases 3.04 2.70 2.33 ‘ S7 2.8
of total cases
Number of hearings in all -— 11.898 10.631 10.690 11.177
defended eases“
Percentage of hearings of — 2.08 1.8-! 1.97 1.89
total eases
I'roserutiuns. Conunnnwealth 22.731 20.161 19.214 11.100 14,754
[\L'lS
Percentage prmeeutions 4.37 3.52 3.32 2.23 2.5
Commonwealth Acts of total
L’u. \'
 
"When a number of defcttded cases are heard together. this is regarded as one hearing.
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COURTS 01T PETTY SESSIONS (EXCLUDI
NG CHILDREN‘S COURTS -—
JUVENILES & MAINTENANCE)
CHARGE CASES
 
I974 I975 I976 I977
I978
Charge cases heard 154.91
0 157.270 156.277 150.025 1
62.911
and determined
Charge eases dismissed through 35.142
32.156 29.154 17.471 16.015
“um 01' proseeunon
Tolul charge eases 190.05
2 189.426 185.431 167.496 1
78.926
Percentage 01' charge cases 18.49
16.97 15.72 10.43 8.9
dismissed through wunl ul‘
proscculion ‘
Charges 01‘ drunkenness 59.817
54.941 56.968 47.918 51.609
l’ereenluge drunkenness 01 31.47
29.00 30.72 28.60 28.8
[oral charge cases
Charge eases deuh \\‘11Il by 30.192
26.419 26.897 26.770 28.501
Justices of the Peace
l’ercenluge of charge 1.1150 15.88
13.94 14.5 15.98 15.9
dealt with by Justices 01'
[he Peace
Charge eases —— Irul'l‘ic 41.1144 46.476
42.782 33.119 36.822
I’ereenlage lrul‘l'ic ellérge 22.00
24.53 23.07 19.77 20.6
cases 01101211 charge
cases
Cummiuuls for rriul 2.638
2.300 2.908 2.851 3.245
Commiuuls for senlenee 6.323
3.262 3.713 3.521 4.579
Percentage of cases 1.38
1.21 1.56 1.70 1.8
eommilled for trial
Percentage 01‘ cases 3.32
1.72 2.00 2.10 2.6
cmnmiued I‘or sentence
Tolul eases mhcr Ihun 148.208
142.950 142.649 134.377 142.104
lrul‘l'ie charges
Percentage 01' charge C;I.\L‘\ 77.98
75.46 76.93 80.22 79.4
(other lhun lruI‘I‘ie charge
cases) 01' total charge
cases
'I'ulul charges excluding 130.235
134.485 128.463 119.578 127.317
cam» 01' drunkennesx
'l'olul charges excluding 58.391
118.009 115.681 116.459 90.495
charges 01' drunkenness &
lral   1; charge eases
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(ii)
 
COURTS OF PETTY SESSIONS (EXCLUDING CHILDREN'S COURTS —
JUVENILES AND MAINTENANCE)
SUMMONS CASES
I978I974 I975 I976 I977
Summons cases heard and 292.657 341.479 354.242 336,187 377,272
determined
Summons cases dismissed 37.179 40.558 38.461 36.827 36.107
through want of prosecution
Total summons cases 329.836 382.037 392.703 373.014 413.379
Percentage of summons 11.27 10.61 9.79 9.87 8.7
cases dismissed through
want of prosecution
Summons cases dealt with 67 21 26 32 56
by Justices of the Peace
Percentage summons cases 0.02 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.013
dealt with by Justices of
the Peace
Total summons cases 92.060 95.648 93.558 83.940 111.212
excluding trafﬁc
Percentage total summons 27.91 25.03 23.82 22.50 23.4 a
cases. excluding traffic.
of total summons cases
Summons cases, trafﬁc 237,776 286.389 299.145 289.074 316.492
Percentage traffic summons 72.08 74.96 76.17 77.49 76.6 .-
cases of total cases
Traffic summons cascs 3.859 1.759 1.069 1.030 1.127
dealt with ex-partc
Percentage of trafﬁc 1.62 0.64 0.36 0.35 0.36
summons cases dealt with
cx-partc
Traffic summons cases dealt 170.146 203.753 225.735 213.839 247,782
with 18c/7SB
l’crcentagc of traffic 71.55 74.96 75.46 73.97 78.3
summons cases dealt with
18c/7513
Transport appeals 8.104 8.755 3.896 3.646 4.276
Bankruptcy examinations 32 15 38 26 49
Applications. lnebriutcs Act 678 549 479 343 815
Applications. Marriage Act 190 125 117 81 70
75 103 4H 25 49Shirc & Municipal Appcals
 (iii)
CHILDREN'S COURTS. JUVENILES
7l
 
I974 I975 I976 I977
I978
Charge cases heard and 26.523
25.833 26.814 24.298 24.529
determined
Charge cases dismissed 3.078
2.804 3.139 2.156 1.958
through want of
prosecution
Total charge cases 29.60
1 28.637 29.953 26.454
26.487
Summons cases heard and 12.630
12,226 I 1.440 1 1.830 1 1.432
determined
Summons cases dismissed 97
2 802 768 656
502
through want of
prosecution
Total summons cases 13.602 13.028 1
2,203 12.468 11.934
Total charge and 43.203
41.665 42.161 38.940 38.421
summons cases
Total charge and summons 4.050
3.606 3.907 2.812 . 2.460
cases dismissed through
want of prosecution
Percentage of cases 9.3
7 8.65 9.27 7.22
6.4
dismissed through want
of prosecution
Committals for trial and 260
358 404 230 550
sentence
Percentage of cases 0.60
0.85 0.96 0.59 1.4
committed for trial or
sentence of total cases
Charge cases. traffic 2.793
2.777 3.530 3.161 3.342
Summons cases. traffic 9.252
9.631 9.753 9.636 9.461
Total traffic cltarge and 12.045
12.408 13.283 12.797 12.803
summons cases
Percentage tral't'ic cases 27.88
29.78 31.50 32.116 33.3
of total cases
Defended traffic cases 3
10 312 462 .41
340
Percentage defended traffic 2,5
7 2.51 3.41: 4.22
7.6
cases of total traffic
cases
Defended cases excluding —
- 990 1.160 1.1 14
1.239
traffic cases
Percentage defended cases —
— 3.38 4.02 4.26
4.8
excluding traffic of total
cases excluding traffic
Traffic summons cases 2
26 123 126 371
46
dealt with ex-parte
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(hr)
CHILDREN‘S COURTS..1LiV[ENlLES
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
Percentage of traffic 2.44 1.27 1.29 3.85 0.5
summons cases dcall wilh
cx-purlc
Trul'l'ic summons cases dcall 3.924 3.831 3.695 3.441 3.793
wilh 18c/7513
l’crccnlagc lral'l‘ic summons 42.41 39.77 27.82 35.70 40.00
cases dealt wilh 18c/7SB
Number 01. cases dcull \viIh 13.813 13.020 12.982 11.729 11.366
:11 Albion Slrccl. Yasmur &
Mindu courts
Pcrccnlugc of [01:11 cascs 31.97 31.24 30.79 30.12 29.6
dcull will] an those ‘
lhrcc courls .
Tolal of all dcl‘cnded cases — 1.302 1.622 1.655 1.579
l’crccnlagc of all dcl'cndcd — 3.12 3.85 4.25 4.1
cases 01' "3131 cases
Number of hearings in — 1.024 1.164 1.127 1.003
all dcl'cndcd cases“
Pcrccnlugc of hearings — 2.45 2.76 2.89 2.6
01‘ 10131 czlscs  
Sunisncs not collcucd prior 10 1975.
 
"When a numbcr ol‘ dcl'cndcd cases are heard together [his is rcgardcd us one hearing.
  
(V)
CHILDREN'S COURT
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(:\4aintenanee — Family Law)
[974 I975 I976 [977
Total eases H.999 2| .329
I3.()Il H.207
Cases for disobedience 7.559 7.690 2
J4} L980
ul' orders
Cases for disobedience 37.79 36.05 I
784 l6.54
of orders — percentage of
total eases
Number of defended eases 2.5-8} L753
(1|7 746
Pereentage defended eases 12.7l 8.21
\. IJ 6.23
of total eases
Number of hearings in at“ —— ‘ I.J97
567 659
defended cases"
Percentage of hearings ot‘ —— 7.0l 4.7
2 5.50
total eases
I978
MAINTENANCE ——
Enl‘oreements — Heard 6; 5-14
determined
Withdrawn 215
Other matters -— Heurd& 80$
determined
Withdrawn 316
Total maintenanee eases LSM
FAMILY LAW —
Ettl'ureemenls — Heard & 3.044
determined
Withdrawn 978
Other matters — Heard & 8. NH
determined
Withdra“ n l..\'06
Total Family Law ease> 12.939
l)et'ended maintenanee cam 126
Number ul‘ hearing)" 120
Del'ended l‘umily Law eases l.()(\(\
Number Ur hearings" 9l6
'l'ntal defended eases l.l92
I'utul hearing)" I.()}(\
l’ereentage del'ended eases 5.04
of total eaxes
Percentage hearing of
tutal eases"
6.99
"When a number of defended ea>es are heard together this i.\ reg
arded ax one hearing,
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(vi)
TOTAL GRADE 1 CASE VOLUMES
Cour! I973 I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
Balmain 1.759 1.836 1.745 1.702 1.419 1.536
Balmain & Glebe 3.993 3.189 3.913 3.172 2.680 2.656
Bankslown 5.651 6.406 6.775 6.112 5.894 5.423
Blacklown 5.329 5.679 5.451 5.158 4.897 4.934
Burwood 4.013 4.326 4.378 3.225 4.000 4.198
Campsie 3.703 3.552 3.761 3.530 3.056 3.136
Cenlral 34.967 34.640 35.249 31.968 39.286 44.362
Fairfield 6.948 7.461 7.512 7.337 6.589 6.499
Glebe 2.234 1.353 2.168 1.470 1.261 1.120
Hornsby 3.667 3.994 3.274 2.808 2.675 2.733
Kogarah 4.417 4.698 ‘ 5.065 4.144 4.205 4.032
Lidcombe 2.596 3.270 3.109 3.343 2.906 3.224
Liverpool 5.509 5.424 5.571 4.514 4.771 5.120
Manly 4.900 6.255 5.241 4.414 4.713 5.267
Newlown 5.866 5.498 5.809 4.777 4.767 4.196
North Sydney 5.815 7.231 8.424 6.292 4.900 6.130
Parramaua 7.011 6.545 6.694 6.370 6.320 7,533
Penrilh 6.251 6.478 6,126 5.089 3.910 4.904
119 Phillip 51 8.913 9.218 9.123 8.108 5.134 5.683
Rcdfern 9.373 7.978 8.088 9.755 5.950 7.351
Ryde 2.640 3.011 2.503 2.153 1.840 1.898
Sutherland 3.966 4.045 4.207 3.646 3.138 3.364
Waverley 5.257 5.020 6.120 4.926 4.739 4.612
M.C.C. 3.332 3.142 2.642 848 1.014 1.889
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(vii)
CASE LOADS PER MAGISTRATE
 
Cour! I973 I974 I975 I976
I977 I978
Balmain & Glebe 3.993 3.189 3.913 3.172 2
.680 2.656
Bankslown 4.709 5.338 5.646 5.093 4
.912 3.615
Blacktown 4.634 4.938 4.740
4.485 4.258 4.290
Burwood 4.013 4.326 4.430
3.225 4.000 4.198
Campsic 3.703 3.553 3.761 3.530
3.056 3.136
Ccnlral 5.828 5.773 5.875 5.331 6
.548 5.545
Fairlield 6.316 6.783 6.829 6.670
5.990 4.999
Hornsby 3.667 3.994 3.274
2.808 3.344 3.416
Kogarah 3.673 3.915 4.221 3.453
3.504 3.360
Lidcombc 2.596 4.087 3.886 4.012
4.843 5.373
Liverpool 4.590 4.520 9 4.642 3.
762 3.976 4,267
Manly 4.083 5.212 4.368 3.678
3.927 4.389
Newtown 4.888 4.582 4.841 3.981
3.972 3.814
North Sydney 4.153 5.165 6.017 4.494
3.500 4.379
Parramalla 5.008 4.675 4.781 4.550
3.950 4.708
l’cnrith 4.630 4.799 4.538 3.770
2.896 3.923
Rcdl'crn 9.375 7.978 8.088 9.755
5.950 7.351
Rydc 2.640 3.764 3.129 2.691
3.067 3.163
Sutherland 3.966 4.045 4.207 3.646
3.138 3.364
Waverley 2.679 2.510 3.060 2.463 2
.369 2.307
M.C.C. 3.332 3.142 2.642 4.240
1.690 1.889
 
Case loads per magistrate an: calculated on the number of permanen
tly rostcrcd magistrates at
each court. Casual magistcriul assistance is not taken into account.
cg. Burwood — total cases 4.198 — l S.M. sitting daily — case loa
d 4.198.
Liverpool — total cases 5.l20 — | S.M. sitting daily and another o
n I day pcr week = l'/_.
S.M.s — case load 4.267.
Blacktown — total cases 4.934 — l S.M. sitting daily and anomcr
on 3 days per month
= IV:u S. M.s — case load 4.290.
 
 
I977
5.930
4.479
4.7315
5.365
4.692
4.802
7.525
4.764
7.42I
5.60I
6.536
6.845
3.905
4.319
4.296
6.642
5.037
(1.016
5.543
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(viii)
COUNTRY DISTRICTS
CASES DEALT WITH BY THE STIPENDIARY MAGIS'I‘RA'I'I:
These figures rcprcscnt all charge and summons cascs
dealt with by lltc Slipcndiary Magistrate including
Children's Court. and cxcluding charges of drunkcnnm
and matters dealt with by local Justices of the Pcucc.
Distrit'l I972 I973 I974 I975 I976
Albury 4.975 4.837 4.680 5.199 5.684
Bathurst 4.981 4.827 4.703 5.239 5.200
Broken Hill 4.485 3.972 4.354 5.07] 5.379
Conma 5.153 4.310 3.822 4.792 4.75.\‘
Cootttmundra 4.849 4.596 4.773 4.809 4.557
Dubho 4.686 3.970 4.608 5.067 5.008
[fast X‘Iuitland 6.145 5.156 6.214 6.690 7.014
(ilcn lnncs 4.959 4.704 5.202 5.598 5.596
Goulhurn 7.392 7.228 6.273 6.714 7.399
Grafton 6.000 6.544 6.365 6.300 6.275
Kuioomba 6.290 6.183 6.395 7.552 6.041
Lisntorc 8.187 6.729 6.233 7.285 6.448
Maitland 4.406 4.326 4.198 4.947
4.137
Narratndcra 5.320 5.304 4.881 5.183 4.7“
Narruhri 4.694 4.295 4.339 4.755 4.455
N0wra 5.689 5.494 6.435 7.185 6.500
Orange 5.321 5.036 4.677 5.351 5.069
‘I'amwurllt 5.838 5.758 6.737 6.829 6.179
Tarcc 5.473 4.968 5.675 6.466 5.919
Wuggu “'agga 7.952 6.404 5.804 5.786 5.255
Campbcllmwn
5.751
I978
6.329
4.843
4.980
6.l I8
4.803
5.412
6.935
4.725
8.473
6.264
6.908
7.791
4.393
4. I 39
4.730
6.756
5.577
6.765
6.345
6.640
6.458
""
2
  
‘l'utttwurlh
anru
Kutomnhu
(irul'ton
(ioulhurn
Lismorc
l‘iuxt Muitlund
“"333“ “-333“
Tarcc
(ilcn lnncs
Nurrundcru
Coolantttndra
()rungc
Dubbo
BullturSt
Alhury
llrokcn Hill
Nurruhri
Muitlund
Connut
(ix)
COUNTRY DISTRICTS
CASE LOADS IN ORDER OF VOLUME
Kutoomhu
Lismorc
Nm\'r;t
Tunmurtlt
(ioulburn
Euxt Muitlamd
Turcc
(irul'ton
Wagga Wagga
Glen Inncs
Orungc
thlllur-Sl
Alhur)’
Nurrundcru
Broken Hill
Dubbo
\lziitlund
(footumundru
Comnai
Nurruhri
77
 
I976 I977 I978
(ioulburn . East Maitland Goulhurn
East Maitland Goiilburn Lismorc
Nowru Lismorc East Muitlund
Lisntorc Nowru Kuroombu
Grafton Katoontba Tamworth
Tamworth Tamworth Nowru
Kmaontba Albury Waggu “'ugga
'l‘ztrcc ‘ Tarce Cantpbclltown
Albur)’ \Vagga Wagga Turcc
Glcn lnncs Grafton Albury
Broken Hill Cooma Grafton
\Vagga Wagga Orange Qucunbcyun
Buthurst Dubbo Orungc
Orange Glcn lnncs Dubbo
Dubbo Broken Hill Brokcn Hill
Narrandcra Cootamundru Batliurst
('ootnu Bathurst Cootumundra
Cootantundru Narrandcra Nztrruhri
Nurrabri Ngrrabri lm'crcll
Maitland Maitland Muitland
(iril‘l'il h
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(X)
STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE GOSFORD. GRADE |
CASE LOAD (TRAFFIC SUMMONS CASES EXCLUDED)
 
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
(.‘zusrurd - 3.132 2.on 2.342 2.635 3.355’
Woy \Voy l.29| 1.464 1.17: 906 l.|92
\Vyong [.874 1.830 1.740 l.7ll |.663
6.297 6.095 5.253 5.252 6.210
Grade I Magislcrial assistance of cighl days each monlh
providcd I'or lhc district.
STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATE BELMONT-WALLSEND. GRADE 1
CASE LOAD (TRAFFIC SUMMONS CASES EXCLUDED)
 
I974 I975 ‘ I976 I977 I978
Bcllnonl l,676 1.486 1.534 L392 2.397
Wallscnd 3.626 3.3l2 2.6l8 2.l77 2,663
5.302 4.798 4.152 3.569 5.060
STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATES NEWCASTLE (2). GRADE I
CASE LOAD (TRAFFIC SUMMONS CASES AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS
EXCLUDED)
 
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
Newcastle 7.085 7.580 6.728 5.234 6,5l7
Case loud pcr S.M. 3,543 3.790 3.364 2.617 3.258
STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATES WOLLONGONG (2), GRADE I
CASE LOAD (TRAFFIC SUMMONS CASES AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS
EXCLUDED)
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
Albion Park
HuIcnshurgh
Ilulli (abolished
I976) 7.752 9.070 8.720 7.333 7.7M
I'orl Kcmbla
Wollongong
Case load pcr S.M. 3.876 4,535 4.360 3.667 3.857
 
 
 
Fairl'icld
Campsic
Bankslown
Newlown
Burwood
Kogarah
Sutherland
Manly
Norlh Sydnay
Parramaua
Blacklown
Pcnrilh
Phillip Slrccl
Paddinglon
Hornsby
Woy Woy
Gosl‘ord
Newcastle
Belmont
Wallscnd
\Vyong
Wollongong
Port Kcmbla
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(xi)
TRAFFIC SUMMONS CASES
CIRCUITS. TRAFFIC MAGISTRATES. GRADE 3
I974 I975 I976 I977 I978
9.613 8.540 7.123 5.409 7.768
3.498 2.226 3.795 5.286 5.169
13.111 10.766 10.918 10.695 12.937
5.337 5.175 4.662 6.124 7.373
4.943 4.307 3.556 1.952 4.285
3.831 1.804 — — -
14.111 11.286 8.218 8.076 11.658
4.679 3.885 3.481 3.273 4.517
7.057 5.219 3.468 4.015 4.475
11.736 9.104 6.949 7.288 8.992
4.422 4.322 3.075 3.755 3.720
6.037 3.453 1.746 3.710 5.385
10.459 7.775 4.821 7.465 9.105
5.625 6.392 6.669 8.141 7.768
6.768 4.662 — — —
47 2.454 6.542 6.992 5.688
12.440 13.508 13.211 15.133 13.456
100.871 152.153 177.409 161.792 178.664
7.735 8.635 8.739 6.722 1.118
8.369 6.921 5.363 6.015 7.894
457 396 425 347 682
2.801 4.953 3.623 3.443 4.170
11.627 12.270 9.411 9.805 12.746
5.291 6.199 5.637 6.260 5.862
1.678 2.007 2.617 3.092 3.771
1.249 1.671 2.159 2.337 2.657
1.345 1.286 1.603 1.382 1.338
9.563 11.163 12.016 13.071 13.628
5.116 6.903 5.897 6.450 6.518"
978 1.257 1.496 2.147 2.164
6.094 8.160 7.393 8.597 8.682
'Tral‘l’ic Magistrate sits le days per wcck. Olhcr three days at Rcdl‘crn Tran
sport Court.
 
_
_
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(xii)
COURT OF PETTY SESSlONS. 4-6 PHILLIP STREET. SYDNEY
I974 I975 I976 I977 [978
Total cases dealt with l02.548 l53.632 l78,096 161.792
178.664
Tral'l‘ic Summons cases |00.87l 152,l53 177.409 l60.259
178.385
i Pcrccnlagc lolal cases |7.59 24.2l 28.17
27.35 27.68
: ol‘ Slulc lolal
l’crccnlagc total cases — 26.5I 30.95 29.76
30.08
of Slulc lolal excluding
cases 0|" drunkcnncss
l’crccnlugc lolal lral'l'ic 40.83 51.40 57.43 53.65
56.36
summons cases of State
lolal I'or lral'l'ic Summons
cases
 (xiii)
CASES DEALT WITH BY STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATES
COURTS “'11” 1.000 OR MORE CASES
(Courts in the Sydney-Metropolitan. Newcastle. Wollongong and Gosl‘ord Districts excluded)
 
I975 I976 I977 I978
Goulburn 4.250 Ooulhurn 4.982 Goulburn' 4,794 Goulburn
5.034
Albury 4.0011 Albury 4.351 Albury 4.477 \Vagga Wagga
4.912
\\‘agga Wagga 4.(X)l \Vagga Wagga 3.485 \Vagga Wagga 4.205 Albury 4.706
Tamworth 3.554 Bathurst 3.314 Queanbeyan 3.395 Campbelltown 4.273
Orange 3.170 Orange 3.000 Tamworth 3.095 Queanbeyan 3.939
|1athurst 3.140 Tamworth 2.789 Orange 3.016 Tamworth
3.574
Queanheyan 2.956 Raymond Terrace 2.752 Bathurst 2.768 Orange 3.359
Nowra 2.842 Broken 1011 2.667 Campbelltown 2.726 Bathurst 3.082
Taree 2.839 Queanheyan 2.553 East Maitland 2.563 Col'l‘s Harbour 2.655
('atnplwlltown 2.739 Nowra 2.542 Nowra 2.562 Katoomba 2.546
Katoomha 2.545 1)uhho 2.429 Broken Hill 2.533 Broken Hill
2.531
Broken Hill 2.483 Col'l's Harbour 2.427 Katoomba 2.526 Lismore
2.520
Lisntore 2.455 Taree 2.332 Raymond Terrace 2.335 Non-ra
2.462
Ra_wtrorid‘1'err;tee 3.211 ('ampbelltown 2.227 Listnorc 2.178 Taree
2.436
Windsor 2.285 Windsor 2.139 Dubbo 2.156 Bowral 2.427
Col‘l's llarhour 2.180 Lismore 2.070 Armidale 2.095 Raymond Terrace
2.407
l.itht_zow 2.164 ('oonia 2.016 Tarce 2.053 Armidale 2.384
Dubho 2.151 Armidale 1.936 Col'l's Harbour 2.034 Dubbo 2.293
(iril’l'ith 1.989 Moree 1.884 Kcmpsey 2.019 Windsor 2.210
.\loree 1.877 (iral‘ton 1.846 Windsor 1.979 l'iast Mailland 2.146
liast Maitland 1.837 Camden 1.842 Bowral 1.832 Coonta
1.995
Tweed Heads 1.781 Katootnha 1.842 Cooma 1.805 Moree 1.936
(iral'ton 1.777 littst :\1ait1and 1.839 Moree 1.726 Tweed Hends‘ 1.880
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(xiii)
CASES 1)L~'/\L'1' WITH BY STII’lENDIARY MAGISTRATES
COURTS WITH 1.000 OR MORE CASES (continued)
 
(Coum in the SydHey-Metropolitan. Newcastle. \\-‘ollongong and Gosford Districts cquudcd)
 
I975
Armidale
Maitland
Cooma
Kcmpscy
Camden
Ccssnock
Singleton
Inverell
Bowral
Muswellbrook
Pl Macquaric
Ballina
Yass
Leeton
Glen lnncs
Coma
1.747
1.745
1.654
1.613
1.566
1,517
1.342
1.272
1.207
1.203
1.166
1.090
1.057
1.019
1.005
1.005
Grifﬁth
Kempscy
Lithgow
Tweed Heads
Maitland
lnvercll
Ccssnock
Bowral
Ballina
Glen Innes
Singleton
Bcga
Pt Macquaric
1.797
1.734
1,670
1.571
1.418
1.367
1.323
1.269
1.156
1.123
1.123
1.106
1.051
Camden
Griffith
Lithgow
Grafton
Tweed Heads
Ballina
Ccssnock
Singleton
Yass
1nvere|1
Maitland
Pt Macquaric
Kurri Kurri
1.586
1.552
1.516
1.493
1.451
1.399
1,369
1,367
1.121
1.100
1.076
1.047
1.046
I978
Camden
Kempsey
Grafton
Maitland
Lithgow
Griffith
Ballina
Cessnoek
Singleton
Yass
Pt Macquarie
Bcga
Inverell
Dcniliquin
Bourke
1.822
1.806
1,630
1.497
1.490
1.431
1.358
1,296
1.260
1.231
1,222
1.129
1.122
1.091
1.049
2
8
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
B. R. Brown, S.M.
On page 40 I posed five questions which I consider
ed were the ques-
tions pertinent to discussion at this seminar. 1 prO
pose to deal with only
some of the matters to which I have made written r
eference, and also to
make passing references to the paper presented by
Mr Hogan and to the
various commentaries on the paper. Having regard to
the fact that my paper
was written more than two months ago I will also gi
ve brieﬂy and in general
terms an updated picture of the delay situation as it is n
ow shown to exist in
the magistrates courts.
It will be readily seen that l have used the word delay
in a number of
different senses during the course of my baper. l hav
e used, for example,
the delay in the sense of a delay or a slowing down in
the process of getting
to the hearing as distinct from a delay or a slowing dow
n in the actual hear—
ing itself. It will, I believe, be just as readily seen that
I recognise that some
delays are avoidable and that others are unavoidable. In
other cases some
delays are said to be advantageous and others disad
vantageous. When I
speak of “advantageous delay” I mean an interruption t
o or postponement
of proceedings for the better administration and the enh
ancement ofjustice
in that nobody suffers or is prejudiced by such delay.
In this regard I refer
to adjournments for the purpose of obtaining pre-se
ntence reports or the
use of diversionary schemes as a substitute for the use
of purely statutory
penalties or punishments. Elsewhere in the paper I have d
istinguished delays
which are caused by the court system itself from others
which are suffered
by the court with detriment to the administration o
f justice.
At times I have looked at the problem of delay subjec
tively and at Other
times I have looked at it objectively. l have spar
ed nobody from my
criticisms and so far as the magistrates of this state ar
e concerned I have
made a somewhat searching self analysis of our role.
We, the magistrates,
must be prepared to accept our share of the blame
in the areas indicated. l
hope there will be general recognition and accep
tance by others of the other
areas of my criticism and comment. Without that th
ere can be little hope of
an effeCtive remedy for the delay situation.
Whilst there must always be a sufficiency of magi
strates. adequate
staff and court accommodation it must be accepte
d that it would not be
proper having regard to the public expense involv
ed to create a situation
where increased appointments would result in the total eli
mination of delays
causing magistrates to be under employed waiting
. as it were, for fresh
custom to come through the courtroom door
s. For many persons. going to
court is a once in a lifetime experience and some
slight delay for them may
well be more acceptable overall than a waste of r
esources in having
magistrates and support staff less than fully occupi
ed.
Many of the observations made by me have been
made also by Mr
Hogan. He too found it important to make specific ref
erence to the legal aid
scheme and to the existing committal for trial procedu
res. May l assure you
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all that our papers had been prepared independently without collusion or
the benefit of conference or any exchange of ideas. Indeed there has been no
conspiracy to divert the course ofjustice! Nonetheless similar themes can be
detected running through his paper and indeed these themes have been pick-
ed up and expanded by most commentators. Mr Hogan made reference on
page 20 to extending the operation of 5.476 of the Crimes Act to give a
p0wer of disposition of other indictable offences and he, in particular,
made reference to the offence of culpable driving. Now whilst this sugges-
tion from him is obviously designed to assist the District Courts’ criminal
workload it would clearly add significantly to the magistrates court
workload and worsen the delay situation in magistrates courts. 1 have made
reference in my paper to the proposed and imminent increase in civil
jurisdiction for magistrates and I suggested therein that the present
establishment strength of the magistracy will then be unlikely to contain the
present delay situation. Adoption of Mr Hogan’s suggestion, whilst not
unacceptable, nonetheless will produce its own problems.
In my comments on s.SlA of the Juslices Ac! 1 made reference to the
need to tidy tip or tighten the procedures under that section. Mr Hogan’s
comment on page 22 of his paper and the figures quoted by him I submit
lend support to the arguments that l have advanced. They apply also with
equal force to my comments in respect of committal for trial generally.
80”] Mr Hogan and Inspector King made reference to the lack of
fairness by trial judges in controlling proceedings and that reference is no
doubt in part applicable to magistrates. However, whilst the nature of the
Crown‘s allegations and the thrust of the defence have been disclosed in the
committal proceedings the magistrate has not had the benefit, in advance,
of such indications.
Mr Bone in his commentary suggests that the implementation of a pre-
trial call over would be of substantial value. I would add that some six
months ago I caused to be implemented in the country and suburban courts
a procedure whereby the Clerk of the Court, some fourteen days prior to
the date set for the hearing, sought confirmation from the police and the
solicitors on the record of the readiness of the parties to proceed. This pro-
cedure has nonetheless achieved only limited success, as frequently non—
criminal cases in the nature of civil claims and family law matters with time
previously reserved for their hearing and apparently then some fourteen
days prior to the hearing ready to proceed were subject to last minute settle-
ment. Little can be done to overcome this circumstance.
Sgt Taylor made reference in his commentary to 5.33 of the Justices
Act as affording protection to defendants by limiting the period of adjourn-
ment of indictable matters to not more than eight days unless with the con—
sent of the defendant. Whilst most defendants acknowledge the existence of
some period of delay and are prepared to consent to a longer period of ad-
journment than eight days there is a small but growing number of more ex-
perienced defendants insisting, perhaps unreasonably in all the cir-
cumstances, on the adjournment not exceeding eight days. This. of course,
can be disruptive to court management. It is time consuming in coming to
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fix an earlier date for hearing, moving some other fixture, a
nd in the long
run is in no real sense profitable to the defendant.
Sgt Taylor, like me, made reference to the use of 5.
753 of the Justices
Ac! as a streamlined ex parle procedure and, in fac
t, the benefits have prev-
ed quite substantial in relation to the conservation o
f time. One must ques-
tion, however, the use of such a procedure
which can permit, as it
sometimes does, one magistrate to dispose of a list
of up to 1,000 separate
cases in one five hour court day. A list of l,000 park
ing cases to be disposed
of in a five hour day, even generously making allowa
nce for the fact that for
up to say 200 of those matters the summons will no
t be served, still provides
a balance of 800 cases to be completed. Allowing
for pleas in mitigation by
solicitors and unrepresented defendants in some of the
balance of 800 cases,
a court is then required to deal “judicially” with th
e remainder in that court
day. Now no calculator is needed to show that the
disposal of at least 800
cases in five hours requires a rate of 160 judicial de
cisions per hour or 2'/2
such decisions every minute. This is a “sausage mach
ine" process. lt can be
described in ‘no other way and it certainly reflects no
credit on the system of
justice and perhaps evidences the pressing need for
the introduction of self
enforcing penalty nOtices, a matter to which 1 have
referred in my paper
(page 59).
In making reference to this sausage machine proce
ssing I intend to
reflect no discredit on magistrates who are ab
le to get through that
workload. They are able to adapt by reason of the
limited scope of those
type of cases to come to something in the nature of
a fixed working scale or
guide, and that provides for easy reference and
consistency in those
penalties. Bttt it is a frightening proposition that s
omebody would be asked
to come to a judicial decision at the rate of 2V2
every minute.
Mr Grove, on page l04, was troubled by my ref
erence on page 55 to
reversed onus. Perhaps l did not express myself
clearly. The reversed onus
provision 1 had in mind is such as is demonstrat
ed in the legislation in a case
such as “possession of property reasonably
suspected of being stolen" as
enacted originally in the Police Offences Ac!
then into the Summary Of-
fences Act and now in the Crimes Act. It is c
olloquially called “goods in
cUStody“. Such a provision of the legislation is
that a person who has in his
custody any property reasonably suspected
of being stolen or Otherwise
unlawfully obtained shall be guilty of an offenc
e and liable to a specified
penalty. However, the legislation goes on to pro
vide that it shall be a suffi-
cient defence to such a charge if the defendant
notifies the court that he had
no reasonable grounds for suspecting the pro
perty was stolen or otherwise
unlawfully obtained.
A further example is to be found, of course, i
n a charge under s.l78B
of the Crimes Act of obtaining a property by passing
a cheque not paid on
presetttation. The onus on the defendant in th
ese cases is, of course, a civil
onus.
I do not intend now to traverse my written th0ughts
in relation to com—
mittal for trial proceedings. Suffice to say that with a
n apparent intention in
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the Crown to make more use in appropriate cases of the summary ju
risdic-
tion of the Supreme Court more defendants will be facing t
rial without hav—
ing undergone committal proceedings. The rules made under
the Supreme
Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act set out a procedure whereby there
is vir-
tually a pre-trial disclosure to the accused of the matters on which the
Crown proposes to rely. Safeguards against trial by ambush are i
nbuilt,
granting of inspection of documents, including statements of all witnes
ses
can be required by the Court under its order. Does this differ in essence
from proposals made by myself and others and over some years f
or the in-
troduction of a system of “paper committals"? ls the disadvantage to
a
defendant of not participating in committal proceedings rea
l or imagined?
[f real, is it not exaggerated?
As a further example of the cumbersome nature of present
day com-
mittal proceedings 1 instance the committal proceedings 1 am stil
l currently
involved in hearing. As at today there has been since the Crown
opened its
case in March 1979 some 150 sitting days. Eight hundred docu
ments and
other items have been admitted as exhibits and a further 4,000 d
ocuments
and other items have been marked for identiﬁcation. The transcr
ipt has
now reached 12,000 pages. Senior Counsel for the Crown has ind
icated that
he does not expect the prosecution will complete the calling of
evidence
before the end of October. l was too frightened to ask and he w
as too
frightened to say in which year! On the assumption that it will b
e this year
nd on the basis of a four days per week hearing, that will entail a
pprox-
'mately a further 125 days before the Crown has adduced all th
e evidence
hat it seeks to call in its case. That will total 275 days approxi
mately to
omplete the evidence without making provision for addresses a
t the con-
lusion of the evidence, or indeed for the reception of further
evidence if a
rimafacie case is found established on the evidence. Can this be
said to be
in the spirit of the legislation? True it is this is an exceptional cas
e in many
respects, but as l have indicated already there is a substant
ial increase in the
:number of lengthy committal for trial proceedings. In fact thre
e cases of 40
Idays estimated duration are listed for hearing at Central Court ove
r the next
Efew weeks. There are a whole host of other matters and l indicat
ed some of
ithose in my paper. I could provide a substantial list in addition t
o that.
 
. The recent restatement of the purpose of committal proceed
ings by the
lCourt of Appeal in Moss v Brown & Anor touching on the subject
matters
of my present committal was indeed timely. Magistrates have a duty, a
s do
iCounsel, to keep proceedings within the confines of that judgmen
t. In view
.of the figures that l have just given you you might think that my
perfor-
mance then is a prime example of a classic failure to adhere to tho
se prin-
ciples and if that is the situation then, of course, l will have to b
ear that
responsibility.
Turning briefly to the current delay situation I am pleased to be able t
o
report that the cutting and pruning exercise to which I made reference in m
y
paper (page 60) has brought about improvement at almost eve
ry court
‘centre and that the delay period set out in Schedule 2 in my p
aper had been
ireduced by some two or three weeks at most centres.
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FOr the reasons previously given
courts at Central, Wynyard Hous
e
and St James Centre are in the
worst position but fortunately a
re not
worsening. It is perhaps notewort
hy that a steady volume of work m
ainly at
Central Court over recent years c
onsequent upon the arrest of pers
ons tak-
ing part in demonstrations and p
rocessions has substantially dimin
ished.
Nonetheless, despite the loss of th
ese time consuming cases from the
court
list, no real improvement has occu
rred in the position of Central Co
urt. I
add there of course that that c
ourt by reason of the concentra
tion of
magistrates at that centre finds its
elf at all times making itself availa
ble to
bring in urgent custodial cases fr
om the suburbs.
An air of pessimism exists among
magistrates generally as to the lik
ely
impact the introduction next week
of the Bail/1c! will have on list co
urts. It
‘is generally thought that the atte
ntion to detail required by that Ac
t will
cause a significant further delay
to the proceedings. Only time wil
l tell in
that regard.
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COMMENTARY
C. J. Bone
Deputy Public Solicitor
Public Solicitor’s Office. N.S.W.
Any unnecessary delay in finalising criminal proceedin
gs is to be
deplored because, apart from any justice that might resul
t in a specific case,
there is a general lack of public confidence in any legal system tha
t allows
such proceedings to be unduly protracted.
There is no doubt that many cases have to be adjourned
for varying
periods for quite valid reasons. It may be that a witness is no
t available, that
proper scientific tests have to be performed or that legal adv
ice is sought by
the defendant. it is perhaps trite to state that cases are adjo
urned every day
in magistrates courts because of reasons such as this. Obvio
usly there must
be some delay in finalising criminal proceedings. It is on
ly when that delay
is unnecessary that there should be cause for concern.
Effect of Delay
Unnecessary delay can have quite devastating effects on t
he course of
criminal proceedings. It is quite common to hear witnesses
attempt to give
evidence of something that occurred a long time ago state
that they find it
difficult to recall the events precisely and this problem i
s aggravated when
they are attempting to give evidence of conversations. C
ertain witnesses
overcome this problem to some extent by refreshing their
memory from a
statement made at the time of the incident or shortly afte
rwards but quite
often they will have no independent recollection of the inc
ident. It may be
that material not considered by that particular witness to be r
elevant will be
éomitted from the statement. It may then transpire that t
hat lost material is
lof crucial importance.
 
Lengthy delay can result in witnesses dying. leaving the ju
risdiction or
otherwise becoming unavailable to give evidence.
Many witnesses in criminal proceedings are what might
be termed
“‘lay" witnesses and will quite often suffer front stress pr
ior to their ap-
pearance in court. Any lengthy delay will of course have an in
creased effect
in this regard.
. Many defendants ask that their case be disposed of as
quickly as pos-
sible and it is apparent that they are more concerned about wa
iting for the
outcome than the outcome itself. An innocent person who has
been charged
with an offence will be anxious to secure his acquittal at the earliest p
ossible
time and unnecessary delay can have quite serious effects on that
defendant.
Unnecessary delay often involves the parties in quite heavy expens
e. If
;a matter is fixed for hearing on a certain day and does not proc
eed legal
irepresentatives and witnesses who have to attend again require addi
tional
Epayment.
 In
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All of the effects so far mentioned are significant but
none is as impor-
tant as the effect upon a defendant who is in custody
awaiting the disposi-
tion of his case. In the majority of cases the c
oncern of magistrates, com-
bined with statutory provisions, ensures that matters in
volving defendants
in custody are disposed of without unnecessary delay.
There have, however.
been cases where persons have been kept in cus
tody for quite lengthy
periods and have then been acquitted. In such case
s there is generally no
provision for any compensation. in cases where t
he defendant is subse-
quently convicted the time spent in custody may for
m part of a sentence but
in other such cases the appropriate sentence might
be something less than
the period spent in custody.
Mr Brown has indicated in his paper that magist
rates may have dif-
ficulties in recalling certain aspects of the evidenc
e when matters are ad-
journed part heard for lengthy periods. This dif
ficulty is encountered,
although probably to a lesser extent, by the legal re
presentatives of persons
appearing.
Causes of delay
There are many factors which contribute towards del
ay. Mr Brown has
referred to the increase in the number ofcases de
alt with by magistrates, the
increase in the number of lengthy and complex defend
ed matters, various
technical inadequacies, lack of accommodation and
the increase in the
number of cases where language difficulties are enc
ountered. He also
.examines two other areas. namely procedural in
adequacies and delays
occasioned by legal aid.
There is no doubt that revised procedures could
reduce delays but
extreme care must be taken in this area. The who
le subject of committal
proceedings is being reviewed and it may be that co
ntemplated alterations to
the current procedure will result in a proper sav
ing of the court‘s time. It
should be stressed. however, that time sa
ving procedures should not be
adopted at the expense of rights and principles
that have been introduced
into the criminal justice system over a long period
.
Because there is a variety of factors which contribu
te towards delay it is
difficult to ascertain if the provision of legal aid in
magistrates courts has
had any effect and, if so, the extent of that effect. A
paper presented to the
Seventeenth Conference of the International Bar
Association in 1978 con-
sidered, among other things, the effect of legal aid on
the volume and length
of litigation. Many of the conclusions reached were ba
sed on the results of a
questionnaire distributed in 20 countries and in a nu
mber of those countries
there had been an increase in the length ofcases. The
response in New South
Wales was most cautious and the consensus revealed a te
ndency towards
increased length of litigation. In my opinion. a lack
of financial resources
and an ignorance of the law has prevented many peo
ple from securing the
due proteCtion of the law. If there is an increa
se in the number of defended
matters because of the provision of legal aid no apol
ogy should be needed.
Legal representation if desired in criminal procee
dings should be a right
rather than a privilege and any increase in the length
of cases caused because
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of representation is not unnecessary delay. [t has been suggested that where
a person charged with a criminal offence is legally aided his or her represen-
tative should carefully examine the matter before a plea of not guilty is
entered. I consider that there should be no difference in approach by a
practitioner whether his client is legally aided or not.
Miscellaneous
As indicated earlier the concern of magistrates, combined with
statutory provisions, ensure that persons in custody are given priority when
cases are adjourned. In practice, the magistrate will give the earliest possible
hearing date to a defendant who has been refused bail or who is unable to
obtain the bail sought. If it appears likely or certain that the defendant will
raise bail the case is generally adjourned for‘a longer period. Persons who
expect to raise bail are occasionally disappointed and because of a lack of
any satisfactory review procedures can remain in custody awaiting the hear-
ing for quite lengthy periods.
There has been a great deal of publicity given to the provisions of the
Bail Act and there have been some suggestions that implementation of the
Act will cause delay. It is difficult to ascertain whether these fears will be
justified.
Remedies
As a response to any problem it is possible to suggest several solutions
such as an increase in the number of courts, more efficient court facilities
and the appointment of more magistrates. My own experience indicates
that, whilst in some individual cases and at some specific courts, delay is
serious, in most instances there is no undue delay in criminal proceedings in
magistrates courts. 1 agree with Mr Brown that greater responsibility is re-
quired from everybody involved to ensure that maximum use is made of
available court time and I am of the opinion that a compulsory pre-hearing
call-over system should be introduced. At present a case might be adjourned
for three months and no attempt by either the prosecution or defence or
both will be made to make the necessary arrangements for witnesses until
shortly before the date of hearing. It might then be discovered that a witness
is unavailable and that this information could have been made available
earlier. At that stage it is too late for the court to use the time that is lost if
the matter cannot proceed. Some improvements would flow from a system
which compelled the representatives of the informant and the defendant to
advise the court say two weeks before the hearing that all witnesses had been
contacted and were available.
 9|
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
C. J. Bone
1 would like to thank the Institute for
presenting this topic for discus-
sion because as far as I am concerned this
particular topic goes to the very
heart of our criminal justice system. I think
that it would be fair to say that
one often hears criticisms of the criminal
justice systems in different coun-
tries, and that the criticism is quite often b
ased on the fact that citizens of
those countries are kept in custody fo
r lengthy periods without being
brought to trial. I think it is equally im
portant for us to realise that we
should examine our own system regularly,
and we should take every step to
ensure that any unnecessary delay is id
entified and eliminated if that is
possible.
Mr Brown in the Schedules to his parﬁcu
lar paper, has presented us
with a wealth of detail as far as statistics a
re concerned, and these statistics
show quite clearly the extent of delay over
the last three years in C0urts of
Petty Sessions, particularly when one lo
oks at defended cases involving
people who are not in custody. My own arit
hmetic would suggest that at the
beginning of 1977 the average delay in the s
etting down for hearing of those
cases was approximately nine weeks. At th
e end of I979 the average delay
was around l3 weeks. Mr Brown in the pr
esentation of his paper has said
that there has been some improvement. Ther
e has been the appointment of
additional magistrates, and, no doubt
, that has had, and will have, some
effect. '
Thirteen weeks, as far as I am concerned,
for people who are not in
custody is probably a reasonably tolerable
limit. It is three months, and
there would be some suggestions that witn
esses would find it difficult to
recall specific instances after three months. It
was fairly clearly stated by Mr
Hogan in his paper that the delay in the S
upreme Court, for example, is
tolerable and that that was some three to
six months, so 1 think three
months in Courts of Petty Sessions is reas
onably tolerable if one bears in
mind the fact that the people we are talking a
bout are not in custody. I think
however, that the real problem that we hav
e to face is where the defendant
is kept in custody awaiting his hearing. Mr B
rown has indicated in his paper
that as far as he is concerned every effort i
s made to ensure that a person in
custody is brought to trial as soon as po
ssible, and l think that I would have
to agree that in nearly all cases absolut
e priority is given to 'such a
defendant.
There are a few problems which concern
me in relation to that par-
ticular matter and perhaps I could give an
illustration. About the middle of
last year a defendant appeared in Central C
ourt of Petty Sessions. He was
unrepresented when first arrested and he en
tered a plea of “not guilty" to
the particular charge which was a fairly mi
nor matter, he was charged with
using a restricted substance. This partic
ular defendant indicated to the
magistrate that he would be able to obtain
approximately $200 in bail. The
matter was adjourned for some 13 wee
ks, which was the average period at
the time, and bail was allowed at $200.
N0w, unfortunately, the defendant
did not raise the bail. As a result he spent t
hat l3 weeks in custody, he ap-
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peared before a magistrate, adhered to his plea of
“not guilty”. The
magistrate held that there was no prima facie case and he was immedia
tely
released. Had anybody had any idea when he first appeared that h
e could
not raise bail then that case would have been set down for heari
ng very
quickly and presumably the defendant would have been rel
eased very
speedily. It was an offence, for which if convicted, he wo
uld have expected
to receive a fairly minor sort of penalty. He would probably have
been fined
a couple of hundred dollars at the most, and yet he remai
ned in custody for
some 13 weeks through no fault of his own. There was no suggesti
on that he
main in custody for that period of time. The point that l m
ake is that there
was no really “fail safe" review procedure which could draw
this particular
problem to everybody’s attention.
It has been suggested to me that the provisions of the Bail A
ct, which is
due to be implemented next week, could improve this sit
uation to some ex-
. tent. 1 also believe that the Criminal Law Review Division i
s examining a
1 proposal that was originally suggested some years ago, i
.e., visiting justices
: should review regularly the cases of people who were allow
ed bail but were
unable to raise bail. I think it is very important that we look
at that because
if we do concede that 12 or 13 weeks is a tolerable period to allo
w defended
3 matters to be adjourned, we must also realise that some
people who expect
1i to get bail will not get bail and those people will not dr
aw that particular
fact to anybody‘s attention.
 
l.
I
i There are obviously a number of causes for delay in any
system of
criminal justice. These problems are, of course, quite complex
and it is very
difficult to ascertain exactly what cause produces exactly what
delay. Com-
mittal proceedings are being reviewed at the moment and we
all hope that
_ there might be some improvement caused as a result of those
particular
1 reviews. I hasten to point out however, that change should
not be made
lightly and 1 think we all should be very careful that we do not
affect basic
fundamental rights purely and simply in an attempt to speed up
the process.
Legal aid has certainly been mentioned very specifically i
n the papers
by Mr Hogan and Mr Brown. Both of the speakers have indic
ated their full
' support for legal aid and yet I seemed to detect somewhere i
n those papers a
note that perhaps the increase in delay caused by the legal aid
scheme could
be avoided in some way. I think l should make my position
very clear on
this particular point.
I would be the first to concede that the increase in legal aid ove
r the last
three or four years in the Courts of Petty Sessions has had some ef
fect upon
delay. The Public Solicitor in 1979 in Newcastle, Sydney and
Wollongong
represented around 20,000 people. Similarly a lot of peo
ple were
represented in the country areas through legal aid schemes
and also in
Children's Courts. Six or seven years ago the overwhelming ma
jority of
those people would not have been legally represented and l have
no doubt
that things would have gone through a little bit quicker becaus
e of that.
Because legal aid has been introduced and because it is conceded t
hat the in-
troduction of that scheme has resulted in some delay, 1 d
o not think that
 
was a particularly bright person, and apparently he was quite
content to re-,
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there is any need to make any apology fo
r that particular fact. Legal
representation in criminal proceedings is a basic righ
t, and if the introduc-
tion of a legal aid scheme adds a week or two
weeks or even more to these
cases, then I think that that is something that h
as to be faced. The answer to
the problem caused is no! to get rid of legal aid or
to diminish legal aid in
any way, shape or form, but to consider the
problem itself yvhich lies well
and truly with the administration. The administ
ration has to accept the fact
that extra facilities must be made available. 1 a
m fairly convinced that legal
aid enhances any system of criminal justice rat
her than detracts from it, and
if there are some minor increases in delay and
other problems caused by the
introduction of such a scheme then that is somethi
ng that I think we have to
accept.
-
Mr Parnell (page 123) makes a number of int
eresting observations and
one of those observations relates to statements
from the dock. Personally l
do not think that statements from the dock ac
tually add to any great extent
to criminal trials. In fact, I think that in
a number of cases they would pro-
bably result in trials taking a little shor
ter time. But, by the same token, I
think that the point made by Mr Parnell is a ve
ry important one. This par-
ticular idea has been subject to some criticism
in recent years. I fully sup-
port statements from the dock. They give peo
ple, who may be quite under-
privileged, the chance to put their story to the c
ourt in a way that they pro-
bably would not be able to if they followed t
he Strict rules of examination
and cross-examination. I do not think that th
at does lead to delay, and l
think that to change any type of system purely
and simply for the sake of
change would be a bad thing. I would certainly
ask all those associated with
the administration of criminal justice to en
sure that before changes are
made they ensure that no basic fundamental
right was prejudiced in any
way.
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COMMENTARY
Sergeant 15! Class 0. Taylor,
New South Wales Police Prosecuting Branch.
As a commentator on the paper prepared by Mr B. Brown, Deputy
Chief Stipendiary Magistrate, it was necessary for me to read and under-
5tand his thoughts and the principles on the subject of ”Problems of Delay
in Criminal Proceedings".
At the outset, 1 wish to state that there is nothing incompatible to that
contained in Mr Brown’s paper to that which in my mind, should apply to
all matters coming before Courts of Petty Sessions and therefore I feel free
to express the views on behalf of the New South Wales Police Department
that an early determination of all prosecution‘s initiated by members of the
Police Force is a most desirable commodity.
The problems of delay in criminal proceedings is always a matter of
concern whether it is looked at through the eyes of the judiciary or through
the eyes of the law enforcement agency. I don‘t always see it as a problem
though, when looked at through the eyes of the defendant or accused
person. The judicial concern, particularly at the magistrate’s level, is kept
paramount through legislation governing the conduct of Courts of Petty
Sessions. Section 33 of the Justices Ac! when dealing with indictable
matters, makes provision to adjourn proceedings where from the absence of
witnesses or for any other reasonable cause, a justice considers it necessary
or advisable to do so. Under this section the justice is bound to obtain the
consent of the defendant, if such adjournment is to exceed eight clear days.
Section 68 of the Justices Ac! enables the justice to adjourn the hearing
of summary matters in the exercise of their discretion to a time and place to
be nominated by them in the presence of the defendant. There is no specific
statutory restriction placed on the justice as in 5.33, but a clear control is
maintained through the discretion given them and no doubt the ejusdem
generis principle is applied as in indictable matters when considering the
length of adjournment in summary matters.
Section 56 of the Jusu'ces Ac! is yet another legislative provision
highlighting the necessity to deal swiftly with detected offences of a sum—
mary nature. The laying of informations or making of complaints is limited
to six months from the time when the matter of the information or com-
plaint arose. There are a number of specific summary offences that allow
for a greater period for the commencement of summary proceedings, but
the Justices Act does limit most summary offences to a period of six
months. However, in relation to indictable matters, they being more serious
in nature. an unlimited period exists in which to commence proceedings.
It is all very well to quote axioms and utopian ideals such as “Justice
delayed is justice denied" and “Justice must not only be done, but must be
seen to be done". Regard must always be had to the practicalities of the
problem that causes the delay in criminal proceedings. There is no doubt
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that the originator of the title to t
he discussion tonight, was aware t
hat a
problem exists and Mr Brown ackn
owledges that the problem exists a
nd he
enumerates the following as possible caus
es:
1. An increase in the work load on
magistrates. (Or better put, the
lack of a sufﬁcient number of magi
strates.)
A questionable accent on legal aid.
The lack of available court accom
modation in certain areas.
The absence of alacrity in the insta
llation of technical facilities for
the recording of evidence.
1 now support the proposition tha
t there is a problem arising from
the
delay in criminal proceedings and p
erhaps 1 can itemise some of those
prob-
lems as seen through the eyes of th
e prosecution.
l. Firstly, it is not unusual, but
now accepted as the norm for
defended matters to be adjourned
for up to three months and
more in Courts of Petty Sessions. Th
e reasons are all too obvious
when a study is made of the reman
d diaries maintained by Police
Prosecutors and Magistrates. In f
act, one wonders whether it is
fair to police, witnesses, litigants a
nd defendants to jam cases in
for hearing on days already obvi
ously over-listed. I know that
many adjournments are made to a
day with a strong prayer or a
hope that time will be made availa
ble through a collapsed list or
additional judicial assistance. Phr
ases such as “Not reached",
“Priority” and “Part heard” only
seem to test the ability of a
typist to spell and adds to the frust
ration of hopeful parties in the
court.
A number of ways exist to mak
e more time available in Court
s of
Petty Sessions. As an example
of this type of thinking, in 19
73
5.758 of the Justices Act was
introduced to alleviate the he
avy
listings of traffic matters and d
o away with the necessity of cal
ling
large numbers of police and
civilian witnesses to prove tr
affic
cases in an ex parte manner. Th
ankfully, this section is worki
ng
most satisfactorily and certainl
y is time saving.
A further time saving innovati
on begging to be introduced is
in
the area of extradition. In order
that a person be extradited fro
m
another country to this State. it
be'comes necessary to establish
to
a prima facie degree, the off
ence for which extradition is
re-
quired. When that person is so
extradited. it seems a redundan
t
exercise to require the prosecut
ion to establish once again in
the
presence of the defendant, a p
rima facie case in order for t
hat
person to be committed for tr
ial. In the event of that perso
n‘s
committal for trial.,all the
witnesses are called for a t
hird time
before a judge and jury durin
g the trial of that person. Sur
ely a
more functional system would
be for the Attorney—General
to
exercise his inherent power to
file an ex officio indictment.
Any
criticism of unfairness to the
accused is nullified as he is m
ade
aware of the case he is required
to meet when he appears befor
e
lﬂql
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the c0urt in the country of arrest and made fully aware
of the
evidence the prosecution will rely upon to establish the off
ence for
which extradition is required.
4. Another way to overcome the problems of delay in c
riminal pro-
ceedings in Courts of Petty Sessions lies in the sphere
of those
indictable offences not covered by 5.476 of the Crimes A
ct or
s.5lA of the Justices Act; those serious felonies and i
ndictable
misdemeanours that can only be determined by a judge an
d jury. I
particularly refer to complicated fraud matters and serious
sexual
offences against females and young people. Whilst there
is a wide
difference between the two types of offences, they each p
resent
their own time consuming procedures from a prosecution
’s point
of view. The fraud matters often require the calling
of many
witnesses and the tendering of volumes of documents to establis
h
the link'between the defendant and‘ the many transaction
s that
have taken place. In sexual matters against females an
d young
persons, 1 am always amazed or aghast at the privilege or a
dvan-
tage given to the accused. to exercise his right of silence,
to sit in
coward’s corner and have the benefit of two bites of the apple.
On
the other hand, how distasteful it must be for a victim to
suffer
the traumas and indignities of a double cross examination
in the
witness box at committal level and subsequently before a jury.
When considering the dispensation of justice, particularl
y in the
area of early hearings, regard should be had beyond that
of a
defendant or an accused person.
The constancy of the phrase “In fairness to the defendan
t or
accused” gives rise to a belief that the defendant is the
one to
receive the greatest consideration. There is certainly room
to
believe that society, the complainant or the individ
ual offended
against, is not entitled to equal judicial consideration a
s is an
accused person. I am supported in this assumption by the
words
of Lord Goddard in Grondkowski’s case' when he said,
‘The judge must consider the interests of justice as well as
the
interests of prisoners. lt is too often nowadays, thought o
r
seems to be thought, that the interests of justice means
only
the interests of the prisoners’.
This verbage of Lord Goddard and the principles he enunciat
ed in
Grondkowski’s case were mentioned recently by our S
upreme
Court of Appeal in Mass v. Brown,z over decisions made by
Mr
Brown in relation to the supply of particulars and the hearin
g of
groups of defendants in lengthy conspiracy charges current
ly part
heard at the Central Court of Petty Sessions. It was held in Mos
s
v. Brown that the non-supply of particulars and the method
adopted by the court at committal level as to the number
of per-
sons to be dealt with at one time, was not unfair to the
defendant
and that the rights of the Crown were being ignored.
‘Mariun (irondkowski. 3l C.A.R. H6.
:Mus‘s v. [iron-n uml Ann/her (I979) l N.S.W.L.R. H4.
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This is yet another example of a superior court remin
ding other
courts that the interests of justice means that an equ
al balance
must be maintained between the interests of the defenda
nt and the
interests of the prosecution. A solution to this proble
m and a time
saving innovation would lie in either the tender o
f affidavit
evidence or the submission of a full brief of ev
idence to an
examining magistrate for perusal and a subsequent f
orwarding of
the papers to the Clerk of the Peace, if he considers
the evidence
justifies the action.
Mr Brown has mentioned s.5lA of the Justices Act. I a
m pleased
to see that he has highlighted an area that exists in that
legislation
enabling a defendant to select his own judge. To back—
flip in re-
lation to his plea — call it what you will. ln s.51A of the
Justices
Act or a hand-up situation where the defendant has in
dicated his
intention to plead guilty to the charge, a full brief of
evidence is
compiled by the investigating police, examined by an experi
enced
Police Prosecutor, viewed by the defendant, a
lmost without
exception scrutinised by the defendant’s legal represe
ntative,
accepted by the Stipendiary Magistrate as a correct cha
rge and
supported by the documented evidence, acted upon by the
Clerk
of the Peace, and yet when that individual appears be
fore the
wrong judge, he changes his plea and the papers are remitted
back
to the Clerk of Petty Sessions for a full hearing. A great was
te of
time and a further indication of a judicial indulgence in favo
ur of
an accused. Why not make provision for a judge to ackn
owledge
his change of plea and simply list the matter for hearing acce
pting
the papers before him as a formal indictment.
I applaud Mr Brown for his comment and forthright
ness in
discussing the delays occasioned through the introduction
of legal
aid. Like him, there is a certain trepidation lest it be
construed
that my criticism of the legal aid system be taken as tot
al opposi-
tion to the scheme. Far from it, and should I fail to
reveal my
correct views on this most delicate area, I wish to quot
e the words
of the Right Honourable Sir Garfield Barwick,
Chief Justice of
Australia, taken from his address at the 20th A
ustralian Legal
Convention in Adelaide on the 2nd July l979.’
One aspect of the workload of the courts, State
, Territorial
and Federal, ought at once to be mentioned. The incr
ease in
the demand for judicial service in the disposal of cr
iminal
proceedings has been very considerable. In the case of s
ome
courts. so great and continuous is this demand
that the
disposal of civil disputes may be impeded or delayed.
Not
only has the number ofcriminal charges to be tried incr
eased:
but the length of the trials themselves appears to be incr
eas-
ing. How far the availability of legal aid has contribute
d to
this latter phenomenon may be a real question. Probably
no
adequate statistics are available on which to form a sa
tisfac-
tory conclusion. Statistics of the length of time it takes to d
eal
"chorled in the Ausll'a/iun Law Journal volum
e 53. 487 at 489.
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with legally aided cases compared with the time taken in cases
which are not so aided and ol‘ the number of acquittals which
have resulted from legally aided defences as compared with a
general average w0uld, amongst other figures, be helpful. I
mention elsewhere in this address the need for responsibility
in the decision to grant legal aid. Here I would refer to the
professional responsibility on the practitioner when handling
a legally aided case. I would not for a moment suggest that a
legally aided litigant should receive less then the profession’s
best service. On the other hand, 1 would expect that the fact
that the community is providing representation perhaps on a
per diem basis would not lead to any unnecessary lengthening
of a case. The profession has a great responsibility to hold the
balance; to do justice to the case, efficiently without waste or
unnecessary consumption of time. For his part, no doubt, the
judge will also see that public time is not needlessly occupied.
Conclusion
I am grateful for the opportunity to be called upon to comment on Mr
Brown’s paper, enabling the voice of a policeman to be heard in this
obviously concerned audience, not necessarily in criticism. but in the hope
that the system that exists might be improved upon for the good of all,
particularly the law abiding community of our society. In concluding this
address, and perhaps expressing a hope by the Department I represent, may
I remind you that the motto of the New South Wales Police Force is,
Culpam Poena Premi! Comes which is translated as, “Punishment Follows
Close on Guilt" or succinctly, “Punishment Swiftly Follows Crime". It
follows that our motto cannot be fulfilled if there are delays in criminal
proceedings.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Sergeant 0. Taylor
As a police prosecutor sitting in the various courts of Petty
Sessions
throughout New South Wales one unwittingly draws compa
risons on the
quality and the work pattern of various magistrates. They do
'vary. Some of
them are good and some of them are a little better. Mr Brown i
n his paper
partly supports me in this proposrtion when he refers t
o the occurring fluc-
tuations attributable amongst other things to the rotati
on of magistrates.
All of us have differing work patterns whether we
be police pro-
secutors, judges or advocates and it follows that some of
our magistrates
are more cautious than others. Some of them are mo
re charitable than
others, or perhaps more gullible. Some of them are too qui
ck at times to set
a matter down as a defended matter when the defendant
is insisting upon his
guilt. Some magistrates, like some judges, develop a cl
ear reputation and
that reputation precedes them wherever they go. Ther
e are many people
who will take advantage of situations of frailties, of char
ities extended, and
all these advantages unfortunately add to the respective
delays in criminal
proceedings.
Practical solutions are needed, not criticisms of frail or
inadequate ad-
ministrators. Effective legislation is desperately needed pro
viding maximum
protection for the masses, not loopholes for the criminal
element. Permit
me to draw y0ur attention to just two recent amendments in
our legislation
in New South Wales that were primarily designed to overc
ome this problem
of delay.
Firstly, let me refer to the most recent amendme
nt in our Crimes
(Amendment) Act of 1979 making provision for a de
fendant to elect to be
tried for an offence in the Supreme Court in its summary
jurisdiction. This
is a half hearted attempt to introduce effective legislation
. What irrespons-
ible white collar criminal would lucidly elect to go before
a Supreme Court
judge in a difficult fraud matter in the absence of a jury
? No criminal in his
right mind would allow the prosecution such a luxury a
nd the court such
expediency. This particular amendment in the Crimes Act
will slowly choke
in its gathering dust.
On the other hand let me relate back to what Mr Br
own said about
5.758 of the Justices Act. This section came into effec
t in 1973 and has
proved to be working most satisfactorily. It enables
many of Our
magistrates to deal with thousands of cases a year in th
e absence of defend-
ants. It does away with the necessity of the police and
the many civilian
witnesses to give evidence. We all welcome these facilita
ting pieces of
legislation.
Each of the speakers to the various papers has
made particular
reference to $5 lA of the Justices Act. If nothing else
comes of this seminar
it is hoped that something will be done to this piece
of legislation that the
criminal now uses to good effect. Section 51A of the J
ustices Act enables an
indictable matter to be dealt with by a defendant th
rough the tender of cer-
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tain documents. What invariably happens is as follows: it is a section utilis-
ed by detectives and experienced police, who will arrest an individual and in
that arrest a detective and the defendant generally develop a particular rap-
port, and in many instances the detective becomes aware that the defendant
is anxious to plead “guilty”. The defendant is charged with an offence and
the detective will provide statements or evidence in statement form to sup-
port the charge. That detective will hand that brief to an experienced pro-
secutor who will likewise read the statement and makes sure it supports the
charge. The third step is for that defendant to appear before one of our
stipendiary magistrates who likewise reads the evidence and satisfies himself
that the evidence supports the charge. He then having satisfied himself that
the defendant wants to plead “guilty” sends the defendant on for a sentence
to the District Court and those papers again are viewed by an officer of Mr
Hogan’s department. That is the fourth step. It then goes before a judge
and the defendant says “I don’t like him". I have a file in front ofme at the
moment where a prostitute has 500 convictions for loitering plus other of-
fences. She would know as many magistrates as 1 would know. These
criminals equally know their judges and what poor legislation is it that
enables a criminal to select his own judge? But it is there. The judge then
remits the matter back to the magistrate and the prosecution have to go into
the evidence. Now in the context of the subject “Delay in Criminal Pro-
ceedings“ is it not the answer for the judge to say “Thank you, you have
changed your plea. I will now accept these papers as a formal indictment",
and the matter is listed for trial? It is as simple as that, and you would find
that very few defendants would be “back flipping to Petty Sessions".
Finally, we all look to our courts for the protection of the innocent but
a balance must be struck, and too much unnecessary concern for an accused
can cause not only calamitous delays but disadvantage victims of crime and
frustrate progress in our judicial system.
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COMMENTARY
M. B. Grove, QC.
Barrister-at—Law
Participants at this seminar have had p
resented two admirably resear—
ched, thoughtful and thought-stimula
ting papers. Upon each has been
made two commentaries. Why then, mi
ght reasonably be asked, this final
helping to digest after the pieces de resi
stance? 1 can only presume that it is
intended that I add some sauce. My o
rientation may be slightly different
from other speakers in that I am not in
government service and although I,
.of course, acknowledge the statutory i
ndependence of the offices held by
some of the speakers and commenta
tors, I come wholly disconnected
from
the machinery of state which operates th
e courts. These views, opinions and
ruminations are my own and I do not p
resent them as an official view of the
Bar Association to which I belong, nor
even a surveyed consensus of my
colleagues — they are nothing but that
for which I must take full respons-
ibility. As legal aid seems to have earne
d frequent mention in the papers —
universal espousals of the availability o
f such in principle, and as many
none-too-subtle hints that it is the causa
causans of extended hearing time
— I should add a caveat that my express
ions of view are not made on behalf
of the Legal Services Commission of Ne
w South Wales of which I have the
privilege to be a part-time member.
May I refer to Mr Hogan‘s paper first.
Little difficulty is felt in supporting h
is proposition that an office
responsible for the preparation of prose
cutions should devote its efforts
solely to that task unencumbered by r
egistry or similar administrative
burdens. Efficient prosecution surely jus
tifies no complaint from an accus-
ed person. lnefficiency is to the detrime
nt of all. It is a logical extension of
such support that I endorse the opening
ofoffices in a significant number of
non-metropolitan areas.
However, I make mention of my sup
port of such re-organization
because, in the midst of the description
of such, almost casually it appears.
it is suggested that the present system o
f court vacations be “looked at"
with a view to ascertaining whether their
elimination would alleviate delay
in disposing of cases. The prefatory exemp
lifications to the suggestion leave
a distinct impression that the writer favo
urs such elimination. There is some
support for such itt one of the commentar
ies already given. I do not seek to
give to this subject what I believe would
be an unwarranted importance by
dwelling upon it too long. I would menti
on that, for better or for worse, the
Sttpretne Court no longer recesses for
a short vacation in mid-year. 1 am
unaware of any increase in the efficienc
y of the disposal of cases for trial iii
the Supreme Court resulting from suc
h abolition. Reference is made to
police leave and no doubt members o
f that force are almost invariably
witnesses in criminal trials. Attempt is
made, quite properly, to accom-
modate listing to their planned leave a
ttd no doubt the needs of other
anticipated witnesses. I do not perceive
a contribution towards the elimina-
tion of delay emerging from a plan th
at would presumably attempt to ac—
commodate the separate vacation pl
ans of Crown Prosecutors, defence
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counsel and instructing solicitors on both sides as well. On the defence side,
the numbers of lawyers to be accommodated are likely to increase propor-
tionate to multiplicity of jointly tried defendants.
Observation indicates that some trials do proceed during vacation
periods. No doubt such occur by special arrangement, but, short of grossly
interfering with an accused concerning his choice of representative, it would
then seem that all matters would require such special attention rather than
the few. [I is not the appropriate place here to debate the pros and cons of
court vacations but it would be self evident that advantages accrue to the
community from the capacity of legal personnel to convene, either infor-
mally or at formal convention, and exchange ideas and experience away
from the routine pressures of office. Lawyers need breadth of experience
not narrowness. .
I welcome Mr Hogan’s statement that he “strongly supports legal
aid”. 1 question the implication in his following remarks that legal aid is
relevantly discussed in the context of delay unless it is intended to be
asserted that legal aid or its availability is a cause or catalyst of the abuse of
procedure. It seems to me that if a person exercises his lawful rights then he
cannot be criticized if he takes time so to do. lf the remarks really mean
that, in the absence of legal aid, an accused person is unlikely to have been
aware of his rights and therefore to exercise them, then the critic should be
prepared to specify which rights he would remove. I note the statistical
observation that trials are longer now (on average) than they were lO to 15
years ago. It may be that the better equipped forces of the Crown were
simply heard to some exclusion of the unassisted accused in the past. It may
be of relevance to note that the 1969 edition of the New South Wales Law
Almanac lists 20 Crown Prosecutors (metropolitan and country) whereas
the 1979 edition lists 35 — an increase of some 75%. The same editions list
three and 14 Public Defenders respectively. I offer the observation that
there seems a general awareness in the community of individual rights,
particularly contra the State whether in criminal or civil context and indeed
legal rights are now taught or at least discussed at high school level and it
may be that the awareness of citizens leads to a preparedness to contest
allegations, and to insist upon due process of law which was not previously
present.
I turn to some of the suggestions for reducing the number of trials in
the District Court as distinguished from reducing the length oftrials. l have
the misfortune to disagree vehemently with Mr Hogan when he describes
trial by judge and jury as a luxury. I need not remind those present of the
history leading to the right of judgment by one's own peers. l readily
acknowledge in our society the vast numbers of minor and not so minor of-
fences, substantial and regulatory, whercfrom such right has been removed.
I aver that such removal should be seen in proper context and from a correct
starting point. Citizens charged with offences should be entitled to the ver-
dict ol‘ their peers and this right is removed by the legislature for reasons,
good or bad. I do not start at the other end with an assumption that alleged
' offences are triable summarily until you get, as it were, to a stage ofl seriousness whereat trial by jury is appropriate. Obviously offences triable
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summarily properly have available upo
n conviction a lesser range of penalty
than those the subject of a trial at wh
ich every legal right, including pro-
cedural rights, has been availabl
e. Surely, however, the touchst
one for
determination of whether a class
of offence is to be stripped of
such
availability of full trial is not to be mere
ly the penalty likely to be imposed. I
pause to note that it is only in matter
s of contest that such full trial is re-
quired. I would perceive a community
interest in the determination of guilt
or innocence particularly in offences
alleged against $.52A' of the Crimes
Ac! arising out of the very numbers of
the matters coming before the court.
Indeed the stated uncertainty engende
red by the unreliability of tools with
which the prosecution has seen fit to ar
m itself, or the legislature to provide,
would seem to me overwhelmingly t
o call for active community involve-
ment. A jury provides this. A great
deal of the procedural law in this
country is sensitive to the situation of t
he individual accused and the need to
weigh and determine every piece of li
tigation upon the merits of evidence
presented. The inexorable routine which
Mr Hogan describes as surround—
ing the breath analysis instrument besp
eaks a danger of perfunctoriness. In
so saying, I offer no criticism of the mot
ives and diligence ofthe magistracy
or the judiciary but an observation of
what I think would be the inevitable
result of dull routine.
Specifically on Mr Hogan’s paper I fi
nally make reference to his sug-
gested adoption of pretrial conference
procedures. I observe the terms in
which he offers the matter for discussi
on. I am attracted to the concept of
definition of issue. As distinguished fro
m listing delays, I would think that
in this area lies the best opportunity for
eliminating delays during the trials
themselves. More radical suggestions
have been made elsewhere, for
example an alteration in the style of def
inition of offences, and a require-
ment that charges be formulated in term
s of particulars so that an accused,
in effect, is required to put in issue t
hose elements of a charge which he
opposes. I respectfully commend Mr H
ogan‘s suggestion as a means of ex-
perimenting available within the frame
work of our present system which
would perhaps indicate whether worth
while savings in time, without pre-
judice to either side of the litigati
on, can be achieved.
1 have not perceived it as my function
to comment upon the commen—
taries but I would record my dissent fr
om the proposition so eloquently put
by Detective Inspector King that the po
lice brief of the style used for com—
mittals under s.51A of the Justices Ac
! substitute for committal hearings.
Admirable as I concede the police inst
ructions in relation to preparation of
such to be, I draw upon common hum
an experience that not all who set out
attain as high standard as set, and I f
ear for the consistent quality. More
significant, however, is the nature of
the material out of which the brief is
prepared. It contains, for example. t
he statements of police officers and
witnesses which may well have b
een taken, indeed, one would th
ink are
likely to have been taken, as an aid to
detection and hopefully to solution.
Such material would only accidentally
emerge in accordance with the rules
of evidence and I do not suggest that
they should be so prepared. It would
be likely to be unusual that the ma
terial collated for the purpose of
investigation would be co—extensive wi
th that to be presented to the court as
evidence. It may be, that the case of
5.51A committals which necessarily
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import an admission of guilt there is some warrant for departure from
adherence to strict standards and for reliance upon the committing
magistrate to satisfy himself by selection of material contained in the brief
which should be properly in evidence. Except in that circumstance of admis-
sion of guilt, however, it is not possible for me to agree with such departure.
May I turn to Mr Brown’s paper. I refer to the series of questions com-
mencing with the following:
In a modern society, does it remain necessary or appropriate to leave
the defendant in a privileged position of being entitled to say nothing,
whilst the prosecution assembles its witnesses to prove each and every
ingredient of the charge.
Accepting the rhetorical nature of such questions, I suggest avenues of
thought along which answers might be found. Primarily, I suggest, one
needs to distinguish the concept of the right to silence from a notion that the
accused should indicate areas of contest. Such safeguards as are funda-
mental to or grafted upon the British-inherited system in currency in this
State must be taken to presume the right to silence of an accused. Systems
derived from continental Europe where accused persons may be required to
participate in investigation and/or trial have no doubt developed their own
separate systems of safeguards which are “geared” to accommodate to
local procedures. In the absence or ignorance of such I see no justiﬁcation
for termination of what stands as a fundamental right and indeed the risk
presents that such termination could well render nugatory those protections
which exist upon the presumed presence of such right.
An obligation of an accused to define areas of contest is distinguished
from the right to silence. I apprehend that the suggestion connotes an op-
tion remaining available for an accused to demand proof. In this context I
refer to Mr Hogan’s suggestion about a pre-trial conference and also the
n0tion of “pleading to particulars" earlier mentioned in this commentary. I
would be concerned that any such procedure would provide that an accused
person be not at risk of penalty for requiring the Crown to undertake its
onus of proof.
I have a contrary view to Mr Brown in relation to the use of averments
of fact as a substitute for proof. At best, I see it as a licence for ill-prepared
prosecution. It is contended that if a fact is an essential ingredient of an of—
fence alleged to have been committed then, ex hypolltesi, it is sufficiently
important to require evidence. I do not contemplate how a provision of
“reverse onus" can be compatible with there being no change in the general
law of requiring the onus of proof to be and remain upon the prosecution.
May I offer some comment on the concept of “paper committals".
Subject to the right of an accused person to object to and have excised any
inadmissible material in a document to be tendered against him and to re-
quire the maker of a statement to attend for cross-examination, the giving
j of evidence in chief in documentary form is at first glance attractive. Never—
: thcless, l have some reservations, one of which is admittedly subjective.
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Therefore, I offer these thoughts leading to su
ch for your consideration in
the light of-separate experience. I have observed peop
le who frequently give
evidence, and these include police officers in
particular, to appear to rely
heavily upon written statements as aides-memoire, o
ften it is suspected, to
the exclusion of any real attempt at recollection of facts a
s they were at the
time of happening. The leads to criticism that su
ch witnesses rather than
retelling events are simply ”parroting" the written wor
d. What occurs is not
altered by euphemistic descriptions such as “ref
reshing recollection“. I
simply perceive a risk that witnesses might be at
tracted to adopting a
posture of adherence to a formalised Statement rat
her than making a real
effort at recall of events, conversations or circumsta
nces. This may have to
be a tolerable circumstance when dealing with pro
fessional investigators
such as police officers who no doubt have to describ
e the circumstances ol'
numerous similar events. I question that it is in the i
nterests of a tribunal
trying to determine what a witness reliably‘attests to
extend the potential of
this situation. 1 would think that the presently require
d attempt at articula-
tion of fact, circumstance and recollection far more
likely to give oppor-
tunity for a tribunal validly to determine the weight
of evidence.
Once again. in Mr Brown’s paper, there is reference
to legal aid in the
context of delay. I do not repeat what I have earlier
said but I emphasize
that no one, least Mall 1, countenance the ab
use of legal aid, but in the
absence of some allegation of misconduct and the spe
cification thereof it is
difficult to perceive the relevance of its existence to de
lay in proceedings.
That a hearing might take longer where a person is
represented than it
would if he were unrepresented is equally likely to be a con
demnation of the
quality of the presentation of the case of the accused
in the first instance as
an indication that the legal representative is extendin
g the hearing in the
second. It is surely unnecessary to argue that expe
dition should be ob-
tainable at the expense of the dtte exercise of an accu
sed of his rights.
I repeat that I do not seek to comment upon the co
mmentaries.
However, a fresh matter raised by Sergeant Taylor in his f
orthright words
does induce response from me. I refer to his proposition co
ncerning extra-
dition. l have little doubt that most jurisdictions whi
ch would be prepared
to extradite an accused person to New South Wales would r
equire presenta-
tion of a prima facie case. However, what such a pers
on “enjoys“ is a
determination satisfactory to the sending country by virtu
e of which it is
prepared to despatch him or her to New South Wales. Any
hearing required
to make sttch determination may or may not be as rigo
rous as committal
proceedings in this State bttt l debate whether it can invaria
bly be presumed
to be a sufficient substitute. May I also respectfully
dissent from the
description of the ideals “justice delayed is juStice denie
d“ and “justice
must not only be done, but seen to be done" as Utopian. la
m concertted for
such as attainable and practical goals. as practical and
attainable now as
they must have appeared on Runnymede lslct to those who e
xtracted similar
terms in the Great Charter over three quarters of a millen
nium ago.
It is apparent that l have not sought to comment about the
whole ofthe
material in the two principal papers nor indeed upon th
e earlier commen-
taries. That I have recorded on occasions a different viewp
oint should nOt
-
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be taken as a general disagreement by me with sentiments expressed or pro-
posals made. 1 seek to leave no impression that I resist change ofany sort or
that I see Messrs Hogan and Brown as it were as new iconoclasts. l disavow
any such opinion and repeat the admiration first expressed in this writing
and add to it my appreciation of the excellent commentaries already made. I
have sought merely to advert to aspects upon which discussion might be
stimulated and particularly those to which I offer consideration of a dif-
ferent viewpoint to that already expressed.
I conclude with some general observations. I accept that no civilized
society would reasonably tolerate waste of resources be it money, material
or manpower. Nevertheless, it must be axiomatic that in the passage of
history a society can afford to expend resources more generously on some
things at one period than at another. The accusation and potential condem—
nation of an individual member of our society is an exercise which is of its
nature special. Each fellow member of that society must have a subjective
share in the exercise by reason of the accused individual being part of our
whole, as well as having what might be called an objective view of the situa-
tion. lt is possible then that procedures which are categorized as extravagant
from that latter view may be acceptable in another perspective. It may be
valid to argue that a society which needs the energies and attentions of its
citizens to the basic requirements for survival can expend less of its
resources upon enquiry into departuresfrom the norm and, if necessary, the
punishment of them. It is an available perception of the present state of this
society that technology is releasing greater numbers of people from in-
dustrial or agricultural toil and therefore it would seem legitimate to argue
that in terms of manpower the society can afford to provide for this special
exercise what is necessary for thoroughness. I certainly do not seek to
perpetuate inefficient or wasteful procedures merely because such man-
power may be available but it may well be that the lengthening of pro-
ceedings should be absorbed by the availability of a greater number of par-
ticipants available to try and conduct the proceedings. 1 see no inherent
necessity to maintain a more or less constant proportion between the
number of judges, barristers, crown prosecutors, counsel, solicitors etc to
population and, accordingly, see no vice in utilization of the maximum
number of trained personnel. Indeed, it does not seem that the future
portends a shortage of persons trained:
‘Taking into account a population increase expected by 1982 (to 14.5
million people) and allowing for retirement of about 5 per cent of
existing lawyers annually, Professbr Richardson suggested that the
profession, on a ratio of one lawyer to l,250 persons, could absorb
4,000 lawyers in the six years 1977 to 1982. This appeared to be only
one half of the 8,000 people (approximately) who could be expected to
graduate from the 10 university law schools during that period. That
figure did not allow for non-university c0urses such as that at the New
South Wales lnstitute of Technology and the Admission Boards
System’ —
Legal Education in New South Wales: Report of Committee of
Inquiry, Chapter 4, paragraph 2.5, New South Wales Government
Printer, December 1979.
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A PROCEDURAL REMEDY TO DELAY IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURTS:
A COMPARATIVE REFLECTION
Dr G. L. Cerroma, DoII.Giur. (Firenze), B.A., LL.M.
Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law
The University of Sydney
Introduction
Delay in criminal proceedings is not a problem unique to t
he Common
Law. The criminal courts in the “civil law” countries are eq
ually, if not
more so, afflicted with the problems of delay. One such
civil law juris-
diction is Italy. In Italy, the problem of delay is the result
of a number of
factors, not least the principle, well entrenched in the Constit
ution, which
denies to the prosecution any discretion whatsoever and req
uires the initia-
tion of criminal proceedings in the case of every infring
ement of the
Criminal Law, however trivial, which comes to the no
tice of the authorities.
This principle is known as the “mandatory initiation of c
riminal pro-
ceedings”: see A.l l2 Constitution.
Consequently, the problem of the overburdened courts has
attracted
the occupation of Italian criminal lawyers and proceduralis
ts for some time.
Since it is undesirable and, in a practical sense, impossible t
o alter the Con-
stitution, the solution to the problem has had to be songht o
utside the con—
stitutional arena. A major possibility has been through proc
edural reform.
The Ordinary Criminal Process in Italy
It may be fruitful, prior to coming to the major point of this
commen-
tary, to briefly describe the ordinary course of criminal proceed
ings in Italy.
The ordinary procedure, as regulated by the Code of Criminal P
rocedure
1930, comprises three broad phases of activity. First, the pre
-insrruclion
phase. This phase, which does not strictly form part of th
e judicial
proceedings, comprises the preliminary investigations by the p
olice and
prosecution to determine whether in fact the conduct under
examination
constitutes a breach of the criminal law and to determine the ident
ity of the
suspect. This phase closes with either a decision to initiate
proceedings
against the suspect, or a decision that the matter is wholly u
nfounded in
which case the prosecution must seek an order of arc/rivalion
from an
examining judge who constitutes the judicial control upon the de
cision of
the prosecution that there is no breach of the criminal law.
Second, (he instruclion phase which may be either forma
l, in which
case it is conducted by an examining judge, or summary,
where it is con-
ducted by the prosecution. This phase consists of the
assumption of
evidence which is primarily at the initiation and direction of t
he examining
judge, or, if relevant, the prosecution. The activities of th
is phase are
technically directed to a determination of whether there
is sufficient
. ..-._..._- . . _.___.___
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evidence to put the accused on trial. In the case of either form of instruc-
tion, if there is insufficient evidence, the examining judge acquits the
accused with a "semenza diproscioglimemo”. lfthere is sufficient evidence
to put the accused on trial, in the case ofa formal instruction the examining
judge makes an “ordinanza di rinvio in giudizio”, or in the case of a sum-
mary instruction the prosecution requests such order directly from the trial
judge, in this case called “decrelo di citazione”.
Third, and final, the trial phase which is conducted before an ad-
judicating panel, except the "prerura", the lowest criminal court which
consists of a single judge only. This phase is, at least theoretically,
characterised by orality and immediacy. However, it has degenerated into a
formal confirmation of the activities and evidence collected in the previous
instruction phase, such that the instruction phase, to the detriment of the
defendant, plays a major role in the decision of the court.
Q
It may be that the ordinary criminal process described above,
comprises many favourable features. However, it is not the aim ofthis com-
mentary to explore that aspect. But, it may be equally apparent that such
procedure would encumber the activities of a lower court which has the
onerous duty of dealing with a larger number of petty matters.
The Criminal Process before the Prerura in Italy
The procedure at the ”prerura” is basically the same as the ordinary
procedure described above except that all of the functions in the criminal
process are concentrated in the "pretore" (judge). The instruction is con-
ducted by the pretore in summary form: A.389(7) c.c.p. Consequently, the
instruction and trial are conducted by the same person. Moreover, in
accordance with A.74(l) c.c.p., the pretore has the function of prosecutor
and as such initiates the criminal proceedings against the accused.
Therefore, at the level of the pretura, the pretore has the functions of pro-
secution, initiation and collection of evidence and adjudication, an example
of a true inquisitorial procedure. The passage from the instruction phase to
the trial is not marked by any specific act except for the "decreto di cila-
:ione in guidizio” with which the pretore subjects the accused to a trial.
The Constitutional Court has often been called upon to consider the
compatibility of such accumulation of functions but in every case held it
constitutionally legitimate, basically because of economic and practical
considerations.
The pretore, however, has two special procedures available to him.
First, the so-called “giudizio direnissimo " whose main characteristic is the
absence of an instruction phase. It is used in cases in which, for example,
the accused is apprehended during the course of the commission ofa crime.
In such cases the pretore may bypass the instruction phase and immediately
place the accused on trial. Second, the “giudizio per deerero", whose main
characteristic is the absence of a trial. The purpose of this procedure is as an
economy measure. This special procedure and its operation in Italy shall
now be examined in some detail.
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The (iiudizio per Decreto: Judgment by Decree
The "giudizio per decreto”, regulated by Ar
ticles 506 to 510 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is the most
widespread of the special pro-
cedures prescribed by the Code. In sub
stance, the pretore may enter by
decree a criminal conviction, “decrelo penal
e di condanna”, without pro-
ceeding to a trial. Moreover, although there
is an instruction phase, it is
often abbreviated and generally consists of an
examination of the offending
conduct and such other investigations as
the pretore regards necessary,
usually, evidence leading to the identity of
the accused as the responsible
party and the absence of a manifest non—fo
undation of the charge.
There are various necessary pre-requisites for
a “decrelo penale di cori-
danna". First, the crime must be one within
the jurisdiction of the pretore.
The pretore has jurisdiction with respect to
all crimes which either carry a
maximum penalty of not more than three ye
ars detention, or a pecuniary
penalty either on its own or in conjunction
with a period of detention as
aforesaid: A.3l c.c.p. Second, it must be a c
rime which can be prosecuted
ex officio. A “decrelo penale di condanna”
cannot be entered where the ac-
cused has been declared a delinquent or a pr
ofessional or habitual offender
or have delinquent tendencies, nor where th
ere is a likelihood of applying a
preventive security measure against the accuse
d. Thirdly, a “decrelo penale
di condamia” can also be made where the
pretore proposes to impose a
pecuniary penalty. It follows, therefore, that
it can also be made where the
penalty for the crime in question is a period'of d
etention or pecuniary penal-
ty in the alternative provided that in the casei
n question the pretore intends
to apply only a pecuniary penalty.
The two basic characteristics of the proced
ure, as evinced from A506
c.c.p., are that it is optional at the discretion
of the pretore and there is an
absence of a trial.
Article 507 of the Code prescribes the fo
rmal requirements for this
form of judgment. The judgment must inclu
de, first, the name, age and ad-
dress of the accused and, if relevant, of the
person civilly obliged to make
reparation; second, the facts, name and
circumstances of the crime; third,
the factual and legal basis of the decision
; fourth. the penalty imposed
together with the articles of law applied; an
d fifth, the date and signatures
of the pretore and clerk to the court.
The decree must then be notified to the acc
used and, if applicable, to
the person civilly obliged to make repara
tion, together with the precept
ordering payment of the fine or reparation a
nd the COSlS of the proceedings.
The accused must also be notified that he may
oppose the decree wilhin five
days of ils noufiealion: A.507(2) c.c.p. If
the decree is not opposed within
five days of its notification the decree beco
mes executed and is equivalent to
a res judica/a decision: A.507(3) c.c.p.
An opposition to the decree must be prop
osed personally by the ac-
cused or through a special procuralor a
rmed with a special mandate:
A.509(l) c.c.p. Although A.509(2) of t
he Code requires that the opposition
 ”0
specify the reasons under penalty of its inadmissibility. the Constitutional
Court held in judgment n.l9 of 14th February, 1973, that A.509(2) c.c.p. is
invalid because it offended A.24(2) of the Constitution which prescribes
that the right of defence is an inviolable right at every stage or grade of the
proceedings. The Constitutional Court was of the view that A.509(2) c.c.p.
could only be legitimate so long as the decreto gave reasons to which there
could be a replication. However, since most decreli did not give any
reasons, notwithstanding that this was required under A.507(3) c.c.p., an
opposition could not therefore be inadmissible for the lack of reasons. Con-
sequently, the court held that the sanction imposed was excessive and
A.509(2) c.c.p. was invalid in so far as it provided for inadmissibility for
failure to specify the reasons for the opposition. Therefore, it is now sufﬁ-
cient that the document of opposition merely request a trial.
C
Where the opposition is either out of time, not presented personally by
the opponent or his special procurator, or fails to comply with any require-
ment of law, the pretore declares its inadmissibility by issuing an “ordin-
anza” and orders execution of the decree. The only remedy against such
order of inadmissibility is an appeal to Cassation which is only an appeal
for error of law. if, on the other hand, the opposition is regular, the
opponent is notiﬁed without delay of the citation for trial.
The personal appearance of the opponent at the audience fixed for trial
is a necessary condition to an effective opposition; the decree is revoked
only if the opponent appears: A.510(2) c.c.p. If the opponent fails to ap-
pear, in the absence of a legitimate impediment, the pretore orders the ex-
ecution of the decree and makes an order for costs against the opponent.
Therefore, there must be, for example, a medical certificate certifying in-
ability to appear to obtain an adjournment. In any event, the proof of a
legitimate impediment to appearance at the audience may be made out even
after an order for execution of the decree by appeal to Cassation provided
that the opponent show that the reason could not be timely deduced at the
pretura by reason of fortuitous circumstances or forza maggiore. This
additional burden upon the opponent to make a personal appearance is to
guarantee a maximum economy of this procedure, that is, to discourage
oppositions. Since in Italian procedure, a failure to appear gives rise to con—
!umacia which means that the proceedings must continue in the normal way
in the absence of the accused, or if the accused is legitimately impeded from
attending, there must be an adjournment, it has often been argued that the
requirement of personal appearance is incompatible with the right of
defence, but the Constitutional Court has always refuted this argument and
consequently the opponent must make a personal appearance for an effec-
tive opposition.
An opposition unfolds as an ordinary trial at first instance. it is not an
appeal but only a means of reinstating the ordinary procedure at first in-
stance. The pretore is not bound by his decision as to penalty in the decree
and if the opposition fails he may impose a heavier penalty upon the oppo-
nent (i.e. the accused). This consequence also is an attempt to discourage
oppositions to ensure a maximum economy of this procedure.
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Article 510(4) c.c.p. provides that if the judgment in the op
position
proceedings determines that the fact did not exist or did
not constitute a
crime, the decree is also revoked as respects others who were co
nvicted of
the same crime even though they did not initiate opposit
ion proceedings.
Moreover, A.508(2) c.c.p. provides that an opposition initiated
by one only
of the persons obliged to make reparation or the aCCused
, extends its effects
to the other party who did not initiate an opposition. Sim
ilarly, the decree is
revoked by the appearance of one only of the said parties e
ven if such party
did not make an opposition: ASl0(3) c.c.p.
Finally, it should also be noted that a penal decree
may be rendered
null in an “azione revocatoria del pubblico ministero ", t
hat is, a revocatory
action initiated by the prosecution as guardian of the p
ublic interest. This
action can be taken where the decree was made o
utside the situations per-
mitted by law. It comprises a jurisdictional control t
hrough the initiation of
an ordinary proceeding aimed at the revocation of th
e decree by judgment
of the court. -
Is the Giudizio per Decrero Compatible with the
Fundamental
Right of Defence?
The question whether the ”giudizio per decrelo ”is c
ompatible with the
right of defence in A.24(2) of the ltalian Constituti
on, and the principle of
“equality before the law" in A.3 of the Constituti
on, has been raised on
‘many occasions and on each occasion the Constituti
onal Court held that the
“giudizio per decreto” does not violate A.24(2) nor
A.3 of the Con-
stitution.
The Constitutional Court has pointed out that the d
ecree merely con-
stitutes a preliminary decision against which the ac
cused may initiate an
opposition. The right of defence is therefore simply d
elayed to the time of
the trial which is carried out in accordance with th
e ordinary procedure
after the opposition has nulliﬁed the decree. In othe
r words, the right of
defence is merely delayed since, if the accused beli
eves the decree to be
unjust or illegal, he may request that the trial be resto
red whereupon he can
oppose the decision of the pretore. Moreover, the cou
rt held that such pro-
cedure cannot be considered to be contradictory to A.24 Co
nstitution since
the ”giudizio per decrelo”, simple and speedy as it
is, is not only advan-
tageous from the point of view of procedural ec
onomy and the judicial
officers but also for the accused who, by accepting the de
cree, avoids endur-
ing a trial together with all the damaging consequences
which can ﬂow from
it. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court held
that this procedure does not
violate A.3 Constitution since it merely represents a differe
nt regulation of
the same and ordinary procedure.
Conclusion
The giudizio per decrelo is an interesting procedure
from the point of
view of economy, simplicity and speed. it may, with
local adaptation, be
suitable for minor criminal matters. Moreover, it cann
ot be said to deny any
of the basic rights, including the right of defence, s
ince these are available
ex postfacto if a trial is requested.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr G. L. Cerloma
I only wish to make a couple of points of clarification with
respect to
my paper. I thought that it would be appropriate to the semin
ar to also refer
to comparative matters.
My paper is intended to draw attention to the fact that the pr
oblem of
delay in lower courts occurs in other jurisdictions; to provok
e some thought
on a comparative level; and to provoke thought on proced
ural solutions,
not merely of a piecemeal nature, but perhaps on a broade
r and more in-
cisive basis. We ought not look with suspicion upon radical
changes in our
procedural law simply because such changes derive from oth
er jurisdictions
perhaps even non common law systems. We ought always ful
ly appreciate
the historical origins of our procedures and institutions a
nd whether the
reasons or premise for such institutions still exist or continue
to be valid.
Sometimes they do still exist and therefore it is proper and p
ractical to con-
tinue the existing institution to which they gave rise. In other c
ases the very
foundations for those institutions have changed or have bec
ome obsolete
and in such case the time for reform is always ripe.
The paper does not purport to represent the procedure de
scribed there
as appropriate for New South Wales. The description of the p
articular pro-
cedure is merely intended to indicate two broad matters.
Firstly, that in
other jurisdictions there has not been any great problem in
extending a pro-
cedure similar, but not identical, to that which we fi
nd under the Motor
Traffic Act to a range of crimes which we sometimes conside
r as serious in
New South Wales, namely in the case of the procedure in
question, to
crimes which attract a maximum penalty of up to three years
imprisonment
although this short cut method is only available if the judge
or magistrate in
the casein question intends to impose a line in lieu of a te
rm of imprison-
ment.
The procedure that I set out is not identical to that in the Moto
r Trafﬁc
Act for several reasons, for example, the procedure we know
is perhaps of
an administrative nature whereas the procedure which I descr
ibe is strictly
judical: lt is a judge who makes the decision and imposes a pena
lty although
without any contact at all with the accused.
Secondly, the procedure which is set out in the paper does not
deny, in
any manner whatsoever, the fundamental and basic righ
ts, such as the right
of defence. Even in those jurisdictions where this procedure is ap
plied they
are very aware of the fundamental right of defence and the o
ther civil
rights. The procedure does not endanger the right of defen
ce since the
defendant in every case has a right to full and proper trial exposlf
aclo if he
thinks that the decision passed down in the first place was in any w
ay unjust
or illegal. ln such case, the defendant may subsequently consult h
is lawyer,
or if he cannot afford a lawyer, seek legal aid and consider, ou
tside the
arena of the court, whether there is a sufficient defence to put t
he matter
before a court with the full benefits of the normal procedures.
 H3
0 seek to provoke some thought about short-
cut procedures, different procedures. We o
ught not block out what is hap-
pening in other jurisdictions but we should
consider their experiences and
perhaps thereby improve the situation in
our own jurisdiction.
My intervention is only t
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E. Sikk, LL.M.
Stipendiary Magistrate, Hobart
The subject of this seminar is particularly interesting to me because for
several years past I have been engaged in a research project funded by the
Australian Institute of Criminology. The purpose of the project is to in-
vestigate the causes of undue delay in dealing with criminal proceedings in
courts of summary jurisdiction throughout Australia. The subject of delay
in the courts is of course a complex and difficult matter but I welcome the
opportunity to make some comments.
There is no time limitation against brin‘ging criminal proceedings at
common law and perhaps understandably so; when the corpus of criminal
wrong doing consisted of felonies and misdemeanours over a much smaller
range of human behaviour it is hardly surprising that the common law took
an unforgiving stance. Presumably there was always the Royal pardon in
reserve for exceptional cases. At any rate to this day there is no common law
doctrine of time limitations either in respect of indictable or summary of-
fences. A few statutes which create summary or simple offences contain
special provisions limiting the time for bringing proceedings but they are
rare indeed. So far as I can recall offhand there is no time limitation govern-
ing indictable offences anywhere in Australia. As for simple offences every
Australian jurisdiction has a provision (if my memory serves me right)
directing the time within which a complain! must be laid for a simple of-
fence. However, in practice. these provisions have been evaded by the sim-
ple expedient of laying the complaint within the statutory period and then
proceeding at leisure to issue the summons. Thus for example almost
everywhere in Australia prosecutions for breaches of trafﬁc laws are heard
and disposed of often years after the commission of the alleged offence.
Surely this is a futile exercise. This lack of a effective time limitation period
prompted me to make a suggestion for law reform to the Tasmanian Law
Reform Commission. Our Commission did eventually approve my proposal
and passed it on to the government. Our government has not yet taken any
action on this proposal but it may well do so when it considers proposed
amendments to the Child Welfare Act perhaps later this year. I attach a
copy of my letter to the Executive Director ofthe Law Reform Commission
which is self explanatory.
It is perhaps appropriate to pause here and ask what is undue delay.
2 The layman is. I think, misled by his childhood experiences into a beliefthat
ideally punishment in the courts should follow swiftly after the commission
of a crime or offence. However, what is the appropriate punishment for a
childhood misdemeanour is by no means appropriate for the sentencing of
': offenders in the courts. This is well illustrated by the practice in our
a children's court jurisdiction so far as bringing proceedings is concerned.
l ' This papcr-was prepared without the ztuthor having the opportunity to sight and peruse the
other papers.
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Years ago we were too poor to build expensive remand ce
ntres for
adolescents. So to this day, except in the most seriOus cases, children a
re not
arrested but are brought before the court by summons say a mo
nth or two
after the commission of the offence. This gives a welfare office
r the oppor-
tunity to visit the child and prepare a report for the court in time
for the
court hearing. The great majority of children eventually plead guilty so t
hat
many children are dealt with and sentenced at their one and
” only court
appearance. This is, in itself of course, a great advantage but mo
re impor-
tant l believe most child welfare workers would agree that if the of
fence is a
matter of real substance then it is usually essential for some lapse
of time to
take place, not only in order to make an accurate assessment ofthe
child but
also for the family to settle down. Incidentally the remand cent
res on the
mainland were envied by us years ago but those pangs of envy are
now long
forgotten. Instead I understand our child welfare authorities are now
prais-
ed for their wisdom and foresight by their mainland counter
parts. Of
course, offences vary and theneed for dblay varies, nevertheless in the c
ase
of children I can see no need for a delay of more than three mon
ths or so
even on a plea of not guilty except in special cases. At the other end of
the
scale there are relatively trivial simple offences where virtually no d
elay is
warranted and no report is required. In these cases in my opinion no co
urt
proceedings are required either. South Australia has shown the way in t
his
regard, while I personally do not completely agree with their system
of
juvenile panels, their diversion ofjuvenile offenders from the court proc
ess
has undoubtedly been a great success. I believe the SOuth Aust
ralian
example is destined to be copied by other States and Territories. Thi
s leads
me to my second point. Apart from trafﬁc matters there is relatively li
ttle
delay in disposing of cases in courts of summary jurisdiction thro
ughout
Australia. I have visited magistrates’ courts in all the capital cent
res
throughout Australia and according to my observations. cases are i
n prac-
tice mostly being heard and disposed of within six months of the co
mmis-
sion of the offence (l except traffic cases and committal proceedi
ngs, white
collar crime in particular in New South Wales). Our time lag for
the
disposal of a not guilty plea at present (including breathalyser ca
ses or
“p.c.a."s as you call them) would be three to four months, perhaps
longer
than the average in Sydney. This is certainly too long and there is admi
ttedly
no room for complacency. However, just as with regard to child off
enders,
a certain amount of delay is not merely inevitable, but even d
esirable from
the point of view of all parties. As a general rule I would suggest six mon
ths
as a tolerable outside limit for delay except in special circumstanc
es.
I prosecuted for the Crown for some 17 years and therefore feel
justified in saying something about indictable offences. l was in Melbourne
recently and learned that the delay involved in hearing a defended criminal
case in the County Court is presently at least 18 months. In other criminal
, jurisdiction in Australia the delay in the hearing of defended cases before
a
jury is quite commonly measured in years. Surely this is intolerable
.
Moreover this has been the situation for many years past and, if the solution
is going to be confined to the appointment of more judges, then this situa
-
tion is obviously going to continue for many years into the future. Indeed it
would appear likely to me that the rate of crime in Australia is likely to con-
tinue to increase over the present decade. See figures recently published by
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Biles, "The size oflhe crime problem in Australia Thus unless something
is done delays are likely to get longer.
1 suggest a time limitation period of say 12 months for indictable
offences with a discretion to extend time just as in the case of summary
offences. The most serious indictable offences should be excluded. My own
experience is that there is simply no useful social purpose to be served in
prosecuting most offenders in respect of offences committed more than a
year previously. Often the experience involves considerable hardship to the
witness and the offender, irritates the jury and poses sentencing problems
for the judge. However, it must be conceded that the ordinary politician
and member of the public know little of the facts of life in court. There is
probably an entrenched view in the community strongly against letting off
offenders because of the lapse of time. How can this unreasonable prejudice
be overcome? .
In my opinion New South Wales has led the way in being the first
Australian State to set up a Bureau of Criminal Statistics a few years ago. It
was because figures were collected systematically for the first time with
regard to penalties imposed on drink drivers that Ross Homel was able to
carry out work on the deterrent effect of penalties imposed on drink drivers.
He informs me that his research is continuing but so far one clear conclu-
sion has emerged. There is no difference between the deterrent effect of
severe and lenient penalties imposed on drink drivers, i.e. given a similar
group of offenders the rate of recidivism will not vary merely according to
the severity of the penalty imposed. Homel‘s conclusion is in line with
similar conclusions apparently reached almost unanimously as a result of
similar research conducted overseas. His conclusions have led to ex-
periments in the diversion of drink drivers from the court process in New
South Wales and hopefully some success may be achieved. However, what
is significant is the method of analysis based on statistical compilation.
Recently the South Australian Government set up a Bureau of Statistics and
last July the collection of statistics began in the lower courts. in my State
the Attorney-General has asked me to prepare a plan for the collection of
statistics in lower courts. Without discussing my report to the Attorney-
General I believe the way is clear for all the Australian States and Territories
to begin statistical compilations with regard to lower court proceedings.
This could be done by treating the complaint or information filed in the
court as the basic document and recording the court orders on the rear on
sheets annexed until the complaint is terminated by a final order. The infor-
mation can be coded and transmitted to a computer for storage. Other
agencies concerned with an offender such as police. prisons, fine collection
and so on, can similarly record basic information in a computer terminal
thus eventually providing a moving picture, as it were, with regard to each
offence as well as each offender. l have no doubt that with the aid of this
basic raw material a qualified researcher can destroy once and for all some
of the popular misconceptions in criminal law. Up to the present it has
never been .possible to demonstrate that stale prosecutions are simply a
waste of time; given the necessary information I feel this can certainly be
done. Accordingly I suggest that the pathway to eventual effective reform
so far as delays in the court are concerned lies on the path along which New
 "
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South Wales is presently leading. It is relev
ant, too, to notice that the Law
Foundation of New South Wales recentl
y commissioned a firm of con-
sultants in Vancouver to suggest alteratio
ns to the court system in New
South Wales based upon changes made in
British Columbia. 1 have a copy
of this report which has, I believe, been
released to the public by the
Attorney-General of New South Wales. I
am sure other States will be deeply
interested in this report and the changes re
commended since the court pro-
cedures in each State are basically the same
.
Finally, I would like to make some further c
omment about traffic mat-
ters. ln my opinion it is not enough to deal w
ith the flood of traffic cases in
the courts by temporary expedients. There
is already enough information
accumulated to indicate that the mere prose
cution of increasing numbers of
traffic offenders in the courts is not just a
useless exercise so far as the road
casualty is concerned but a serious threat to the
efficient functioning of the
lower courts. By all means have more traff
ic police on the roads and more
enforcement. However, just as in the case o
f children much more effective
means for the diversion of offenders are requ
ired, indeed what is needed is a
wholesale re-appraisal of the traffic enfo
rcement system. Ultimately this
too can only be achieved by the method o
f statistical compilation which I
have already discussed.
'
For these reasons 1 suggest that thecomput
erisation of the criminal
justice system is the key to overcoming the pr
oblems of delay in the courts.
Indeed I believe the proper use of the comput
er will mark the beginning of a
rational effective and humane system of cri
minal justice.
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APPENDIX
13th September, 1978
The Executive Director.
Law Reform Commission,
HOBART, 7000.
Dear Bill,
Thank you for your reply about corroboration, it prompts me to offer
a suggestion for law reform.
As you may be aware I am presently a member of a committee set up by
the Minister for Social Welfare with the Object of revising our Child
Welfare Act. One provision under consideration is Section 26 of the Justices
Act 1959 which is as follows:
26 In a case of a simple offence (not being an indictable of-
fence) or of a breach of duty. unless some other time is
limited for making complaint by the law relating to the par-
ticular case, complaint must be made within six months
from the time when the matter of complaint arose.
ln practice this provision has not succeeded in eliminating delay. Police
practice is to lay the complaint within the period of six months allowed thus
enabling the issue of a summons to the defendant at any time in the future.
Of course in some cases, for example where the defendant has deliberately
evaded service say by leaving the State, delay may be fully justified. ln
perhaps the majority of cases however delay has been caused by
administrative error or no particular fault on either side. Understandably
the police are loath to exercise a discretion and simply abandon stale pro-
secutions. The result is that from time to time stale cases are brought to
court and often dismissed (after a hearing) under the Probation of
Offenders Act because of their age without any penalty being imposed.
Section 26 governs proceedings in the Children‘s Court where it is of course
particularly important that proceedings should be disposed of
expeditiously.
My own observation (corroborated by my colleagues) is that ocea—
sionally for example stale traffic complaints years old are brought before
the court often with no good explanation for the delay except to clear police
files. Section 26 has a counterpart in most if not all the Other States and my
impression is that it has not worked effectively elsewhere either.
At any rate 1 have drafted an alternative provision as follows:
326 (l) In a case of a simple offence (not being an indictable offence)
or of a breach of duty alleged to have been committed by any
person unless some lesser time is limited for making com-
plaint by the law relating to the particular case complaint
 
 ”'
5'
 
(2)
(3)
(4)
119
must be made within six months from the
time when the
matter of complaint arose.
N0 summons based upon a complaint referred to
in sub sec-
tion (1) shall issue to any person referred to in sub
section (1)
unless such summons requires such person to a
ppear to
answer the complaint within a period of six months
from the
time when the matter of complaint arose.
No warrant based upon a complaint referred to in sub sect
ion
(1) shall issue to any person referred to in sub section (1)
unless such warrant is issued within a period of six months
‘ from the time when the matter of complaint arose.
Upon application at any time made to a Magistrate by a com-
plainant who has duly laid a complaint in'accordance with
sub section (1) such Magistrate may in his discretion and for
good and sufficient cause shown by the complainant issue a
summons or warrant otherwise than as required by sub sec-
tions (2) and (3). An application under this sub section may be
made ex parte on a written application by the complainant in
accordance with the form prescribed in the Rules. On the
hearing of such application a Magistrate shall not be bound
by strict rules of evidence and may hear such evidence or
accept such statements as he thinks fit.
I understand you are soliciting proposals for law reform and submi
t my
draft provision accordingly.
Yours sincerely,
E. Sikk,
Magistrate.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
E. Sikk, S.M.
First of all, I am sorry that no one commented on my proposal to
introduce a time limitation. There is nothing revolutionary in that proposal.
(Indeed, there is nothing very revolutionary about any of the proposals sub-
mitted to this Seminar.) The time limitation of six months was actually
introduced in England by a series of Acts called the Jervis Acts to regularise
proceedings in lower courts. Time limitation for bringing proceedings
within six months was instituted during the 18305 and copied by all the other
Australian States up to the 18505. At the present time Victoria and
Queensland have time limitations for summary proceedings of l2 months,
and all the other States for six months. I simply suggested fulfilling the
original intention of the Jervis Acts, which go back a long way, and provide
that proceedings must be brought within six‘months and terminated within
six months except in special circumstances. 1' do not really see any reason
why that should not apply to proceedings by way of jury trial. I have sug-
gested that this is probably unpalatable to a lot of people. It sounds revolu—
tionary but it is not. The proper way to test it I would suggest would be by
way of a suitable research project which I am sure can be devised.
However, just to illustrate that it is really not revolutionary to toss
cases out the window we can look back to the original history of Australia. I
was in the Archives Department at The Rocks this afternoon trying to trace
the very first case ever heard in New South Wales before magistrates and l
traced it to the l9th February, 1788. That was the original meeting of the
Bench of Magistrates in Sydney. David Collins and Augustus Hix heard
that first case and the actual offence seems to be (I cannot decipher the
writing very well) a lady charged with “unlawfully detaining a sailor‘s
pants" for which she was reprimanded. Presumably in Australia in the
magistrates’ courts cases were dealt with expeditiously from then on, as they
have been on the whole and still are being dealt with relatively expeditiously
with a few exceptions which I have mentioned in regard to traffic and com-
mittal proceedings.
The story in the superior courts is a different matter. In my own State
there were notorious delays because of a defect in the original Charter of
Justice and the Governor’s Commissions which meant that persons were
unable to be tried for felonies in the colony of Van Diemen‘s Land. They
had to be taken to Sydney to be tried, and that meant that many people or
many persons who would have otherwise been tried and punished were not
tried and punished at all because the witnesses and the accused simply could
riot be transported to Sydney. So undoubtedly many serious cases never
came to court at all in the early part of the history of Tasmania. I do not
think that that was a disaster so far as the colony ol' Van Diemen‘s Land
was concerned. The administration of justice went on in its own l'ashion
because the magistrates were able to meet and try cases, and presumably
lesser charges were preferred, but there were those delays at an early stage in
the history of Tasmania.
The proposal that I would have suggested is simply to eliminate those
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delays by having, say, a 12 months time limitation on the less serious
categories of crimes. For example breaking and entering, stealing, offences
of dishonesty constitute half the crimes tried in New South Wales, and a
profile of the prison population shows that over half the inmates are there
for offences of dishonesty. Many of these offences of dishonesty can and
should be tried within the period of 12 months. If they are not, then it does
not seem to me to matter very much if a time limitation actually saves some
of them from prosecution.
When I was prosecuting I had the privilege on many occasions of being
able to prosecute with a fairly up-to-date list, i.e., prosecuting offenders or
persons charged with crimes who were alleged to have committed those
crimes within a matter of a few months previously. Possibly this is the sort
ol' atmosphere which Cr0wn prosecutors or defenders in this State have
never experienced but it is, I suggest, a state of affairs which should be com-
monplace. lf it is and you have an up-to-date list you can keep it up-to-date.
ln Tasmania the criminal list is relatively up—to-date in the superior courts
and always has been compared to the other States. A time limitation on of-
fenders, say, with regard to “break and enter“ and ”steal" would result in
bringing the list up-to-date, and once it is brought up-to-date then very few
would escape the net. There is no tragedy in so far as criminals getting off
scot free is concerned. Most of these “break and enters” and “steals” are
based upon confessional evidence. Very often it is just oral confessional
evidence, or an unsigned record of interview, with a very high rate of ac-
quittals. It does not seem to me that very much would be lost by getting rid
of those stale cases so far as the superior courts are concerned.
There is one further comment, if‘l may make it, about “hand up
briefs". We have had it since 1963 in Tasmania. Tasmania was the first
jurisdiction in the British Commonwealth to introduce “hand up briefs".
Now every State in Australia has a “hand up brief“ system except for New
South Wales. I earnestly suggest that New South Wales ought to consider
the “hand up brief“ system with the consent ofthe accused, but it does not
work unless the criminal list is up-to-date. If the criminal list is not up-to-
date, of course, defendants will opt for a committal proceedings and very
properly so. lfl were appearing for an accused person in this State I would
most certainly suggest to him that he should take all legitimate oppor-
tunities for delay that he possibly can for two good reasons. The first reason
is that if he comes to trial a year or two after his offence, even if he admits
he is guilty. lie is etttitled to test the prosecution case and plead “not
guilty". If he comes to trial a year or two after the commission of his
offence it is very likely that the judge will take, and properly take, account
of the fact he has been of good behaviour in the interim period and very
properly decide to mitigate penalty. Secondly, there is always the possibility
that witnesses may perhaps die or leave the jurisdiction. It is perfectly
proper advice to point out to an accused person, with or without legal aid.
that he is entitled to take advantage of these delays. If he does then, of
course, the “hand tip brief" procedure is of little effect.
In Tasmania the “hand up brief" is commonly used because there is
very little delay so far as the superior courts are concerned. There is no
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advantage to be gained by having a dress rehearsal for the police and other
witnesses before one goes to trial and it is avoided. If I were defending in my
own State of Tasmania, my advice would be t0~avoid at all costs committal
proceedings, unless one is dealing with very complex white collar crime
where there is advantage to be gained by committal proceedings.
The other matter 1 would like to mention is that of “majority
verdicts”. I think most jurisdictions surely have majority verdicts. I had not
realised that they do not exist in New South Wales. It seems to me
something of an anomaly as most jurisdictions have them. Certainly, we
have had majority verdicts in Tasmania for many years and it has worked
exceedingly well. Undoubtedly it has saved abortive trials.
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DISCUSSION PAPER
J. Parnell, LL.M.
Public Servant
Delays can be attacked by:
1. Taking matters out of the system.
2. Altering the procedure in the system.
Although the former is not tonight's theme the future co
ntent of the
criminal justice system will set off to some extent any gai
ns by improved
procedure. For the ramiﬁcation of technological, en
vironmental and con-
sumer matters will greatly increase the scope of the syst
em in future.
Mere gardening therefore will not achieve tonight’s end. Revol
utionary
thinking and acting is imperative. .
Generally, the introduction of one level of first in
stance jurisdiction
across the board from piracy to parking appeals is an imm
ediate starting
point. Tailored with inbuilt reviews and limited appeals to
the higher level
this would achieve:
1. Optimum utilization of judicial hours.
2. Avoidance in the sentencing process of the maxim ”specializ
ation
is the thief of compassion".
3. Maximum executive and administrative efficiency.
The elimination at a stroke of the time wasting preliminaries under
Division 1 Part IV, of the Justices Act. .
lnevitably such reform would focus attention on the future for cri
minal
juries. From the standpoint of expediency, and much of our law
is so orien-
tated (e.g. ignoralio juris), there is no doubt that summary proce
dures are
quicker and attract more pleas. But, would the public be
satisfied to
sacrifice the jury system in these interests?
Nevertheless, there can be little logic in a system which tries the th
icfof
a $1,000 Holden summarily and the thief of a $1,001 Holden b
y jury (with
the added luxury of an unsworn statement from the dock). Mon
ey ought
never to be the criterion.
Accordingly, there may be a very good case for restriction of jury
trials
to the crimes of specific intent within Part 111 of the Crimes Act.
It is implicit in the issue between the ABS. and Mr Hogan’s f
igures
that a small number of the difficult cases are extending the del
ay in the
higher courts. The $1,001 thief's entitlement to an unsworn s
tatement
causes some to blame this luxury for an reluctance to submit with
the con-
sequent delays. And, there may well be some force in this argume
nt. This
anachronism has been a strong survivor (Kop '5 case. 1923 and 1974) b
ut on
my interpretation of the 1974 debate it is doubtful whether any Gov
ernment
 [24
has a mandate for continuing to extend the statement to other than the
 
indigent and the uneducated.
Even if one level of first instance jurisdiction does not come there
would appear to be a strong case to deny the present dock statement at least
to those defendants set out in the 1979 Bill to abolish juries for certain
classes of white collar offences.
Recent popularity in the use of 5.412 also appears to be extending the
time in individual trials. To the summary tribunal of fact and the experienc-
ed juryman or indeed. any juryman in a joint trial, the failure to call
evidence of good character could raise an inference of bad character. So in
the interests of uniform justice for all and the shortening of some trials
there is probably a good case for repeal of 5.412.  
"
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PRESENTATION or PAPER
.1. Parnell, S. M.
Obviously the main proposals are long-term proposals, although from
the official silence in journals and otherwise I doubt whether the prospect of
increased input into the system is fully appreciated, and the revolution
presaged by Mr Grove may have to come earlier.
In quoting the figures of $1,000 and $1,00l I did not take into account
5.476 in adding those figures. The mandatory levels are slightly lower but
the principles are exactly the same. I did consider either as a complement or
as an independent measure of‘taking the sentencing role away from the
court. This would deal with the situation feared by Sergeant Taylor. but
that is a matter for other considerations and I doubt whether that would be
accepted by the public of New South Wales. There is some shift from the
adversary system implicit in any consideration of the matters I have put for-
ward.
One commentator referred to the statements from the dock. The thrust
of my view was not that abolition of the statement might attract more pleas,
but that the existence of the statement does inhibit pleas in certain matters.
Detective Inspector King and Mr Hogan may have some views on that. On
the question of insistence of guilt my experience is that such is usually ac-
companied by some explanation which is quite incompatible with guilt, and
it can only lead to a trial.
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DISCUSSION
His Honour Judge J. H. Slaunton, Q.C., Chief Judge of the District
Court, N.S.W.
I understood that this Seminar was to discuss and deal with possible
causes of delay. The first thing we had better do is make sure that Mr Sikk
gets on that plane tomorrow, because if his philosophy of the law combined
with the younger generations learning of the law as per Rumpole of the Old
Bailey ”never plead guilty” becomes the philosophy of the defendants in
this State, then instead of having 90% pleas of “guilty” and delays up to
two years, we will certainly have to fail to prosecute every second prisoner
' or discharge him.
I wish to make two comments about Mr Hogan’s paper. He refers to
removing 5.52A offences to the magistrates. I would not oppose that so
much for the reason that Mr Brown gives, but rather because I do not agree
with him that the judiciary seem to be taking that offence lightly, so that
you can expect to get a bond if you kill a man on the roads of this State
whilst driving under the inﬂuence of intoxicating liquor. Further, I think
the offence is too serious to be dealt with other than by a jury; I think that
would be a very serious inroad to the right of trial by jury in this State. We
have seen in previous years how inroads have been made without very much
protest from those people whom you would expect to protest. We have also
seen how the powers of magistrates to impose sentences of imprisonment
have risen from one year to two years, now to a cumulative of three years,
and this proposal of course would allow five years. If that is acceptable to
the people of this State then, so be it, but I do not think it would be.
The other matter to which I wish to refer is Mr Hogan’s remarks about
causes of delay and his reference to that quaint old phrase of our childhood,
that you can appoint judges, magistrates and build courts until the “cows
come home". I remark upon that because lest it be thought that that is
precisely what is happening now. in fact, it is not. More magistrates are be-
ing appointed, more judges are appointed. Judges are not appointed to deal
with criminal lists by and large, they are appointed to deal with civil lists.
The reason they are not appointed to deal with criminal lists is that there is
nowhere in this city to hear the cases. Mr Hogan knows that there is no
delay outside the Sydney Metropolitan area and the periphery of Sydney.
And he knows why there is no delay. There is no delay because there are
courts elsewhere to hear the cases. He comes to me and asks “Could I have
a judge for'an extra week at Narrandera because there are five criminal
cases there?“ (as will be done in April of this year). I send him out a judge
who is taken away from the civil list here. There is a court there for the
judge to sit in, for the jury to be present at, and that is why the case can be
disposed of. There is no delay around the State because judges are made
available when delay is likely to occur. But that, of course, does not deal
with this appalling state of affairs in Sydney where there are no! five cases
awaiting trial here but 500 odd at Darlinghurst alone. Not pleas of
“guilty", bu15_00jury1rials awaiting hearing. This figure, which has gone
up from 423 in the last two years to 500 odd, will probably be 550 by June
of this year. And this will get worse because we have not the courts to deal
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with this situation. lndeed, what is proposed at this Seminar for reducing
delay, and worthwhile though it would be (and l for one support any
amendment for doing away with the disgraceful state of affairs that arises in
terms of costs and inconvenience from the operation of s.51A or its misuse),
would, if these various reforms were introduced, speed up the work through
the magistrates courts and increase the delay in the District Court. If
anybody can tell me how the delay in that Court can be reduced signifi-
cantly without more courts to hear the cases 1 would be pleased to hear it.
There will be some ways that you will cut down some time in the hear-
ing of cases. I do not think that abolition of the statement from the dock
would be one, but pre-trial procedures of some sort could be one way if the
profession will co-operate and if the accused will co-operate. If Mr Sikk is
right they will not, they will cause further delay. So, you have got to get
them into Court. You have got to produce a court and a judge and a jury to
hear the case. That is when you might get a plea, but that is what has got to
be done and it has not been done. It is going to be a mammoth undertaking
but, of course, there are a number of things concerned with the law of
criminal justice in this State that will be mammoth undertakings. One sug-
gestion by Mr Parnell is a complete review of the criminal law. Probably an
ongoing commission may take ﬁve or ten years to report. That is probably
necessary, but delay in the courts because there are insufﬁcient courts is a
matter that I think has received too little attention. With great respect for
my Registrar I think he has tended to brush it aside in his paper as being
something that we can afford to ignore. He gives it a very minor part. Only
two criminal courtrooms have been built in this city since 1964 and attempts
to use courts designed for civil use have been attended by great incon-
venience to the public and jurors. Properly designed and constructed
criminal courts of adequate numbers are absolutely necessary.
Tom Kelly, Solicitor
Much has been said and written about delays in criminal proceedings in
the magistrates and the District Courts and before single judges of the
Supreme Court, but there are some matters in respect of the Court of
Criminal Appeal that concern me. It is not a jurisdiction 1 practise in very
often, only about once a year, and perhaps my experiences have been excep-
tional, there may be others who might be able to inform me if they have
found the same thing. The delay is not in matters coming on, the court gets
them on just as soon as possible, any delay would be because the appellant
is not ready. It is the delay in the reserving of some of the decisions. I
appreciate trying to have the court constituted by the most learned judges,
the last time I was there I had the Chief Justice. the Chief Justice of the
Common Law and the President of Appeal, does and must create certain
bottlenecks but there are a couple of incidences in my experience that I
might point out.
In 1976 Stephen Dowd’s appeal was heard on the 27th May and that
was reserved until the llth June the following year. That is over 12 months.
It was dismissed, but only five months of the time was ordered to count.
There was another appeal of Desmond McEwan; _it was heard on the llth
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March, I979, and I understand the court reserved until the 23rd November,
1979. That is eight months and the verdict was one of acquittal. This man
was able to walk away having had to wait eight months for the decision. In
fact, I understand from the time of his arrest he served a substantial part of
his non-parole period. There is another case I am aware of where the court
has reserved for eight months. 1 think some attention could be given to this
problem of delay.
Daryl Rees, Department of Corrective Services
A brief comment on the paper of Mr Brown particularly his comments
in relation to prison and escapes (pages 47 and 48) where he says “the in-
creasing number of prisoners who are able [0 escape from lawful custody
within the prison system”. In other parts of Mr Brown’s paper statistics are
quoted in quite some detail, and an analysis is made of these figures, but
with regards to the claim concerning the increasing number of escapes there
are no figures to substantiate his statement.
I would like to give the number of total escapes. These are tetal figures
from Department of Corrective Services' institutions throughout New
South Wales. They cover the period from the lst July to 30m June in the
years that I mention.
l974-l975 198
1975-1976 183
l976-1977 188
1977-1978 I80
l978-l979 168
By whatever interpretation you place upon those figures I put it to Mr
Brown that you would be very had put indeed to say that there is an increas-
ing number of escapes, and I thought it may have been prudent in the light
of the attitude which various sections of the media take towards escapes
that these ﬁgures could well have been sought out and included in the paper.
8. R. Brown
I am certainly not concerned to get into any particular debate as to
whether the numbers offer a marginal increase or a marginal redUCtion in
the numbers of the persons who have been able to manage to escape from
custody. The figures which I was recently given in relation to the rate of
escapes for a period of seven months from June, 1979, to February, I980.
indicate that over that period “7 persons had been able to escape from
lawful custody. The point that I make is not so much as in connection with
the escape but 0n the basis that the work which is generated upon that
escape. One can be almost certain that the escape will be accompanied by
allegations of assault in respect of a prison officer. Then inevitably one or
two motor vehicles will be taken in respect of the getaway situation, and in-
deed there may be a whole string of offences of the nature of break, enter
and steal and the like which are committed by the escapee whilst he is on the
run. I am not concerned so much in relation to the fact that a certain
number of prisoners escape, but rather wished to indicate that it is one of
 ’—.. _..___———-_.
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the areas which does bring to the lower courts a considerable amount of
extra work by reason of the fact that they did escape. I do not want to be
thought to be critical of a role which the Department of Corrective Services
might play in relation to the humane handling of persons, and I am not
so
much concerned in relation to thOSe who have gone from some of the ac-
tivities on which they are released. But the point, so far as I am concerned,
is connected with the offences committed whilst on the run, and indeed that
is only part of the reference I made to the prison system.
My other reference to the prison system referred to the apparent in-
ability to maintain discipline or good order in the institution. 1 can say now
there has been quite a substantial number of cases in the Central Court of
Petty Sessions since the activity which brought some 20 defendants on 38
serious charges into Central Court arising from the disturbances at the Cen-
tral Industrial Prison just prior to the 18th October, 1978. Some of those
matters still remain unresolved. ‘
J. M. G. Callaghan, S.M.
As a practising magistrate l have been living with this problem in sum-
mary courts of both the delays and the days when you finish early and there
is nothing to do. it seems to me that we have one fairly serious problem that
we have not been able to solve and that is the case that is listed for hearing
and on the day of the court nobody arrives, or the witnesses are not ready,
or somebody else is not ready, or you get told the day before that this is to
happen. 1 am particularly concerned with the free legal aid solicitor such as
the Aboriginal Legal Service, the Commonwealth Legal Service, the Public
Solicitor, and l have spent some time with my own Public Solicitor trying to
work out a solution. For instance today I had two cases listed for hearing.
The defendants just did not turn up. The Public Solicitor said that he had
not been able to contact the client since the first day when he was given
preliminary instructions. This situation does arise right throughout the
whole spectrum of legal aid. Preliminary instructions are given, time is
allocated, but on the day of the hearing the client is in some other part of
the country or overseas. I cannot see the answer to this difficulty except for
the person representing the client to spend some time chasing up the client.
A private solicitor who is not properly instructed or is not paid will not con-
tinue with the case. If he has been paid it is fairly certain that the client will
attend and the trial proceed. We try to do our best by perhaps adding an
extra case to the list to replace those cases where the client may not attend.
Kevin Ryan, M.P., Barrister at Law
There is just one aspect of Judge Staunton's comments that I would
like to take up. His Honour emphasised very strongly that there are not
enough courts. There may have been an implication that also there are not
enough judges, because presumably there are no judges either Civil or
criminal not being allocated, and that implies that if there are not enough
criminal courts then the notionally excess judges are being allocated civilly.
The District Court civil list has a tolerable delay at the moment and I am
sure no one would want to see that lengthened. I think it would follow that
if there are more courts to be built for criminal matters then some of these
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judges sitting civilly would have to be reallocated to the criminal courts.
That might result in a see-saw situation where now there is tolerable delay in
the civil list but it may become lengthened because of the reallocation to the
criminal list. I think if you do require more criminal courts to be built
obviously you must also need more District Court judges to be appointed as
well.
C. R. Briese, Chief Stipendiary Magistrate, N.S.W.
I would like to agree with the Chief Judge as to the situation applying
in the District Court. It has reached the point where they certainly do need
more courts and, indeed, more judges. The only alternative to this would be
to increase the jurisdiction of magistrates and here you reach the point of
deciding whether or not a person’s innocence or guilt is to be determined by
one man or by a jury. It seems to me, however, one could consider the
, jurisdiction of magistrates being increased not so much in the criminal field
but in the civil jurisdiction. 1 would think it not impossible for magistrates
to be of such quality that they might take from the District Court matters of
up to say $5,000 or even $10,000. I know that there are some jurisdictions in
other States, for example South Australia, where that is proposed to be the
case. Magistrates will deal with civil matters up to a limit of $10,000.
A decision has to be made: either to have more judges and more courts
for judges, or the alternative is to put more of the work from judges down
among magistrates where we still have space. Our space too will run out and
it may well be we are fast reaching the day where we need more courts and
more magistrates.
Carolyn Simpson, Barrister at Law
My ﬁrst comment concerns night courts. I understand that there has
been some effort made in this State to introduce night courts, but it seems to
me that that effort was not a very substantial one and only applied to traffic
courts. It is accepted that most people charged with traffic offences do not
turn up anyway, and there are many other matters that could very easily be
dealt with at night both in the magistrates courts and in the District Court.
There would be many advantages to the community by doing so other than
the reduction of delays. It may be that only pleas of guilty could be dealt
with in that way. That would clear the daily lists for committal proceedings
in the magistrates courts and for trials in the District Court. It seems to me
jthat that is one simple solution to some of the problems of delay in both of
ithose courts.
Kevin Ryan, in answering to Judge Staunton, mentioned the question
of the availability of District Courts. It seems to me that one of the reasons
that courts are not available for trials in the District Court is that few of
them have a dock available for the prisoner to sit in. There are many cases
where the prisoner does not need to be confined to a dock. The accused per-
son can sit behind his counsel, and any of the courts in the civil jurisdiction
could be used. The provision of a jury box should be relatively simple in
courts in the Barracks Building and in the old District Court. Many more
District Court judges could be made available to hear trials with juries and, 
‘
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certainly, to hear pleas of “guilty” and therefore
reduce delays in those
matters.
There has been some suggestion raised by previous s
peakers that some
of the delays have been caused by the accused himself or
his representatives,
and some of the blame for this has been cast on the
use of the dock state-
ment. 1 would like to state that l and many of my colleag
ues would support
those delays if it means the dock statement is to contin
ue to be the right of
an accused person. I do not believe that taking away the r
ight of an accused
person to make a statement from the dock to reduce delay
s in criminal pro-
ceedings is a reasonable means of coping with those delay
s. If it does cause
any delay then some other means must be found for dea
ling with those
delays.
Finally, again on the suggestion that‘some of the delays h
ave been
caused by the accused person, we all know that there are case
s where people
have to be represented at short notice by somebody other tha
n the person
they have chosen or the person who was prepared to represent th
em in the
first place. Rule 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules prevents und
er most cir-
cumstances an appellant from raising any matters that were not
raised at the
hearing of the trial. That may be for a number of different reason
s but that
Rule, together with the effect of Dugan ’5 case, may mean that i
f the matters
not raised at the trial cannot be raised in the criminal appeal th
e accused
person, who thereby is a convicted person, no longer has a right
to sue his
solicitor or counsel, if he has that right at all, for negligence. A “C
atch 22"
for an accused person and I would suggest that if he brings about a
ny delays
in his own trial that that is a right that he has, and not somethin
g that the
State should avoid by bringing on his trial unduly quickly a
gainst his
wishes.
The~ Honourable Mr Justice Adrian Roden, Supreme Court, N.S.W.
My present calling precludes me from adopting Mr Parnell‘s suggestion
that we should think or act in a revolutionary fashion. I believe nevertheless
that we should perhaps not think and act in quite as contrary a fashion
to
that as lawyers are wont to do. in matters of law reform the approach in
New South Wales, certainly so far as criminal matters are concerned, is
this:
nothing can possibly be considered for introduction in this State unless it
has been tried somewhere else before, and has been proved somewhere else
before. lt is perhaps our good fortune that that attitude has not prevailed in
all other common law States.
There are some suggestions which I have hoped for a periodnow of
some years would find receptive ears. They are not all directed towards
overcoming delays in the criminal justice system but many of them, I
believe, would have that effect, and 1 would like to refer to some of them.
Many people see some of the safeguards that are built into our criminal
justice system as causing delay, and so proposals to overcome delay tend to
be seen as an attack upon some of those safeguards. l would rather
approach the matter in a different way and say “Are we not tending,
 
 132
particularly at the summary level, to clutter up our criminal justice system
with a number of matters in respect of which it is not appropriate to con-
sider the necessity for such safeguards?” There are myriads of regularity
offences and other matters in respect of which the community attitude is
“Yes, they call for penalties”, but equally the community attitude is that
persons who commit those offences ought not to be regarded as criminals.
Elsewhere in a paper that was presented at another meeting of this Institute
1 characterised those as being matters such as offences involving bread in
sausages, cockroaches in restaurants, dogs without collars, and companies
without returns. And they are but a small sample of the type of matter that
we persist in treating as criminal offences. We persist in saying that if a
penalty is to be exacted in respect of them it will be exacted through pro-.
ceedings in criminal courts. [f the person charged disputes the claim, or
wants to have someone adjudicate upon the amount not only do we go
through the entirety of the criminal procedure at the summary level but at
his whim he can have the whole procedure repeated again before a District
Court Judge. Part of the proposal that I am hoping will fall one day on
receptive ears is that we take out of the criminal justice system altogether
Such matters, which, I believe, have no place there.
The word “decriminalization” has been very popular in recent times in
another context. I have never understood its meaning. I have never
understood what is supposed to exist within our system that enables
something to remain an offence that will attract a penalty, without being
criminal, and without requiring to go through the criminal justice system.
Perhaps something fitting that description c0uld be created, and as social
attitudes change so matters may be moved from one category to the other.
The next matter that I think is of very great importance so far as un-
necessary delays are concerned is that of the compulsory full scale commit-
tal. Mr Sikk has mentioned that Tasmania did away with the necessity for it
in 1963. It is, of course, a fact, as he says, that every other Australian State
has done away with it. It is a fact that England did away with it in the
Criminal Justice AC! of 1967. New South Wales is proving the point that I
made at the beginning of this address, by having allowed I980 to arrive
without having done anything about it at all.
ln England, I am led to believe, it is very much the exception rather
than the rule for an accused person to require a full scale committal, and I
do not think it would be very long before it became the exception rather
‘ than the rule in New South Wales. In England a Section I committal under
the Criminal Justice Ac! of 1967 is virtually identical to our now
disreputable s.51A. The only difference is a very sensible difference that on
, the basis of the hand up brief there is a committal for trial instead of this
peculiar thing that we have which is called a “committal for sentence”. If
that were adopted in New South Wales we would not be talking about what
‘ should be done with s.SlA because it simply would not exist.
Mr Grove at page l03 refers to some more radical suggestions that have
3 been made elsewhere. I suspect that I am the author of those more radical
’ suggestions that have been made elsewhere; and they refer to the way in
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which charges are defined, the way in which they are presented, the way in
which they are prosecuted, and the way in which verdicts are taken — which
I suppose is a pretty fair coverage of the whole business.
I believe that we have a quite unnecessary number of separate offences.
I invite you to go to the Crimes Ac! and see how many sections there are
that create an offence which we could call ”stealing” or “theft” but prefer
to call “larceny" on the basis that if we do, fewer persons who are not
lawyers will be able to understand what it means. There is a whole array.
Stealing cattle comes under a different section from stealing dogs; stealing
wills, stealing in a dwellinghouse, all sorts of different stealings each of
which it would seem to me is and could be expressed as the one simple
offence, with the opportunity being there, if the legislature wishes, to say
that the penalty will vary depending upon the object stolen or who steals it
or where he steals it. These unnecessary complications are carried through
when we come to matters such as culpable driving (referred to by earlier
speakers) and others in respect of which you can go before a Court either on
indictment or summarily, depending not only upon the charge that is laid,
but depending also upon the charge that is left if one disappears. For
example if a person is charged with culpable driving, based upon an allega-
tion of dangerous driving and a death resulting, and he is acquitted, the next
step, as I understand it, is normally for that same person to be charged or at
least for a charge already laid to be pursued before a magistrate in respect of
the summary offence of dangerous driving. There is no issue estoppel, there
is no way in which the acquittal on indictment will serve to prevent that
matter from going ahead.
The “more radical" suggestion is that every offence be stated in terms
of the conduct that constitutes the basic offence, with any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that might be thought to change its character as
something of an appendage to it. Take for example the case that l have just
mentioned, culpable driving involving dangerous driving with a death
resulting. The present situation is that the indictable offence is tried first
and the jury is asked in the one question whether it is satisfied that all the in-
gredients of- the aggravated offence are present and that the statutory
defence is not available. If the jury says “no”, by a verdict of “not guilty”,
it does not indicate which one or which ones of those ingredients it found to
be not present, or whether it acquitted on the basis of the statutory defence.
One doesn‘t know whether it found that the driving was not dangerous, or
whether it found that the statutory defence was available through lack of
causation. If the basic offence were stated for all purposes as “dangerous
driving”, and it were made indictable if the aggravating circumstance of
death were alleged, then under this proposal the superior court would hear
the charge, the jury would first say “guilty" or “not guilty" to the basic of—
fence of dangerous driving, and would then, if it said “yes", answer the
subsidiary question Of whether the aggravating circumstance is found to be
present, and the statutory defence unavailable. There would never be a need
for a second summary trial.
The same would apply under the Poisons Act. If possession of more
than the prescribed quantity is alleged, the Crown at present charges alleges
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”supply” under the so-called deeming provision. The basic offence
under
the “radical” proposal would be possession; the jury would fin
d the
accused “guilty” or “not guilty" of possession. If “not guilty” that wou
ld
be the end of the matter altogether, with no following summary trial. If t
he
jury said “guilty of possession” then it would be called on to answer t
he
second question: “Was the possession for the purposes of supply?
”,
whether that be by proof or by operation of the deeming provision.
The same problem of unnecessary litigation through the manner i
n
which offences are charged is seen even where there is not a separate sum-
mary offence. An example is the case of a person charged with murder
,
whos‘e attitude is that he does not contest any of the elements which th
e
Crown is required to prove, but does wish to set up a matter such as
“diminished responsibility" or “provocation” in order to become entitl
ed
to a verdict of manslaughter. If the manslaughter plea is not accepted by th
e
Crown, the trial proceeds, despite the virtual admission of all the el
ements
of murder, with each one of those elements having to be strictly proved b
y
the Crown. This may take days and days of involved scientific eviden
ce
none of which is to be challenged. The proposal would make it possible for
a plea to be entered leaving only the mitigating circumstance such as l hav
e
mentioned, or in other cases the aggravating circumstance, if a person ad-
mits a killing but denies the requisite intent to make the killing murder. This
involves what Mr Parnell might improperly describe as a revolutionary ap-
proach, but I do think that when we look to what might be done with th
e
way in which the law is stated, and the law is administered, in order to pre-
vent what seems a risk of the system being bogged down altogether, we have
got to be prepared to look at it a little more deeply than lawyers ten
d
generally to do when approaching these problems.
l do not want to say any more abOut specific aspects of those pro-
posals, but I certainly do commend to this Seminar a rather deeper con-
sideration of where the ﬂaws in the system may be, than is involved in
simply looking at a few matters such as s.SlA which is working badly, or
5.758 which is working well. The whole system I believe is due for a very
thorough review. It has tended to grow like Topsy for along, longtime, and
I think it is about time we had a good look to see where that has led us.
0. D. Woods (Public Defender), Director, Criminal Law
Review Division, Attorney-General’s Department, N.S.W.
lam also involved in some minor way in advising the Attorney-General
about criminal law reform.
lf 1 might say so with respect to His Honour Mr Justice Roden, the
politics of criminal law reform are fairly straightforward. There are votes in
having separate offences of stealing pigs, birds or whatever, although it may
be more elegant to have one simple larceny or stealing provision. The reason
why we have specific A’s and B’s and so on in the Crimes Ac! is not because
people keep slipping through loopholes (as occurs under taxation laws) but
because a particular pressure group in the community demands that
“something be done” about problem X. If by the statutory repetition of
{
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some criminal offence in a slightly different wording the governmen
t can
say it has now legislated to deal. with problem X then everybody is
happy —
or at least the particular pressure group which it was sought to plac
ate is
happy.
But this Institute, to the extent that it engenders public comment on
criminal law reform, is to that extent a political organisation, altho
ugh
hardly “high pressure". Judge Staunton rather bluntly said that we n
eed
new criminal courts, as indeed we do, but the probability is that th
e press
who will report on this meeting will have obtained copies of the prin
ted
papers in advance and they will draw any story which they put in the pap
ers
tomorrow from this material. It is most unlikely, l think, that anything
said
in this discussion period will be reported. The politics of it are very c
om-
plicated. Although it is very probable that Judge Staunton’s comments h
ere
will be communicated in one way of another to the relevant authorities they
might not, with respect, necessarily be always communicated in the most
politically effective way.
It is the complexity of the whole area of criminal law reform which
gives rise to the problem of delay. If the present government, or another
government, says that it is going to initiate a thorough-going reform of the
criminal law, as was done in South Australia in the 19705, you can quite
possibly expect to see splendid reports such as the SOUth Australians have
indeed produced. There is a series of excellent reports which are now resting
heavily on their bottoms in the Attorney-General's Department in Adelaide
and there is very little prospect that they will be legislated into existence.
That is simply the politics of it.
As far as delays are concerned, I can only agree with previous speakers
(Mr Bone in particular), who said that if we are going to have amendments
to the law which help overcome the problem of delay, they must not be at
the expense of fundamental rights. l am sceptical frankly about the prospect
of a complete overhaul of the criminal law (in the Justinian style).in the im-
mediate future. The only alternative to overcoming the problem of delay is
the hard slog of pointing out, as Judge Staunton has done, in the right
political ears, those things which are problems, and pushing for them in
whatever appropriate way available.
So 1 do not see any easy solution. Any solution which hacks away at
fundamental rights will not be politically acceptable. No government,
whether it be Liberal or Labor, is going to undertake criminal law reform
the result of which is to provoke such a political backlash that it becomes
non-productive. Those in the community who defend the traditional rights
of criminal defendants (what Mr Taylor referred to as “loopholes for
criminals”) are, I hope, a determined and noisy group — I believe that the
way to overcoming delays does not lie in the “slash and burn" approach, if
1 might put it that way. From my point of view, anyway, there is no alter-
native but the continuation of dialogue between interested people within the
criminal justice system — the time-consuming process of committees,
recommendations, argument and follow-up.
136
-The Criminal Law Review Division of which I am a part is very willing
and indeed eager to listen to proposals which bear upon these matters. I
would, if I may, Chief Justice, extend an invitation to all here to com-
municate with me at the Attorney-General’s Department if they have any
. particular ideas about delays in criminal law and indeed about criminal law
reform generally. I will do my best to delay too long in replying to any such
communication.
W. R. Wheeler, Clerk of Petty Sessions, Newtown, and Chamber
Magistrate
The seminar is titled “Problems of Delay in Criminal Proceedings"
and we have heard papers from members of the legal profession, but the
question I would like to ask is “Which of you gentlemen has had any formal
administrative training?". lt is my view that a great cause of‘delay in the
proceedings is in the Justice Department itself with the administrators. l
administer one small part of this system and yet ten years of my life have
been spent learning the law, l4 months was spent trying to practise it at the
Public Solicitor’s Office, and I am now administering it. We have a turn-
over at Newtown that a small businessman would be proud of — it runs into
millions of dollars. We have a brilliant debt recovery service yet I hear
tonight that my Department has commissioned a study by an American firm
into management procedure. We look for better trained methods in the
Department, and for better opportunities to discuss matters such as this
with other people in the Department.
ls there really a problem? I have not heard of a defendant ever saying
“This has gone on too long". The defendant of a once only crime kept in
custody will complain, but I would like to hear his views. I have not heard
them tonight.
Sergeant 0. Taylor
One thing that distrcsses me and a lot of my colleagues is the stringent
length lawyers, judges, magistrates, and other people go to protect the evil
person in our society. There are 9,000 policemen in this State and the
majority of them do a conscientious and most unrewarding service. Our
Chief Justice had some rather unique words to say about the policemen in
this State in the case of R. v. Darrell Joseph Burke in the Court ofCriminal
Appeal (No. 133 of 1978) and l atn proud of his expressions. We have a
good reputation with our Chief Justice and a good police service, but I am
still amazed at the length some people will go to protect criminals.
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